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Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
Despite their increasing complexity, financial markets’ fundamental purpose remains un-
changed: the aggregation of decentralized information about uncertain prospects in order to
enable optimal resource allocations and efficient risk sharing. As demonstrated by the financial
crisis from 2007 to 2008, financial markets’ well-functioning is more fragile than was generally
believed. Moreover, from a European perspective, the subsequent and still ongoing sovereign
debt crisis has called for unconventional monetary policy measures, whose unprecedented conse-
quences on financial risks and real investments are currently unfolding. Overall, the recent past
has reminded economists about the importance of a better understanding of how financial mar-
kets perform their economically important role and how sensitive they react to an increasingly
complex environment.
The presented dissertation comprises four independent chapters. Each chapter represents one
research paper written either in co-authorship or by myself over the course of my PhD at the
University of Zurich. The four chapters span a wide vertical intersection of financial economics,
ranging from a laboratory market experiment about trading complex risks, to derivatives mar-
kets’ information processing role, to new sovereign debt instruments in response to persistently
high sovereign debt levels. However, they all are centered on financial markets’ evaluation and
redistribution of uncertainty.
In Chapter 1, Trading Complex Risks, I experimentally study how heterogeneous investors
price and share complex risks in a complete Walrasian market. I distinguish ‘complex’ from
‘simple’ risks in that the former refers to a situation in which agents only possess imperfect
information about the underlying objective probabilities. Although this arguably corresponds to
a specific notion of complexity, it naturally extends to financial markets’ inherent uncertainty.
Moreover, this probabilistic definition of complexity differs from what decision theorists usually
refer to as ‘ambiguity’, where the underlying distribution is not objectively defined. A complete
Walrasian market is chosen as it allows for the most simple benchmark comparison to the seminal
asset pricing theory by Debreu (1959) and Arrow (1964): in the absence of complexity, risks
should be perfectly shared among risk-averse agents and only aggregate risk is priced.
My experimental design consists of two components: (i) an experimental asset market, where
subjects can trade either simple or complex risks, and (ii) a treatment which confronts subjects
with the latter. Regarding (i), I closely follow Biais et al. (2017), whose asset market essen-
tially corresponds to a Walrasian auction. Specifically, every buyer (seller) is provided with a
predefined price vector, where, for every element of the vector, they are asked to specify the
asset quantity they want to trade. The aggregated supply and demand curves are then crossed
to determine market-clearing prices and quantities. By additionally introducing trading rounds
3
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with random price draws, potential deviations due to the absence of perfect competition can be
controlled for. Regarding (ii), I carefully design a two-sided complexity treatment that satisfies
the following conditions: (a) it comprehensibly visualizes the asset’s underlying payoff distribu-
tion, (b) it leaves no doubt about the problem’s objective nature, and (c) it is complex enough
to prevent (most) subjects from solving it analytically.
Before analyzing the experimental data, I develop a theoretical framework that allows for
clear-cut predictions regarding individual trading behavior under both simple and complex risks.
For simple risks, I generalize the predictions by Biais et al. (2017) with respect to the underlying
probability distribution, however, this requires me to restrict my analysis to expected utility
theory.1 For complex risks, I analyze individual trading behavior in the presence of complexity-
induced multiple priors, while allowing for both kinked and smooth preferences towards the fact
that the true underlying payoff distribution is unknown.
In the absence of aggregate risk, for every agent there must exist a trading strategy such that
she is perfectly hedged against future consumption risk. In brief, my theoretical analysis implies
that, assuming agents dislike complexity, individual as well as aggregated supply and demand
are less price sensitive for complex than simple risks, as agents become more reluctant to deviate
from their perfect hedging strategy. Intuitively, if risks are complex, risk-averse agents not only
want demand compensation for the risk they are bearing from not playing their perfect hedging
strategy, but also for the uncertainty about the actual riskiness of not being perfectly hedged.
At the market level, the experimental data strongly conveys theory’s prediction that com-
plexity (locally) reduces supply and demand price sensitivity. In other words, subjects, on
average, trade as theory predicts when presuming agents are complexity-averse. In equilibrium,
complex risks are generally mispriced, but equally well shared as simple risks. At the individual
level, complexity induces more mistakes in subjects’ decision making, where mistakes are defined
as actions that are strictly dominated according to the theory.
Comparing frequencies and distributions of dominated actions under simple and complex
risks, I find that subjects’ increasingly noisy trading behavior under the latter can be explained
by random choice models. Strikingly, as the number of subjects is increased, this noise cancels
out, generating theory-consistent risk allocations in equilibrium. Overall, markets’ effectiveness
in aggregating individual beliefs about complex risks is determined by the trade-off between
reduced price sensitivity and increased noise levels in decision making. However, even under
severe complexity-induced bounds to rationality, markets prove remarkably efficient in pric-
ing complex risks. Beyond binding limits to rationality, this quality is eventually lost, while,
strikingly, market’s risk sharing qualities remain largely unimpaired.
Chapter 2, Risk and Return around the Clock, co-authored with Alexandre Ziegler, investi-
gates around-the-clock price discovery for several benchmark assets from the main asset classes
equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities. Based on high-frequency data, i.e., five-minute in-
tervals, on futures contracts with recently extended trading hours, we study those assets’ precise
1In contrast, the imposed symmetry in Biais et al.’s (2017) design allows for a more general model of individual
behavior, i.e., by only imposing the absence of first order stochastically dominated actions.
5risk and return distributions over the 24-hour trading day.2
Our sample consists of 13 very liquid contracts, i.e., the daily volume in the front-month
contract alone generally exceeds 100,000 contracts. For equities, we focus on the S&P 500,
EuroStoxx 50, and Nikkei futures; for bonds on the 10-year US Treasury Note, 10-year German
Bund, and 10-year Japanese Bond futures; for currencies on the EUR/USD and JPY/USD
futures; and for commodities on theWest Texas Intermediate and Brent oil, as well as on the gold,
silver, and high-grade copper futures. Besides longer trading hours relative to their underlying
cash markets, futures contracts are particularly well-suited for analyzing price discovery due to
their unified market organization and few regulatory restrictions, e.g., no short-selling constraints
by construction.
We show that sizeable price discovery occurs around the clock. For a given asset, its risk-
return distribution is fairly similar throughout the 24-hour trading day, indicating a broadly
constant risk-return relationship. Although, the amount of price discovery varies significantly
both during the day and across assets, relative price and variance contribution usually move hand
in hand, suggesting an efficient information aggregation around the clock. In general, efficiency is
higher during an asset’s main (home) market hours. Nonetheless, we document short periods of
inefficient price discovery, where relative price contribution leads relative variance contribution
(JPY/USD) or vice versa (S&P 500).
For all assets, we document strong intraday volatility patterns, where the exact shapes of
these patterns vary considerably across assets. Strikingly, US equities’ well-known U-shaped
intraday volatility pattern is absent for most assets. The release of US macroeconomic news
not only strongly affects US equities, US treasuries, and USD related exchange rates, but the
majority of other assets as well. Generally, assets’ volatility is higher during US trading hours,
but also strongly pronounced during different periods of the 24-hour trading day. When decom-
posing intraday volatility into its diffusion and jump components, we find that both risk types
are crucial drivers of intraday volatility patterns. Moreover, jumps substantially contribute to
total volatility levels: On average, jump risk accounts for approximately 5% to 13% of daily
realized variance.
Furthermore, we observe that average volume-volatility relationships often break at jump
times. This points to falling market depth in response to traders’ anticipation of large price
moves at times of scheduled news announcements. Overall, our results emphasize the importance
of around-the-clock trading for modern financial markets’ efficient price discovery.
Similar to Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Multimarket Informed Trading and Risk Aversion, also
considers derivative contracts, but this time in a multimarket setting. Specifically, I study agents’
trading behavior in the presence of asymmetric information, when the underlying risk can either
be traded in the stock or in the options market. In general, the mechanism of how dispersed
information is incorporated into prices of inherently linked assets that trade on different markets
is crucial for the understanding of asset markets’ information aggregation role.
2For most futures contracts, the extended trading hours range from 00:00 to 23:15 Central European Time.
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In contrast to the literature, I assume informed traders to be heterogeneously risk-averse
and only imperfectly informed about a future jump risk. Within a sequential trading model, I
investigate the triangular trade-off between leverage, market depth, and risk in informed traders’
choice of their preferred trading venue. In order to prevent no-trading equilibria, I adopt the
literature’s standard assumption of exogenously arriving liquidity traders.
In this setting, a rational expectation equilibrium needs to satisfy two conditions: (i) com-
petitive market makers’ price quotes have to leave them with zero profits in expectation, and (ii)
given these quotes, informed traders’ choice of trading venue must align with market makers’
conjectures. A semi-separating equilibrium is reached whenever informed traders are separated
between the two markets in such a way that both (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously. Due to
their asymmetric payoff profile, trading options is more risky than trading the stock. Hence,
in a semi-separating equilibrium, informed option traders are relatively more risk-averse than
informed stock traders.
My numerical analysis demonstrates that, in the presence of heterogeneously risk-averse
informed traders, a semi-separating equilibrium constitutes the robust outcome of the model.
Moreover, as market makers’ perception of adverse selection risk increases, so does the proportion
of informed stock trading. However, the sensitivity of this relationship becomes smaller, as
the probability of informed trading augments. In contrast to the risk-neutral benchmark, the
relative amount of informed stock trading is always higher under a semi-separating equilibrium.
Intuitively, risk-averse traders are less reluctant to forgo a given leverage advantage in return
for a lower payoff risk. Unsurprisingly, if the stock market becomes more liquid, the amount of
informed stock trading in equilibrium rises.
Since post-announcement returns of M&A target firms provide a nice fit with my model’s
underlying stock dynamics, I test its predictions by analyzing those firms’ pre-deal announcement
stock and options trading data. As predicted by the model, the relative amount of abnormal
stock volume (vs. relative abnormal options volume) is increasing in the overall proportion of
abnormal trading volume. Moreover, the data clearly rejects a linear in favor of a concave
relationship. This is in line with the prediction that fewer informed traders switch from the
options to the stock market as their relative presence increases.
Chapter 4, Indebtedness, Interests, and Incentives: State-contingent Sovereign Debt Re-
visited, co-authored with Andrin Bögli, has a somewhat different focus. By introducing new
refinancing instruments for highly indebted sovereigns, it takes a macroeconomic perspective
on financial markets. Compared to the variability of asset prices, macroeconomic risks can be
considered rather small, i.e., with an average standard deviation of the growth rate lying around
3% per annum (see, e.g., Lucas (1987)). Due to these relatively low fluctuations in GDP, gov-
ernments can accumulate substantial amounts of public debt during normal times. However,
in the presence or rare growth disasters, such as the financial-crisis-induced ‘Great Recession’,
such debt levels may become unsustainable.
This final chapter begins with the observation that, despite its most severe effects have
abated, the preconditions for a recrudescence of the sovereign debt crisis still persist to date:
7vast public debt-to-GDP levels in many European countries. In this context, we first refer to
the European Central Bank (ECB)’s most effective crisis mitigation policy, i.e., its ‘Outright
Monetary Transactions’ program (OMT). We argue that OMT’s conditional guarantee, i.e.,
to buy unlimited amounts of distressed sovereign bonds in order to align their yields with
fundamentals, can be interpreted as an implicit put option for highly indebted governments
written by the ECB. However, soon after its announcement, concerns were raised that OMT’s
implicit put option fails to internalize risk sharing costs and could therefore lead to undesirable
risk redistribution effects among Eurozone member states.3 Based on these concerns, we propose
two state-contingent refinancing alternatives to OMT, both temporary in nature and designed
to provide indebted governments with more space for a feasible deleveraging.
First, motivated by OMT’s inherent insurance mechanism, we consider puttable bonds, where
investors have the right, upon default, to put their claims with a third party (e.g., an intergov-
ernmental agency such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)) in return for the bonds
principal plus accrued interests. This explicit insurance mechanism effectively turns puttable
bonds into a risk-free investment, hence, paying investors only the risk-free rate. However, in
sharp contrast to OMT, a government willing to issue puttable bonds has to ex-ante compensate
the insurance-providing third party by paying the latter the premium of the bonds’ embedded
put option.
In the absence of default costs, we show that Merton’s (1974) equivalence result holds: The
risk-adjusted spread on standard sovereign debt equals puttable debt’s embedded put premium.
Hence, if a government does not face default specific costs, it is exactly indifferent between
issuing standard or puttable bonds. However, under the issuance of puttable debt, sovereign
default probabilities decrease due to its lower interest charges. Therefore, whenever default is
costly, the attractiveness of puttable debt depends on the resulting reduction in expected default
costs.
Second, based on the well-known proposal of GDP-linked bonds, we propose what we call
‘GDR bonds’, i.e., bonds whose interests are contingent on a country’s current GDP-to-debt
ratio (GDR) and hence inversely related to its relative indebtedness. Compared to puttable
debt, GDR bonds allow for consumption smoothing, as their cyclical interest charges provide
the issuing government with more fiscal leeway when growth, and therefore its tax income,
declines. In contrast to standard GDP-linked bonds, a sustainable but credible deleveraging
commitment allows for a competitive risk-return profile of GDR bonds, even in the face of
pessimistic growth outlooks. This is a direct implication of GDP growth’s low volatility.4
In order to compare state-contingent debt’s welfare implications relative to standard sovereign
debt, we conduct an empirical case study involving the five Eurozone countries most heavily af-
fected by the debt crisis: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. We ensure the validity
of Merton’s (1974) equivalence result by calibrating country-specific default costs. In the pres-
3The constitutional complaints of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany against OMT’s compliance
with EU law were rejected by the European Court of Justice in 2015 (source: judgment of the court in case
C-62/14, June 16, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/).
4At this point, I refer to the discussion of GDR bonds’ calibrated Sharpe ratios in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4.
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ence of a risk-averse representative agent, we find the counter-cyclical fiscal leeway induced by
GDR bonds to dominate puttable bonds’ interest savings and (more pronounced) reduction in
expected default costs. We conclude our analysis by discussing implied deleveraging incentives,
limited commitment, and practical implementation issues for GDR bonds.
In summary, my dissertation adds to the understanding of financial markets’ fundamental
information aggregation and risk sharing mechanism in three particular contexts: (i) if risks are
complex, i.e., if agents only possess imperfect information about the traded asset’s objective
payoff distribution, (ii) when asset markets’ information processing role is extended to practi-
cally allow around the clock trading, and (iii) under the presence of asymmetric information
in a multimarket setting involving a stock and an options market. Finally, the last chapter
provides some novel insights regarding potential welfare improvements from making relatively
lower macroeconomic risks tradeable via GDR bonds.
Probably the most characterizing feature of this dissertation is its combination of empirical
and theoretical methods applied to experimental, high-frequency, as well as macroeconomic data
in the study of financial markets. As every chapter presents one research paper, their accessibility
via selective reading is ensured. Nevertheless, I hope readers will share my fascination for the
manifoldness of financial economics, which I was allowed to discover during the challenging but
very rewarding journey of my PhD. The structure of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Part II comprises the herein previewed chapters. Part III contains the complete bibliography,
and my curriculum vitae is provided in Part IV.
Part II
Research Papers
9

1 Trading Complex Risks
Complex risks differ from simple risks in that agents facing them only possess imperfect
information about the underlying objective probabilities. This paper studies how complex
risks are priced by and shared among heterogeneous investors in a Walrasian market. I
apply decision theory under ambiguity to derive robust predictions regarding the trading
of complex risks in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. I test these predictions in
the laboratory. The experimental data provides strong evidence for theory’s predicted
reduction in subjects’ price sensitivity under complex risks. While complexity induces
more noise in individual trading decisions, market outcomes remain theory-consistent.
This striking feature can be reconciled with a random choice model, where the bounds
on rationality are reinforced by complexity. When moving from simple to complex risks,
equilibrium prices become more whereas risk allocations become less sensitive to noise
introduced by imperfectly rational subjects. Markets’ effectiveness in aggregating beliefs
about complex risks is determined by the trade-off between reduced price sensitivity and
reinforced bounded rationality. Moreover, my results imply that complexity has similar
but more pronounced effects on market outcomes than ambiguity induced by conventional
Ellsberg urns.
1.1 Introduction
Financial markets have incurred a dramatic increase in complexity over the past decades. Suc-
cessive market integration and ongoing financial innovation both have expanded and complicated
the universe of tradable risks. The soaring levels of securitized contingent claims, a prominent
example of the latter, are generally believed to have catalyzed what eventually turned into
the Great Recession.1 Meanwhile, the implications of this rising complexity in traded assets’
inherited risk structure are still poorly understood.
Alongside information aggregation, financial markets’ essential raison d’être is their efficiency
in allocating tradable risks to those with the highest risk bearing capacities. Efficient risk
sharing is, however, not prevailing unconditionally in such markets. Greenwald and Stiglitz
I am indebted to my advisor Marc Chesney for his support and guidance. I thank Peter Bossaerts,
Markus Brunnermeier, Claire Célérier, Sylvain Chassang, Sebastian Dörr, Thierry Foucault, Andreas Fuster,
Cars Hommes, Philipp Illeditsch, Chad Kendall, Carsten Murawski, Martin Schonger, Nicolas Treich, Roberto
Weber, Alexandre Ziegler, and participants at the TSE Finance Workshop and the University of Zurich PhD
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(1986) show that when either information is imperfect or markets are incomplete, competitive
market allocations are generally not constrained Pareto efficient.
In this paper I study how ‘complex risks’ are priced by and shared among heterogeneous
agents. In contrast to simple risks, I regard a given asset’s payoff distribution as complex, if
agents only possess imperfect information about the underlying objective probabilities. Starting
from a complete market, I focus on the role of imperfect information on the pricing and sharing
of tradable risks when aggregate endowments are constant. I thus deliberately abstract from
financial innovation’s potential market completion effects in order to highlight complexity’s
informational role on market efficiency.2
My analysis rests on two integral parts: First, within a simple economy without aggregate
uncertainty, I analyze competitive trading of both simple and complex risks via a complete
Walrasian market. In order to account for complexity effects on agents’ trading behavior, I
apply decision theory under ambiguity, equivalently often referred to as Knightian uncertainty
(Knight, 1921). Second, by conducting a laboratory experiment, I test the derived clear-cut
predictions empirically.
Given market completeness, the absence of aggregate risk implies the existence of individual
trading strategies that leave agents perfectly hedged against future consumption risk. Relying
on ambiguity theory, I show that, for complexity-averse agents, competitive supply and demand
become less price sensitive under complex risks, as agents become more reluctant to deviate from
their perfect hedging strategy. This is intuitive: If risks are complex, the agents not only demand
compensation for the risk they are bearing from not playing their perfect hedging strategy, but
also for the uncertainty about the actual riskiness induced by such an action.
Experimental asset market equilibria corroborate complexity aversion-implied trading be-
havior, i.e., I find complexity to (locally) reduce supply and demand price elasticity. At the
market level, complex risks are generally mispriced, but equally well shared relative to simple
risks. At the individual level, complexity causes more mistakes in subjects’ trading decisions,
where mistakes are defined as adopting strictly dominated strategies as implied by theory.
A comparison of both frequencies and distributions of dominated actions under simple and
complex risks confirms that subjects’ trading strategies become increasingly noisy under the
latter. Strikingly, as the number of subjects becomes larger, this noise cancels out in equilibrium
and theory-consistent risk allocations prevail. This can be explained by a random choice model,
where the relative likelihood of a given action is increasing in its ambiguity theory-based utility.
Overall, markets’ effectiveness in aggregating individual beliefs about complex risks is de-
termined by the trade-off between reduced price sensitivity and increased severity of bounded
2In reality, most markets, including those for financial assets, can hardly be characterized as being complete
in a static sense, i.e., in the absence of retrading opportunities. Hence, the financial innovation industry’s touted
services towards market completion have to be evaluated against dynamic completeness as developed in Kreps
(1982) and Duffie and Huang (1985). Assuming dynamic completeness, the existence of a Radner equilibrium
(Radner, 1972) crucially depends on agents’ ability of perfect foresight, i.e., to perfectly forecast today all future
prices depending on information revealed tomorrow. Asparouhove et al. (2016) experimentally show how the
inability of perfect foresight can cause considerable deviations from equilibrium prices. Thus, one reasonable
concern implied by the increasing complexity of traded risks is that agents lacking the required resources to fully
understand their complicated nature may fail to correctly forecast future price movements.
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rationality (more dominated actions). Accounting for subjective beliefs, I find that, despite rein-
forced bounds to rational behavior, markets prove remarkably effective in pricing complex risks.
Beyond binding limits to rationality, their information aggregation is impaired, while optimal
risk sharing still prevails. Finally, my results indicate that complex risks have similar but more
pronounced implications on market outcomes than ambiguity induced by conventional Ellsberg
urns.
In contrast to a situation with known payoff distributions, complexity is introduced by
providing subjects instead with the formal definition of the underlying process in addition to
a dynamic visualization of its past trajectory. Thus, the presence of complex risks requires
subjects to deductively determine traded assets’ payoff distributions by processing complex
information. The advantage of this implementation is the simple structure of the complicated but
yet well-defined problem at heart. In fact, it requires solving a stochastic differential equation,
which, although technically doable by hand, turns out to be infeasible for the vast majority of
subjects.3 However, the problem’s simple formulation together with the visualized information
of one random realization allows one to appraise—with more or less certainty—the apparently
objective underlying risk.
In summary, the term complexity will henceforth refer to a complete Walrasian market for a
risky asset whose true payoff distribution is not known with certainty, thereby imposing complex
risks on utility maximizing traders. Although this notion of complexity is arguably specific, it
naturally extends to real world financial markets’ inherent purpose of multidimensional risk
sharing.4
In the absence of perfect information, subjects possess a more or less precise estimate of the
relevant payoff distribution, i.e., are faced with a smaller or wider set of possible priors. Consid-
ering the imperfection of the available information, “it would be irrational for an individual who
has poor information about her environment to ignore this fact and behave as though she were
much better informed” (Epstein and Schneider, 2010, p. 5). Trading decisions under complex
risks are henceforth analyzed by applying two seminal ambiguity models in financial economics:
a generalization of the multiple-priors model by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and the smooth
ambiguity model by Klibanoff et al. (2005). While the former implies kinked ambiguity prefer-
ences, the later allows for smooth ambiguity effects.
The intuition behind both models is simple. If agents are averse to perceived ambiguity, they,
ceteris paribus, prefer to avoid being exposed to imperfectly understood risks. When starting
3This is not surprising given the means at hand and the limited time available during the experiment. Pre-
senting subjects with an obviously solvable but complicated problem represents the design’s integral treatment.
4There is a vast scientific literature on various notions of (financial) complexity. In computer science and ma-
chine learning one distinguishes, e.g., between computational complexity (required resources), sample complexity
(minimum number of draws), and Kolmogorov complexity (minimum descriptive length) of problem solving. The
herein considered form of complexity is somewhat different in that it directly relates to the analysis of pricing
and risk sharing in a financial market. Interestingly enough, recent contributions in decision science provide
evidence for commonalities between the human brain and computer algorithms solving and reacting to problems
with varying levels of complexity (see, e.g., Bossaerts and Murawski (2016)).
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from a zero ambiguity exposure, this leads to a no-trade interval.5 For nonzero initial endow-
ments in the risky asset, as pointed out by Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992), engaging in trade
is generally still optimal. In my model economy, incentives to trade stem from nontradable but
hedgeable consumption risk. In short, under both models, agents’ price sensitivity of their per-
fect hedging strategy decreases in the presence of complex risks. Intuitively, being completely
hedged insures agents not only against risk but also against potential complexity-induced ambi-
guity. The main difference between the two models lies in their implied conditions for mispricing.
Within the smooth ambiguity model, incorrect beliefs immediately impact equilibrium prices,
whereas this does not unconditionally hold for the multiple-priors model. Overall, my empirical
evidence speaks in favor of kinked preferences as embedded in the latter.
The merits of taking the study of how individual decision making aggregates to market
outcomes to the lab are manifold. First, by design, the lab easily allows for the construction
of a complete market. Moreover, the experimenter can exercise full control over each market
participants’ information set and how their individual decisions interact towards equilibrium.
Second, the laboratory environment offers the unique virtue of measuring subjects’ beliefs, in
particular their expectations, which most often constitutes an impossibility when confronted
with real world data. Third, treatment effects under investigation can be analyzed in isolation,
while controlling for any kind of endogeneity concerns. Thus, the lab enables a direct comparison
between simple versus complex risks, while comparing the latter to the ‘pure ambiguity’ case
usually associated with Ellsberg’s (1961) urn experiment. Once the unobservability of expec-
tations and the inability to monitor strategic uncertainty underlying field data are taken into
serious account, the advantages of full laboratory control become evident.
My design directly builds on the experimental setup proposed by Biais et al. (2017). Relying
on a two-state world with two nonredundant assets (a risk-free bond and a risky stock), it
offers the simplest possible setting to test the seminal general equilibrium theory by Debreu
(1959) and Arrow (1964). Controlling for subjects competitive behavior, Biais et al. (2017) find
market outcomes to be consistent with the theory of complete and perfect markets: On average,
(simple) risk is perfectly shared and only aggregate risk is priced. Therefore, Biais et al.’s
(2017) parameter-free test of the most fundamental asset pricing theory constitutes the ideal
benchmark upon which the trading of simple and complex risks can be compared.6 Moreover,
its simple market-clearing pricing scheme based on individual supply and demand functions can
be controlled for any kind of strategic uncertainty. This constitutes an impracticality in the
context of the continuous double auction that is normally used in experimental asset market
studies.
This paper relates to three distinctive strands of the literature. First, a growing literature
investigates the drivers and implications of financial complexity both from a theoretical as well
5For example, this phenomenon serves Dimmock et al. (2016) in explaining known household portfolio puzzles,
e.g., the equity home bias.
6For their most general predictions, Biais et al. (2017) only rely on first order stochastic dominance. When al-
lowing for deviations from their symmetric payoff distribution, my analysis assumes expected utility maximization
instead.
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as an empirical perspective. Ellison (2005) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) demonstrate theo-
retically that inefficient levels of financial complexity can prevail in a competitive equilibrium.
Carlin (2009) finds that financial complexity is an increasing function in the degree of compe-
tition among financial institutions. Carlin and Manso (2011) show how educational initiatives
aiming to foster financial literacy may eventually cause welfare diminishing obfuscation, i.e., the
strategic acceleration of complexity by financial service providers in order to preserve industry
rents (see Ellison and Ellison (2009)). From an investor’s view, Brunnermeier and Oehmke
(2009) discuss three different ways to deal with complexity: (i) applying separation results, (ii)
relying on models, or (iii) via standardization. Arora et al. (2011) illustrate how the usage of
computationally complex derivatives may worsen asymmetric information costs.
Célérier and Vallée (2017) empirically test the implications of the Carlin (2009) model and
indeed find complexity to be increasing in issuer competition. Furthermore, several studies an-
alyze the steadily growing market for complex securities, in particular their pricing, historical
performance, as well as the characteristics of the involved issuers and investors (Henderson and
Pearson (2011), Ghent et al. (2014), Griffin et al. (2013), Sato (2014), and Amromin et al.
(2011)). Relying on expected utility theory, Hens and Rieger (2008) moreover reject the often
claimed market completing effect of structured products. In summary, there exists both theoret-
ical and accumulating empirical evidence that financial institutions rely on a continuing increase
in complexity to shield industry rents from competitors and learning by investors rather than
to create higher quality products. My paper complements this literature by investigating rising
complexity’s implications on agents’ trading behavior.
Second, the herein presented analysis naturally relates to experimental studies on trading
ambiguous or complex assets. Implementing a continuous double auction of state-contingent
claims based on an Ellsberg urn, Bossaerts et al. (2010) analyze how subjects’ ambiguity aversion
affects asset prices and final portfolio holdings. Similar to the no-trade result, they find that,
for certain subsets of prices, ambiguity-averse agents prefer to hold nonambiguous portfolios.
Furthermore, Bossaerts et al. (2010) show how, in the presence of aggregate risk, sufficiently
ambiguity-averse investors indirectly impact asset prices by altering the per capita risk to be
shared among marginal investors.
Carlin et al. (2013) study how computational complexity alters bidding behavior in a de-
terministic environment.7 They find higher complexity to increase volatility, lower liquidity,
and decrease trade efficiency, i.e., to reduce gains from trade. Moreover, Carlin et al. (2013)
provide evidence that, additional to any noise arising from estimation errors, traders’ bidding
strategies are influenced by a complexity-induced adverse selection problem. Intuitively, given
traders’ private values of the tradable asset are affiliated, the fear of winner’s curse, i.e., to
systematically lose by trading against a better informed counterparty, leads traders to submit
more conservative ask and bid quotes.
Asparouhove et al. (2015) show how ambiguity preferences can explain asset prices under
7In the experimental design by Carlin et al. (2013) participants trade different assets whose values have to
be determined deductively by solving systems of linear equations, where the authors differentiate between simple
and complex computational problems.
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asymmetric reasoning. They consider a continuous double auction of arrow securities, where,
midway through the auction, agents are confronted with an involved updating problem regard-
ing the relative likelihood of the underlying states.8 In line with Fox and Tversky’s (1995)
comparative ignorance proposition, Asparouhove et al. (2015) argue that agents perceive irrec-
oncilable post-updating market prices as ambiguous. Hence, if ambiguity-averse, agents who
apply incorrect reasoning become price-insensitive. Consistent with ambiguity aversion, the
more price-sensitive agents there exist, the less severe is the experimentally documented mis-
pricing.
Third, this paper also relates to an emerging literature comparing individuals’ preferences
towards pure Ellsberg-like ambiguity and complex risk(s), where, as in this paper, the latter
is uniquely defined by an objective probabilistic structure. The findings in Halevy (2007) give
support to a close relation between individuals’ ability to correctly reduce compound lotteries and
their attitudes to pure ambiguity. The vast majority of subjects (95%) who failed to disentangle
compound objective lotteries, displayed nonambiguity-neutral behavior.
In their recent paper, Armantier and Treich (2016) provide strong empirical evidence for “a
tight link between attitudes toward ambiguity and attitudes toward complex risk” (Armantier
and Treich, 2016, p. 5). In their ambiguity treatment, subjects are confronted with lotteries
whose outcomes depend on draws from an opaque Ellsberg urn, while complex risks are repre-
sented by lotteries that get settled by simultaneous draws from multiple transparent urns. Based
on estimated certainty equivalents for both lottery types, Armantier and Treich (2016) elicit am-
biguity as well as complex risk premiums. They find a strong positive correlation between the
two premiums across subjects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model econ-
omy and develops the necessary theory for generating predictions about trading both simple
and complex risks. Section 1.3 describes the experimental design and confronts the theoretical
predictions with the data. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Theory
This section introduces the model economy for which I thereafter study individual trading be-
havior conditional on agents’ information quality. If risks are simple, implications of varying
risk-preferences are analyzed within the classical framework of expected utility. In contrast, if
risks are complex, individual preferences are adjusted to account for their imperfect information.
The first case provides a clear-cut benchmark to which complexity-induced implications can be
compared to.
8The updating task in Asparouhove et al.’s (2015) experimental design is an adaptation of the famous ‘Monty
Hall problem’.
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1.2.1 Model
I start from the simple economy of Biais et al. (2017). In the two-period interpretation of this
trading economy, t ∈ {1, 2}, uncertainty gets resolved in the second period, where there are two
possible states of the world, Ω = {u, d}. The probability of reaching state u is denoted by pi,
i.e., P(ω=u) = pi and P(ω=d) = 1− pi, respectively. Contrary to Biais et al. (2017), I allow for
any nontrivial binary payoff distribution pi ∈ (0, 1).9 This generalization is crucial, given agents’
subjective probability estimates in the context of complex risks.
The economy offers access to a complete asset market, where shares of a risky asset (stock)
can be traded in exchange for units in the risk-free asset (numéraire). The stock pays a state-
dependent dividend X per share in t = 2, but nothing beforehand. The dividend fully transfers
the stock’s final value to shareholders, i.e., after payments have been made, all shares expire
worthless (no continuation value). Without loss of generality, it is assumed that X(u) > X(d).
The time difference between t = 1 and t = 2 is considered to be very short, allowing to abstract
from any time discounting. Therefore, in-between periods, the risk-free asset simply serves as
pure storage device (cash) that does not pay any interests.
There is an infinite number of agents populating the economy. I denote the unbounded set
of agents by I. Agent i ∈ I is endowed with nonnegative holdings in the risk-free asset Bi,
Si shares of the risky stock, and some state-contingent non-tradable income Ii(ω) paid out in
t = 2 only. Moreover, every agent belongs to one of two types, i.e., either she is allowed to buy
shares (potential buyer) or to sell them (potential seller). There exist as many buyers as sellers
and their respective endowments are identical within each type. Every agent only cares about
her utility of consumption Ci(ω) in t = 2, where consumption is given by the sum of the final
holdings in the risk-free asset, dividend payments, and nontradable income. In the first period,
potential buyers and sellers are able to trade shares via a call-market in order to maximize their
increasing utility from consumption Ui(Ci) in the second period.
Finally, agents’ state-contingent income is set to exactly offset the aggregate consumption
risk caused by the stock’s dividend payments. If aggregate endowments are constant, I show
that for risk-averse agents, the rational expectation equilibrium is independent from potentially
heterogeneous attitudes towards simple consumption risks. In particular, under simple risks,
the stock market-clearing price and quantity remain unaffected by the shape of agents’ utility
functions (Ui)i∈I . If, despite the income Ii(ω), aggregate risk prevailed, market equilibrium
would necessarily reflect agents’ (average) risk preferences.10
9Biais et al. (2017) only consider the symmetrical case, i.e., pi = 1/2. Imposing symmetry has the advantage
of delivering robust predictions even under the inapplicability of expected utility theory, i.e., by only assuming
the absence of first order stochastically dominated actions.
10Constantinides (1982) shows that if agents with different risk attitudes all maximize expected utility subject
to a common prior, equilibrium prices can always be rationalized in a representative agent framework. Hence, in
the absence of complex risks, market equilibrium can be explained by the risk preferences of this representative
agent.
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1.2.2 Trading Simple Risks: Expected Utility
In the presence of simple risks, since the value of pi is common knowledge, agents possess perfect
information regarding the stock’s payoff distribution. According to classical consumption-based
asset pricing theory, the stochastic discount factor then corresponds to the representative agent’s
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. In Biais et al.’s (2017) simple economy, with con-
sumption restricted to t = 2, expected utility theory implies an equilibrium stock price P equal
to the stock’s normalized expected payoff weighted by her marginal utilities across states.11
By choosing (Ii(ω))(i∈I) such that aggregate consumption risk vanishes, the interconnectedness
between P and marginal utilities disappears, allowing for predictions robust to any parameteri-
zation of any set of increasing utility functions (Ui)i∈I . The results in this subsection correspond
to generalizations of Biais et al. (2017) to values of pi 6= 1/2.
Recalling the two-state nature of the economy in t = 2, one can write agent i’s expected
utility from consumption as
E
[
Ui(Ci(ω))
]
= pi Ui(Ci(u)) + (1− pi)Ui(Ci(d))
= pi Ui
(
µi +
√
1− pi
pi
σi
)
+ (1− pi)Ui
(
µi −
√
pi
1− piσi
)
, (1.1)
where µi ≡ piCi(u)+(1−pi)Ci(d) and σ2i ≡ pi(1−pi) (Ci(u)− Ci(d))2. Thus, any agent’s expected
utility can be rewritten as a function of her expected consumption, the standard deviation of
consumption across states, and the probability pi.
In the absence of aggregate risk, i.e., if aggregate endowment across SiX(ω) and Ii(ω) is
constant, there must exist a tradable quantity Q̂ at which every seller and buyer is perfectly
hedged against any consumption risk in t = 2. If agents are risk-averse, i.e., whenever Ui is
strictly concave for every agent i, there exists a unique equilibrium for the call-market in t = 1.
Proposition 1.1. If Ui is differentiable and strictly concave ∀i ∈ I, and there exists a tradable
quantity Q̂ such that every seller and buyer is perfectly hedged, i.e., σi = 0,∀i ∈ I, then seller
i’s supply and buyer j’s demand curve for the risky asset have the unique intersection point
(E[X], Q̂),∀{i, j} ⊂ I.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A1.
11When deciding on her optimal trading strategy Q in t = 1, the representative agent solves the following
problem (where Q > 0 implies buying)
max
Q
E[Ui(Ci(ω))] s.t. Ci(ω) = (Si +Q)X(ω) + (Bi −QP ) + Ii(ω),
maximizing her expected utility from consumption in t = 2 subject to her budget constraint (neglecting any
borrowing constraints). Hence, the first order condition yields
P = E
[
U ′i(Ci(ω))
E[U ′i(Ci(ω))]
X(ω)
]
.
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The driving force behind Proposition 1.1 is the strict concavity of the utility functions, i.e.,
agents aversion to consumption risk. To see this, it is helpful to separately consider the shape
of both seller i’s supply and buyer j’s demand curve for the risky stock.
First, note that for a price equal to one share’s expected dividend, seller i’s expected con-
sumption in Eq. (1.1) is independent of the number of shares sold. Since seller i is risk-averse,
for P = E[X] she will therefore always decide to sell exactly Q̂ shares and thereby be perfectly
hedged against future fluctuations in consumption. However, for P < E[X] (P > E[X]) her
expected consumption only increases, if she sells less (more) than Q̂ shares. Because she is
only willing to incur risk, i.e., deviate from selling Q̂ shares, if appropriately compensated in
return, her supply curve must lie somewhere in the lower left and upper right quadrant of the
price-quantity space shown in Subfigure (a) of Figure 1.1.
Second, note that for P = E[X], similarly buyer j’s expected consumption in Eq. (1.1) is
independent of the number of shares bought. Given her risk-aversion, she chooses to buy exactly
Q̂ shares for P = E[X], and more (less) than Q̂ shares if P < E[X] (P > E[X]), as illustrated
in Subfigure (b) of Figure 1.1. Thus, when there is no aggregate risk, seller i’s supply and buyer
j’s demand curve exhibit the unique intersection point (E[X], Q̂) as depicted in Subfigure (c).
Interestingly enough, depending on the shape of Ui, a large opposite income effect can
dominate the corresponding substitution effect of a given price change. Hence, seller i’s supply
or buyer j’s demand curve can effectively be nonmonotonic within the respective dominating
quadrants of the PQ-plane. The following remark provides an example of a nonmonotonic
supply curve.
Remark 1.1. Suppose, seller i’s utility function is defined piecewise as follows
Ui(C) =
c1
C1−
1− , for 0 ≤ C ≤ C,
c2 − e−αC , for C ≤ C,
where α >  > 0 and  small, α > 0, and c1 and c2 are positive constants such that Ui
is differentiable ∀C ≥ 0. For certain parameter pairs (α, pi), seller i’s supply curve can be
nonmonotonic over a nonempty subset of P .
Proof. For proof see Appendix A1.
Figure D1.1 in the Appendix D1 shows an example of a nonmonotonic supply curve for similar
parameter values as in the actual experiment. The intuition for this exemplary nonmonotonicity
effect is simple. For every seller and any given Q, both C(d) and C(u) are strictly increasing in
P > 0. If prices are high enough, seller i’s higher CARA coefficient α, relevant for C(ω) > C,
can dominate her lower CRRA coefficient . Thus, for even higher prices, she is willing to bear
less and less risk, causing her supply curve to decrease until it eventually reaches Q̂, and thereby
completely eliminating her consumption risk.
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Figure 1.1. Trading equilibrium for simple risks
Notes: This figure shows the unique equilibrium for risk-averse agents in the absence of
aggregate consumption risk.
Absence of Risk Aversion
In case agents are not averse to consumption risk, for all P 6= E[X], an even stricter separation
between dominating and dominated strategies than shown in Figure 1.1 applies. From the proof
of Proposition 1.1 it directly follows that whenever Ui is either linear or convex, seller i always
strictly prefers to sell zero shares for P < E[X]. In contrast, for P > E[X], her expected utility
is maximized if and only if she sells her full initial endowment in shares. The symmetric behavior
applies to risk-neutral and risk-loving buyers, respectively.
For P = E[X], risk-neutral agents are indifferent between trading Q̂ shares or any other
quantity, whereas risk-loving agents are indifferent between trading zero shares or the maximum
number possible. In summary, as long as they do not consistently choose among their set of
indifferent strategies in an asymmetric manner, the equilibrium in Figure 1.1 remains unaffected
by a nonzero mass of nonrisk-averse agents.
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1.2.3 Trading Complex Risks: Heterogeneous Complexity Preferences
When agents’ information regarding the distribution of X(ω) is imperfect, I consider the associ-
ated consumption risk to be (more) complex. In the presence of such complex risks, rationality
in decision making requires some form of acknowledgment regarding the information’s inherent
degree of (im)precision. The literature provides a vast number of models intended to account
for individuals’ degree of confidence in their relative likelihood estimates. In the following, I
analyze individual trading of complex risks within two classes of seminal ambiguity models:
multiple-priors utility and the ‘smooth ambiguity’ model proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2005).
In the former, agents’ information quality has a ‘first order’ effect on their trading decision
(change in mean), whereas for the latter, lower information precision increases the total amount
of perceived ‘risk’ (see Epstein and Schneider (2010)). For multiple-priors utility, there exists a
direct mapping to rank-dependent expected utility, which I briefly discuss.
Multiple-priors Utility
Agents facing complex risks are unable to determine pi with certainty, but rather consider several
payoff distributions possible. Hence, intuitively, when making their trading decisions, they are
guided by a set of potential probability laws. I denote agent i’s subjective set of possible priors
on the state space Ω by Ci.
Based on this idea of multiple priors, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatize a multiple-
priors maxmin decision rule that assumes infinite ambiguity-aversion. In order to allow for a full
spectrum of ambiguity preferences, I employ the generalization proposed by Ghirardato et al.
(2004), the so-called α-maxmin model, instead. Assuming the set Ci of subjective priors to be
convex, agent i’s utility from consumption in t = 2 is then given by
Ui(Ci(ω)) = αi min
pi∈Ci
(
E
[
Ui(pi)
])
+ (1− αi) max
pi∈Ci
(
E
[
Ui(pi)
])
, (1.2)
where, as before, E
[
Ui(pi)
] ≡ pi Ui(Ci(u))+(1−pi)Ui(Ci(d)), Ui is a differentiable and strictly con-
cave utility function, and αi ∈ [0, 1]. First, note the straightforward interpretation of Eq. (1.2).
On the one hand, the cardinality or wideness of Ci measures agent i’s ambiguity perception:
The bigger her set of subjective priors, the more ambiguity she perceives. On the other hand,
her preferences towards ambiguity are expressed by αi: If αi > 1/2, she puts more weight on the
minimal expected utility, implying ambiguity-aversion. In contrast, if αi < 1/2 (αi = 1/2), then
she is ambiguity-loving (ambiguity-neutral). For their axiomatization, Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) assume maximal ambiguity-aversion, i.e., αi = 1. Second, whenever Ci is a singleton,
Eq. (1.2) reduces to Eq. (1.1) with subjective probability pii, i.e., Eq. (1.2) converges to sub-
jective expected utility as Ci → pii. For ease of notation, I furthermore rely on the following
definition:
Ei
[
X
]
:= αiEi
[
X
]
+ (1− αi)Ei
[
X
]
, (1.3)
where Ei
[
X
] ≡ Epii [X] with pii := arg min
pi∈Ci
µi(pi), and Ei
[
X
] ≡ Epii [X] with pii := arg max
pi∈Ci
µi(pi).
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Table 1.1. Agent types with multiple-pirors utility
beliefs about pi
correct (pi ∈ Bi) incorrect (pi 6∈ Bi)
ambiguity-averse yes (αi >
1/2) Type AC Type AI
no (αi ≤ 1/2) Type NC Type NI
Notes: In the presence of complexity-induced ambiguity, I distinguish between four different
types of agents with multiple-priors utility. Agent i can either be ambiguity-averse or does
not dislike ambiguity. Additionally, she can either apply correct or incorrect reasoning when
processing her imperfect information about pi.
When risks are complex, agents perceive ambiguity regarding the probability pi. In order
to analyze individual trading behavior within the α-maxmin model, a case-by-case analysis is
required, whereby agent i can behave differently from agent j in two dimensions: First, agent
i is either averse to (αi > 1/2) or not disliking (αi ≤ 1/2) perceived ambiguity. Second, she can
either have correct or incorrect beliefs about the true payoff probability pi. More precisely, I
classify agent i as having incorrect beliefs, if pi is not sufficiently close to the midpoint of her set
of priors, i.e., if pi 6∈ Bi ⊂ Ci, where Bi itself depends on her ambiguity-aversion:
Bi =
[piM −∆(2αi − 1), piM + ∆(2αi − 1)], for αi >
1
2 ,
piM for αi ≤ 12 ,
(1.4)
where piM denotes the midpoint of Ci with length (or maximum difference) 2∆. We note that
Bi → Ci as αi → 1 and Bi → piM as αi → 1/2. Table 1.1 summarizes the four possible
combinations of types.
Price Sensitivity
In order to deduce the effect(s) of complexity-driven ambiguity on agents’ trading behavior, the
different types presented in Table 1.1 have to be considered separately. I start with the first
row of Table 1.1. If aggregate endowments are constant, any risk-averse agent, as shown above,
prefers to trade exactly Q̂ shares for P = E[X]. Now, given their distaste for the perceived
ambiguity regarding pi, agents of type AC and AI eventually both prefer to trade Q̂ for prices
significantly different from E[X]. More precisely, for any given degree of risk-aversion, the subset
of prices for which they wish to be perfectly hedged against consumption risk is increasing in
both their ambiguity aversion and ambiguity perception.
Proposition 1.2. In the presence of perceived ambiguity and if there exists a tradable quantity
Q̂ such that σi = 0 ∀i ∈ I, then agents of types AC and AI exhibit constant supply or demand
curves over closed subsets of P . Their absolute price elasticity is a decreasing function in both
αi and the cardinality/length of Ci.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A1.
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In case of no aggregate risk, it holds for any seller i that pii < pii for Q < Q̂ and pii > pii
for Q > Q̂, respectively. Intuitively, if seller i is hedged against varying consumption by selling
exactly Q̂ shares, her expected consumption µi decreases in 1 − pii (pii) whenever she sells less
(more) than Q̂ shares. Analogously, for any buyer j it holds that pij > pij for Q < Q̂ and pij < pij
for Q > Q̂, respectively. These shifts in relative size of pii and pii around Q̂ in combination with
ambiguity-aversion are the driving force behind Proposition 1.2.
To foster the reader’s intuition, the result in Proposition 1.2 is illustrated in Figure 1.2
from the perspective of an ambiguity-averse seller—the analogous reasoning also applies to any
ambiguity-averse buyer. First, due to seller i’s risk-aversion, it can be shown (see proof of
Proposition 1.2) that for P = Ei[X], selling exactly Q̂ shares strictly dominates trading any
other quantity of the risky asset. Moreover, given Eq. (1.2), she is only willing to sell less than
Q̂ shares for prices strictly below Ei[X] (see proof of Proposition 1.2). This is illustrated in
Subfigure (a) of Figure 1.2. Analogously, seller i only agrees to sell more than Q̂ shares in
return for P > Ei[X] (see Subfigure (b)). Second, due to the above discussed order effect of pii
and pii, it follows that the lower price bound L in Subfigure (a) and the upper price bound U
in Subfigure (b) do not coincide. Therefore, putting everything together, the piecewise constant
supply curve depicted in Subfigure (c) prevails, where seller i’s supply of the risky asset is
constant over the closed subset [L,U ].
In comparison to the analysis under simple risks in Section 1.2.2, a nice and intuitive inter-
pretation of Proposition 1.2 emerges. Since agents of types AC and AI are averse to ambiguity,
selling or buying Q̂ shares becomes even more attractive compared to situations with objec-
tive payoff distributions. By trading exactly Q̂ units of the risky asset, agents are not only
able to avoid risk, but additionally to dispose any exposure to perceived ambiguity. Trading Q̂
shares hence simultaneously corresponds to the perfect hedging strategy against both risk and
ambiguity. In return for this dual insurance, agents are willing to forego potential gains from
trade.
I now turn to the second row in Table 1.1. For nonambiguity-averse agents, there are two
cases to be distinguished among. First, if αi equals 1/2, agent i is ambiguity-neutral. For a
seller with αi = 1/2, L and U in Figure 1.2 coincide, i.e., under complex risks, she behaves as a
subjective expected utility-maximizer. The analogous argument applies for an ambiguity-neutral
buyer. Second, if αi < 1/2, agent i is ambiguity-loving. The same reasoning as in the proof of
Proposition 1.2 implies that for an ambiguity-loving seller, it holds that L > U . Hence, when
risks are complex, there exists a certain price between U and L for which she is indifferent
between gaining exposure to ambiguity from selling less or more than Q̂ shares. At or precisely
beyond this threshold, her supply curve therefore exhibits a discontinuity, i.e., jumping from
strictly below to strictly above Q̂.12 For prices below and above the threshold, her supply
curve’s price elasticity increases in comparison to simple risks. Again, the analogous argument
can be made for an ambiguity-loving buyer.
12This can be interpreted as the natural counterpart of ambiguity-averse sellers’ piecewise flat supply curves.
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Figure 1.2. Supply curve of ambiguity-averse seller with multiple-priors
Notes: This figure shows the piecewise flat supply curve for complex risks implied by the
α-maxmin model (Eq. (1.2)) for a risk-averse and ambiguity-disliking seller i.
Mispricing and Suboptimal Risk Sharing
How complex risks are priced and shared in equilibrium, crucially depends on agents’ beliefs
regarding pi. If aggregate endowments are constant, the risky asset is mispriced whenever the
market-clearing price deviates from its expected dividend. Furthermore, the absence of aggregate
risk in combination with a complete market allows for perfect risk sharing. Hence, whenever the
market-clearing quantity (per capita) is different from Q̂, consumption risk is only suboptimally
shared among risk-averse agents. I therefore subsequently refer to the market-clearing price and
quantity for simple risks, i.e., (E[X], Q̂), as benchmark equilibrium.
Nonambiguity-loving agents (αi ≥ 1/2) with correct beliefs (pi ∈ Bi) never cause any mis-
pricing or incomplete risk sharing, simply because their supply or demand curves always go
through (see above) the benchmark equilibrium. Due to the jump of their supply (demand)
curve between U and L, an ambiguity-loving seller (buyer) almost surely never chooses to sell
(buy) Q̂ shares at P = E[X], independently of her beliefs regarding pi. While it is clear why
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Figure 1.3. Equilibrium analysis for complex risks under multiple-priors utility
Notes: For the α-maxmin model (Eq. (1.2)), this figure illustrates how ambiguity-averse
agents with incorrect beliefs can cause mispricing and suboptimal risk sharing of complex
risks in equilibrium (Proposition 1.3). Subfigure (a) shows three exemplary supply curves
of one ambiguity-neutral (type NC) and two ambiguity-averse (type AC and AI) sellers.
All exemplary buyers in Subfigure (b) are assumed to be nonambiguity-loving and to have
correct beliefs. Subfigure (c) finally shows, how the incorrect beliefs of seller AI cause
mispricing and incomplete risk sharing of complex risks in equilibrium. Due to the absence
of aggregate consumption risk, both distortions are unambiguously defined and measurable.
ambiguity-neutral agents with incorrect beliefs provoke mispricing and suboptimal risk shar-
ing, due to their piecewise constant supply and demand curves, this is, however, less clear for
ambiguity-averse agents whose Bi does not contain pi.
Proposition 1.3. In the presence of perceived ambiguity and if there exists a tradable quantity
Q̂ such that σi = 0 ∀i ∈ I, then any nonzero mass of type AI sellers (buyers) moves aggregate
supply (demand) away from the market equilibrium under simple risks.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A1.
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Figure 1.3 illustrates the mechanics behind Proposition 1.3 for the simplified case of only
three sellers and buyers, respectively. Subfigure (a) depicts the exemplary supply curves (for
a given discrete price grid) from three different sellers. Assuming type NC to be ambiguity-
neutral, she chooses—in line with her correct beliefs—to sell Q̂ shares for P = E[X]. Due
to type AC’s pronounced ambiguity-aversion, her supply curve is constant over a considerable
subset of prices (delimited by circles). Importantly, since pi ∈ BAC, its constant part still contains
the benchmark equilibrium. In contrast, the constant piece of type AI’s supply curve (delimited
by squares) does not include the point (E[X], Q̂). Hence, neither the length of CAI nor the
degree of her ambiguity-aversion αAI > 1/2 are sufficient to prevent that pi 6∈ BAI. Therefore,
based on incorrect beliefs, her supply draws the average supply curve (solid line) away from the
benchmark equilibrium.
For simplicity, all three buyers in Subfigure (b) are assumed to hold correct beliefs such that
their demand curves all contain the benchmark equilibrium. This ensures that any mispricing
and incomplete risk sharing in equilibrium is solely driven by the AI-type seller’s supply curve in
Subfigure (a). The solid line constitutes the resulting average demand curve. Finally, Subfigure
(c) depicts the market-clearing price P ? and quantity Q? (per capita) that corresponds to the
intersection of the average supply and demand curves. Due to seller AI’s underestimation of
pi, the market-clearing price is smaller than the stock’s expected dividend, implying mispricing
equal to |P ? − E[X]|. Furthermore, the average market-clearing quantity of shares is greater
than Q̂, i.e., in equilibrium, agents do not share complex risks perfectly.
Intuitively, Proposition 1.3 establishes a condition under which ambiguity-induced price in-
sensitivity is sufficiently large in order to offset any equilibrium effects of incorrect beliefs about
complex risks. Given the midpoint of agent i’s set of priors Ci, the more ambiguity-averse she is,
i.e., the larger her αi, the wider becomes the subset of payoff distributions Bi for which incorrect
beliefs do not cause any deviations from the benchmark equilibrium. Note that for any αi < 1,
the subset Bi in Eq. (1.4) is strictly smaller than Ci. Thus, as long as agent i is not maximally
ambiguity-averse, requiring the true payoff distribution pi to be contained in Ci is not sufficient
for precluding differences between simple and complex equilibria.
From Multiple-priors to Rank-dependent Expected Utility
Since the seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), cumulative prospect theory has be-
come the most prominent alternative to expected utility for modeling decision making under
uncertainty. Therefore, a reasonable question likely asked by the reader is the following: How
do trading decisions under complex risks from agents with rank-dependent utility differ from
the herein presented analysis? For binary acts, e.g., trading the above risky asset, Chateauneuf
et al. (2007) show that their proposed ‘neo-additive’ decision weights allow for a one-to-one cor-
respondence from αi and Ci in Eq. (1.2) to (i) a likelihood sensitivity index and (ii) a pessimism
(optimism) index as generally used in rank-dependent expected utility models.13
13In rank-dependent expected utility models, the likelihood sensitivity index measures the steepness of the
probability weighting function and the optimism (pessimism) index its intersection point with the 45-degree line.
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Smooth Ambiguity Preferences
Proposition 1.2’s somehow extreme result of (local) perfect price inelasticity is arguably linked
to the kinked preferences induced by the maxmin property of Eq. (1.2). In order to support
the generalizability of the result’s qualitative finding, I henceforth analyze individual trading
behavior under the ‘smooth ambiguity’ model by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Adopting the above
notation, agent i’s utility from consumption in t = 2 can then be written as
Ui(Ci(ω)) =
∫
∆(Ω)
φi
(
E
[
Ui(p˜i)
])
dµi(p˜i), (1.5)
where ∆(Ω) is the simplex of all possible payoff distributions on Ω, µi is agent i’s subjective
probability measure on ∆(Ω), and φi is a continuous, strictly increasing, real-valued function.
Eq. (1.5) has an intuitive interpretation: On the one hand, the more payoff distributions
exhibit a nonzero probability mass under µi, the bigger agent i’s set of possible priors. On the
other hand, the curvature of φi(·) expresses her ambiguity preferences: As for utility functions
in the presence of risk, concavity of φi(·) implies ambiguity-averse, linearity ambiguity-neutral,
and convexity ambiguity-loving preferences. Hence, similar to the α-maxmin model in Eq. (1.2),
the smooth ambiguity model allows for a separation between the level of ambiguity perceived
by agent i as well as her general preferences towards ambiguity per se. For ease of notation and
analog to Eq. (1.3), I rely on the following definition:
Ei[X] :=
∫
∆(Ω)
Ep˜i[X]dµi(p˜i), (1.6)
where Ep˜i[X] denotes the expected payoff of the risky asset based on P(ω=u) = p˜i and P(ω=d) =
1− p˜i, respectively.
Proposition 1.4. Let µi(p˜i) be the normalized Lebesgue measure on agent i’s set of possible
priors [pii, pii] ⊂ [0, 1], i.e., µi(p˜i) := 1/(pii − pii)dp˜i ∀p˜i ∈ [pii, pii]. In the presence of perceived
ambiguity and if there exists a tradable quantity Q̂ such that σi = 0 ∀i ∈ I, then
(i) agent i’s price elasticity is an increasing function in the second order derivative of φi(·).
(ii) any nonzero mass of sellers (buyers) for whom pii+pii2 6= pi moves aggregate supply (demand)
away from the benchmark equilibrium under simple risks.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A1.
As implied by the proof of Proposition 1.4, with utility as in Eq. (1.5), any agent’s supply
(demand) curve goes through (Q̂, Ei[X]). Thus, independently of her ambiguity preferences,
she always finds it optimal to sell (buy) Q̂ shares for a price P equal to her subjective expected
payoff per share given her subset of priors.
For prices below and above Ei[X], Figure 1.4 exemplary illustrates how imperfect infor-
mation about pi affects an ambiguity-averse seller’s supply curve. The demand curve for any
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Figure 1.4. Supply curve of ambiguity-averse seller with smooth preferences
Notes: This figure shows the decreased price elasticity of the supply curve for complex risks
implied by the smooth ambiguity model (Eq. (1.5)) for a risk-averse and ambiguity-disliking
seller i.
ambiguity-averse buyer behaves analogously. If, under complex risks, seller i dislikes any per-
ceived ambiguity regarding pi, selling Q̂ shares generally becomes more attractive than under
simple risks. Due to her smooth distaste for ambiguity, i.e., the concavity of φi(·), she smoothly
decreases her supply’s price elasticity for prices different from Ei[X], as displayed in Figure 1.4.
However, in contrast to Figure 1.2, her supply curve never becomes perfectly inelastic for any
interior nonempty subset of prices.
In case seller i is ambiguity-loving, i.e., φi(·) is convex, the slope of her supply curve amplifies
when moving form simple to complex risks. Comparing Figure 1.4 to Subfigure (a) in Figure 1.1
moreover shows how increasing complexity under Eq. (1.5) manifests itself similarly as a shift
in sellers’ risk aversion under Eq. (1.1): If seller i is ambiguity-averse, she is always willing to
accept a lower µi in return for a gradual reduction in σi.
For equally probable priors, the second part of Proposition 1.4 states that whenever there is a
critical mass of agents for whom pi is different from their respective midpoint of priors, they shift
aggregate supply (demand) away from the benchmark equilibrium. Under the smooth ambiguity
model, the pricing and allocation of complex risks is therefore more sensitive to agents’ ex-ante
beliefs than under kinked ambiguity-preferences. For smooth preferences, ambiguity-induced
price insensitivity can never offset a critical mass’ distorting equilibrium effects of incorrect
beliefs, no matter how small the respective deviations relative to pi are.
Summary
In contrast to the smooth ambiguity model, the pricing of complex risks by ambiguity-averse
agents with multiple-priors utility is less sensitive to incorrect beliefs. Within the multiple-priors
model, the necessary mispricing condition requires the exclusion from a set, i.e., pi 6∈ Bi, instead
of a pointwise deviation from pi. Another implication of its piecewise constant supply (demand)
curve is the arising possibility of multiple equilibria. In an economy with three-dimensional
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heterogeneous agents, i.e., with respect to their beliefs as well as their preferences towards risk
and ambiguity, multiple equilibria are nevertheless unlikely to prevail. For instance, if the supply
curve of a given mass of sellers equals Q̂ for a nonsingleton subset of prices, a nonzero mass
of sellers whose supply is not constant over the same subset is sufficient for the average supply
curve to be nonconstant.
In general, within both models, complex risks have similar implications for individual trading
behavior and aggregate market outcomes:
1. If averse to complexity-induced ambiguity, the price sensitivity of agents with nonsingleton
priors decreases under complex risks.
2. Agents with nonsingleton priors can cause mispricing and trade towards suboptimal allo-
cations of complex risks.
These two implications are not independent. A decrease in price sensitivity around the perfect
hedging quantity Q̂ reduces the potential for imperfectly shared idiosyncratic risks. This is
intuitive, because, under complex risks, ambiguity-averse agents always prefer to trade (close
to) Q̂ shares for a wider range of prices. However, for smooth ambiguity preferences, a reduction
in price sensitivity does not attenuate the degree of mispricing induced by imperfect information
(see above).
1.2.4 Price-taking Behavior, Asymmetric Information, and Strategic Uncer-
tainty
Before turning to the experimental test of the above theory, three potentially interfering effects
need to be addressed more carefully. First, my model economy assumes infinitely many agents.
When implementing it in the laboratory, complying with this particular assumption constitutes
an apparent impossibility. I meet this practical constraint by running all sessions with a relatively
high number of at least 16 subjects.14 Moreover, I alternate between two different pricing
schemes: market-clearing—as persistently assumed above—and random price draws (see below).
Comparing subjects’ supply and demand functions between these two pricing schemes allows me
to control for their price-taking behavior.
Second, and more importantly, depending on how agents self-assess their information pro-
cessing capabilities relative to others, they might perceive considerable information asymmetries
in the presence of complex risks. In a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) rational-expectation equilib-
rium, market-clearing prices imperfectly reflect informed traders’ costly information about the
risky stock’s expected payoff. Applied to my setting, there exists a dominant strategy for (com-
pletely) uninformed agents whose implications are in line with the ambiguity preference-based
theory above: Agents who perceive themselves as uninformed (i.e., face too high information
processing costs) and simultaneously believe markets to generate, at least partially, informa-
tion efficient prices should always submit perfectly inelastic supply (demand) functions, i.e.,
Qi(P ) = Q̂ ∀P .
14This minimum number is in line with the average number of 17.6 subjects per session in Biais et al. (2017).
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Note, however, that in contrast to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), I require some unobservable
heterogeneity in agents’ information processing abilities (costs) in order to prevent market-
clearing prices to be fully informative.15 Otherwise, given the conditionality of agents’ supply
(demand) functions on market-clearing prices, no one has an incentive to process the complex
information in the first place. Thus, Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) informational efficiency
paradox would prevail.
Third, any further potential implications caused by strategic uncertainty must be accounted
for. In a trading game such as the one considered herein, agent i generally faces strategic
uncertainty about the behavior of the remaining −i traders. Whenever agent i forms subjective
beliefs about her opponents’ actions, these beliefs—whether rationalizable or not—may affect
her trading decisions ex-ante.
Alternating between market-clearing and random price draws not only allows for testing the
price-taking hypothesis, but additionally enables me to control for any potential effects from
either perceived asymmetric information or strategic uncertainty.
1.3 Experiment
In this section I first present the parameterization of the model economy, motivate and illus-
trate the chosen lab implementation of complex risks, and provide a detailed overview of the
conducted sessions. The collected data is then analyzed on both the aggregate as well as on
the individual level. For the latter, I construct two different measures of price sensitivity. The
variant discrepancy between individual behavior and aggregate outcomes under simple versus
complex risks can be reconciled with varying bounds on quasi-rational choice. Finally, mar-
kets’ general effectiveness in aggregating traders’ imperfect information about complex risks is
evaluated.
1.3.1 Design and Sessions Overview
The selection process of the model parameters is twofold. On the one hand, the distribution of
the stock’s binary dividend needs to be fixed. In order to control for a natural focal point effect,
I alternate between two values of pi, i.e., pi ∈ {1/3, 1/2}. Furthermore, to simplify calculations
of expected payoffs, I set the stock’s dividend X(ω) equal to ECU 150 (experimental currency
units) in state u and ECU 0 in state d, respectively.
On the other hand, agents’ endowments need to be as such that aggregate consumption
is constant across states. Table 1.2 presents the endowments for both sellers and buyers that
independently apply at the beginning of every trading round. Note, in the presence of equally
many sellers as buyers, consumption risk is zero on the aggregate level. In particular, if any
seller i and any buyer j agree to trade Q̂ = 2 shares at a price per share of P , both are perfectly
hedged with constant consumption equal to ECU 300 + 2P and ECU 600 − 2P , respectively.
15Whenever agent i believes that there is a nonzero mass of agents submitting supply (demand) functions
based on relatively less informative beliefs, she finds herself better off trading according to her more informative
beliefs.
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Table 1.2. Endowments for sellers and buyers
Seller Buyer
Stock 4 0
Bond 0 300
Cont. income I(ω)
State u: I(u) 0 0
State d: I(d) 300 300
Agg. endowment constant
Notes: This table shows the endowments for sellers and buyers, respectively, that apply at
the beginning of every independent trading round. All figures except the number of shares
are in experimental currency units (ECU).
The symmetry between sellers’ and buyers’ potential overall consumption is intentional. When
comparing local sensitivities between their supply and demand, symmetric function arguments
allow me to isolate and solely analyze preference driven differences.16
Complex versus Simple Risks in the Laboratory
When implemented in the laboratory, complex risks need to satisfy two necessary conditions in
order to comply with the above definition:
(i) they have to follow an objective underlying probability distribution, and
(ii) subjects have to be aware of the problem’s well-defined nature and the existence of its
unique solution.
Moreover, when aiming for informative empirical data, the (imperfect) information about com-
plex risks should
(iii) not be too complex, i.e., imposing at least some nontrivial restrictions on subjects’ sets of
priors, but
(iv) still be complex enough such that subjective priors neither are singletons.
I argue that the following implementation satisfies (i)–(iv). Consider the geometric Brownian
motion shown in Subfigure (a) of Figure 1.5. In the ‘complexity treatment’, subjects were
provided with both the dynamic visualization of a reference path between t = 0 and t = 1, as
well as the formal specification of the stochastic differential equation governing its evolution.
In order to map a continuous process St into the required binary payoff distribution,17 a simple
threshold approach was applied. More specifically, whenever the reference path in t = 2 was
greater or equal than a predefined threshold L, i.e., if S2 ≥ L, the risky stock paid a dividend
16Despite the symmetry in total consumption, endowment effects and reference-dependent preferences (see,
e.g., Kahneman et al. (1991)) could of course still be at play here. However, I find no such evidence in my
experimental data.
17Not to be confused with seller i’s share endowment Si in Section 1.2.
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(a) Pre-trading screenshot (b) Post-trading screenshot
Figure 1.5. Complex risks in the laboratory
Notes: This figure shows the information about complex risks subjects were provided with
during the experiment. For the first stage, Subfigure (a) presents an example of the infor-
mation displayed on subjects’ screens when asked to enter their supply (demand) schedules.
Whenever the blue reference path ends up in the green region, the stock pays a dividend
per share equal to ECU 150 (experimental currency units) and zero otherwise. Given the
here considered parameterization, Appendix B1 shows that the former probability equals
1/2. For the second stage, Subfigure (b) presents a possible realization of the process and
the stock’s corresponding payoff per share.
X(u) equal to 150 and zero otherwise. As demonstrated in Appendix B1, the problem of
determining P(S2≥L) as in Figure 1.5 can be solved with a back-of-the-envelope calculation
applying Ito¯ calculus.
When submitting their respective supply (demand) functions during the first stage of trad-
ing rounds with complex risks, subjects were presented the type of information as exemplary
displayed in Subfigure (a) of Figure 1.5. While doing so, they were given the possibility to
repeatedly observe the reference path’s dynamic evolution between t = 0 and t = 1. Across
complex trading rounds, two different parameterizations of St were used—one for pi = 1/3 and
one for pi = 1/2, respectively—whereas the realized path was unique to every round. At the sec-
ond stage, subjects were informed about their number of shares sold (bought) and were presented
with the realization of S2 as, e.g., shown in Subfigure (b).
For submitting their supply (demand) schedules, subjects faced—similar as in Biais et al.
(2017)—a predefined price vector. The increment of the uniformly spaced price vector was set to
five ECU, i.e., for every P ∈ {0, 5, 10, ..., 145, 150}, subjects were asked to choose the preferred
number of shares to be sold (bought).18 These quantities were entered with a precision of two
decimal places.
18In order to minimize the number of necessary keyboard entries, the decision process was divided into two
substages (see the experimental instructions in Appendix E1 for details).
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(b) Pre-trading screenshot for ambiguous risks
Figure 1.6. Simple and ambiguous risks in the laboratory
Notes: This figure shows the information about simple and ambiguous risks subjects were
provided with at the first stage during the respective trading rounds of the experiment.
Whenever the randomly drawn ball is green, the stock pays a dividend per share equal to
ECU 150 (experimental currency units) and zero otherwise. In contrast to simple risks in
Subfigure (a), the distribution of green and red balls in Subfigure (b) is arbitrary.
In order to more precisely test the above theoretical predictions, it is helpful to control for
subjects’ beliefs about complex risks. This is achieved in the following way. During the first
stage of complex trading rounds, subjects were additionally asked to provide their point estimate
regarding the stock’s expected payoff per share.19 Independently of subjective preferences, the
thereby elicited point estimates allow to anchor subjects’ individual sets of priors.
In contrast, during the first stage of trading rounds with simple risks, subjects knew the exact
probability of the stock paying a dividend equal to 150. For the case where pi = 1/2, subjects
were confronted with an urn containing 15 green and 15 red balls, as depicted in Subfigure (a) of
Figure 1.6. At the second stage, the color of one randomly drawn ball was revealed. Whenever
this ball happened to be green, the stock paid a dividend per share equal to ECU 150 and zero
otherwise. Finally, as a control treatment, the tradable risks of the last trading round were
purely ambiguous. Instead of a ‘transparent urn’, subjects were confronted with the Ellsberg
(1961)-like urn shown in Subfigure (b), whose composition of green and red balls was unknown.
Sessions Structure, Incentivization, and Subject Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 provides an overview of the six sessions conducted in the ‘Laboratory for Experimen-
tal and Behavioral Economics’ at the University of Zurich during fall 2016. The number in
parenthesis indicates the number of subjects in a given session. Each session consisted of ten in-
dependent trading rounds. All subjects only participated in one session. For every single trading
round, Table 1.3 lists the actual payoff distribution, the nature of the underlying consumption
risk—simple (S) versus complex (C), and the applied pricing scheme—market clearing (MC)
19Depending on subjects’ respective preferences, the risky asset’s expected payoff under complex risks is either
defined by the mean of Eq. (1.3) for trading more or less than Q̂ shares, or by Eq. (1.6), respectively.
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Table 1.3. Sessions overview
Session 1 (#16) Session 2 (#18) Session 3 (#16)
Round pi Type Pricing pi Type Pricing pi Type Pricing
1 1 C (P) MC 1 C (P) MC 1 C (P) MC
2 high C (P) random high C (P) random high C (P) random
3 low C (P) MC low C (P) MC low C (P) MC
4 1/2 C MC 1/3 C random 1/3 C MC
5 1/3 C MC 1/2 C random 1/3 C random
6 1/2 C random 1/3 C MC 1/2 C MC
7 1/3 C random 1/2 C MC 1/2 C random
8 1/2 S MC 1/2 S random 1/2 S MC
9 1/3 S random 1/3 S MC 1/3 S random
10 ambig A MC ambig A random ambig A MC
Session 4 (#16) Session 5 (#16) Session 6 (#16)
Round pi Type Pricing pi Type Pricing pi Type Pricing
1 1/2 S (P) MC 1/2 S (P) MC 1/2 S (P) MC
2 9/10 S (P) random 9/10 S (P) random 9/10 S (P) random
3 1/2 S MC 1/2 S random 1/2 S MC
4 1/3 S random 1/3 S MC 1/3 S random
5 high C (P) MC high C (P) MC high C (P) MC
6 1/2 C MC 1/3 C random 1/3 C MC
7 1/3 C MC 1/2 C random 1/3 C random
8 1/2 C random 1/3 C MC 1/2 C MC
9 1/3 C random 1/2 C MC 1/2 C random
10 ambig A MC ambig A random ambig A MC
Notes: This table provides an overview of the six conducted sessions. Each session con-
sisted of ten independent trading rounds. The number in parenthesis indicates the number
of subjects in a given session. For every session, the first column lists the actual payoff
distribution, the second column the nature of the underlying consumption risk (simple (S)
versus complex (C)), and the third column the applied pricing scheme (market clearing
(MC) versus random price draw (random)). The ‘high’ (‘low’) pi refers to an integer param-
eterization of the geometric Brownian motion that implies a 84.21% (15.89%) probability
of a dividend per share equal to 150. Trading rounds with a ‘P’ in parenthesis are practice
rounds.
versus random price draw (random). A ‘high’ (‘low’) pi refers to an integer parameterization of
the stochastic reference path St that results in a probability P(S2≥L) of 84.21% (15.89%), and
‘P’ denotes a practice round. To control for potential ‘comparative ignorance effects’ (see Fox
and Tversky (1995)), the sequential ordering of simple and complex risks is reversed between
the first three and the last three sessions.
In each session, after the ten trading rounds shown in Table 1.3, subjects were additionally
presented with two lotteries, each based on one of the two urns in Figure 1.6. For both lotteries,
their certainty equivalents were elicited via Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) computerized iterative
choice list method. Importantly, the lotteries’ payoffs were chosen such that they matched the
range of possible consumption levels in each of the previous trading rounds (see Figure D1.2 in
Appendix D1). Overall, one session lasted approximately 90 minutes.
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Table 1.4. Summary statistics and randomization check
Total sample Sellers Buyers p-value
Variable (N = 98) (N = 49) (N = 49)
Age 23.674 23.837 23.510 0.689
(3.008) (3.287) (2.724)
Gender 0.337 0.286 0.388 0.393
(0.475) (0.456) (0.492)
UZH (ETH) 0.582 0.653 0.510 0.219
(0.496) (0.481) (0.505)
# semesters 3.806 3.633 3.980 0.365
(2.827) (2.928) (2.742)
Knowledge BM 0.459 0.367 0.551 0.105
(0.501) (0.487) (0.503)
Risk aversion 0.060 0.087 0.035 0.328
(0.265) (0.294) (0.232)
CRRA-γ 0.684 1.045 0.323 0.335
(3.358) (4.415) (1.740)
Ambiguity aversion 0.101 0.067 0.133 0.133
(0.245) (0.225) (0.262)
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in the total sam-
ple and across sellers and buyers, respectively. p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect
randomization are listed in the last column (Wilcoxon signed rank tests for interval vari-
ables and Yates (1934)’ corrected χ2 tests for binary variables). ‘Age’ is reported in years.
‘Gender’ and ‘UZH’ are dummy variables indicating female subjects and students from
the University of Zurich (versus ETH). ‘# semesters’ denotes the number of completed
semesters. ‘Knowledge BM’ is a dummy variable equal to one for subjects who have heard
about the mathematical object ‘Brownian motion’ before. Risk aversion is measured as
the normalized difference (∈ [−1, 1]) between the simple lottery’s expected payoff and sub-
jects’ respective certainty equivalents. CRRA-γ denotes the corresponding constant relative
risk aversion coefficient. Ambiguity aversion is measured as the individual differences in
certainty equivalents between the simple and ambiguous lottery.
At the end of every session, one out of the seven nonpractice trading rounds or one of the two
lottery outcomes was randomly chosen, each with equal probability. Subjects then were paid
either their final wealth of the selected trading round or the outcome of the selected lottery,
both divided by twelve. Additionally, if their point estimate regarding pi was correct (within
±3%), they earned an extra three Swiss francs, whenever the corresponding trading round was
selected for payment. On average, participants received 38.40 Swiss francs, with a maximum of
CHF 50 and a minimum of CHF 25.
Recruited subjects were students from either the University of Zurich or ETH Zurich, major-
ing in economics, business, mathematics, physics, engineering, or computer science, respectively.
Their respective role of either a buyer or a seller was randomly assigned at the beginning of the
experiment and thereafter retained throughout all trading rounds. The instructions provided to
subjects acting as sellers are provided in Appendix E1.20
20Analogous instructions were provided to subjects acting as buyers and are available upon request.
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Table 1.4 presents the average values (proportions) of certain socioeconomic variables col-
lected via a short questionnaire following the main experiment. Risk aversion is measured as
the normalized difference between the simple lottery’s expected payoff and subjects’ respective
certainty equivalents. A value of one (minus one) denotes maximum (minimum) risk aversion,21
a value of zero implies risk-neutrality. The total sample’s average risk aversion of 0.060 corre-
sponds to a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient of 0.684.22 Ambiguity aversion
is defined as the individual differences in certainty equivalents for the simple and ambiguous
lottery. Hence, a positive value indicates ambiguity aversion. A standard randomization check
reveals no significant indications of an unbalanced sample.23
1.3.2 Aggregate Market Outcomes
Figure 1.7 shows average supply and demand curves across sessions with identical chronology of
simple versus complex risks. For trading rounds with complex risks, the vertical solid (dotted)
line indicates sellers’ (buyers’) average point estimate of the risky asset’s expected payoff. In
general, subjects overestimate the latter,24 where in three of four cases, sellers’ average estimate
exceeds the one of buyers.25 Focusing on average supply and demand curves around (average)
expected payoffs, price sensitivities locally decrease for all four cases in Figure 1.7 when moving
from simple to complex risks.
Table 1.5 reports average market clearing prices and quantities in concordance with Fig-
ure 1.7, i.e., across sessions with the same sequential order of simple and complex trading
rounds. Moreover, column three and four of Table 1.5 list the degree of mispricing and subopti-
mal risk sharing according to the respective definitions in Section 1.2. As anticipated, mispricing
is clearly less pronounced under simple than under complex risks. Notably, however, even under
complex risks, the price of the risky stock seems relatively reasonable (average deviation from
expected payoffs of approximately 14%). Both simple and complex risks are well shared. Strik-
ingly, in three out of four cases, the degree of risk sharing is higher or equal for complex relative
to simple trading rounds.
In order to better visualize local differences in price sensitivity, I adjust the average supply
and demand curves under complex risks in Figure 1.7 to control for subjective beliefs. Essentially,
the price grid, against which each individual curve gets plotted, is adapted such that average
payoff estimates coincide with risky assets’ true expected payoffs (see Appendix C1 for details).
21According to Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) iterative choice list method.
22My estimate of average relative risk aversion is in line with the experimental literature: see Holt and Laury
(2002) for binary lotteries, Goeree et al. (2002) for private value auctions, Goeree et al. (2003) for generalized
matching pennies games, and Goeree and Holt (2004) for one-shot matrix games. Similarly, Biais et al. (2017)
find the representative investor’s CRRA coefficient to approximately equal 0.5.
23Throughout the entire paper, I report two-sided p-values.
24One possible explanation is that subjects fail to account for the second order effect due to the nonzero
quadratic variation of the Brownian motion Wt.
25This could be due to an ‘indirect’ endowment effect.
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Figure 1.7. Average supply and demand
Notes: This figure shows the average supply and demand curves across subjects and trading
rounds. In the top (bottom) row, averages are computed across sessions where complex
(simple) trading rounds are followed by simple (complex) trading rounds. In the left (right)
column, averages are computed across trading rounds where pi is equal to 1/2 (1/3). The black
horizontal line (first from the left) corresponds to the risky asset’s expected payoff. The
solid horizontal line indicates sellers’ average point estimate of the risky asset’s expected
payoff under complex risks, whereas the dotted horizontal line corresponds to the average
of buyers’ respective point estimates. In the lower left plot, the two exactly coincide.
Figure 1.8 presents the adjusted supply and demand curves under complex risks. In contrast
to Figure 1.7, Figure 1.8 allows for a direct comparison of price sensitivities. For prices close to
but below E[X], all four supply curves for simple risks lie below the respective supply curves
for complex risks, only to cross the latter for prices close to but (generally) higher than E[X]
(vertical lines in Figure 1.8). The opposite holds true for the two demand curves where pi equals
1/2 (left column of Figure 1.8). For pi equal to 1/3, demand curves coincide for very low prices,
but are higher in the case of complex risks for prices around and above E[X].
For a more systematic investigation of the empirical supply and demand functions depicted
in Figure 1.8, I plot the respective averages across all sessions (to further reduce noise) together
with their respective error bounds, indicating standard errors of the mean. The resulting supply
and demand curves are shown in Figure 1.9. The above described pattern now manifests itself
more clearly. For pi equal to 1/2 (left column of Figure 1.9), the average supply (demand) for
simple risks crosses the respective supply (demand) for complex risks from below (above). For
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Table 1.5. Average market clearing prices and quantities
Market clearing Mispricing Suboptimal
risk sharing
P ? Q? |P ? − E[X]| |Q? − Q̂|
Simple risks
pi = 1/2
Sessions 1-3 76.87 2.10 1.87 0.10
Sessions 4-6 79.47 2.33 4.47 0.33
pi = 1/3
Sessions 1-3 52.82 2.01 2.82 0.01
Sessions 4-6 46.89 2.00 3.11 0.00
Complex risks
pi = 1/2
Sessions 1-3 80.30 1.94 5.30 0.06
Sessions 4-6 80.98 2.10 5.98 0.10
pi = 1/3
Sessions 1-3 63.47 1.99 13.47 0.01
Sessions 4-6 56.98 2.15 6.98 0.15
Notes: This table reports average market clearing prices and quantities across sessions with
the same sequential order of trading rounds involving simple and complex risks, respectively.
Moreover, the measures of mispricing and suboptimal risk sharing as defined in Section 1.2
are listed in column three and four.
pi equal to 1/3, the same is true for sellers, whereas for buyers, average demands converge at a
price close to the risky stock’s expected payoff. Furthermore, in all four cases, there is a clear
difference in price sensitivity around prices equal to expected values.
The statistical significance of the differences in Figure 1.9 is tested by conducting a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, where, in the case of complex risks, interpolated quantities are used. The results
thereof are plotted in Figure D1.3 in Appendix D1. As conjectured, the average supply curves
are statistically different for prices below and above expected payoffs. In case of pi equal to
1/2, the same statistically significant hump-shaped pattern around E[X] is observed for average
demand curves. For pi equal to 1/3, their p-values are close to 0.1 below E[X], temporarily
increase around E[X], and decrease again sharply to values close to zero thereafter.
Naturally, an analogous analysis lends itself to contrast subjects’ behavior between the two
applied pricing mechanisms: market clearing and random price draws. Figure 1.10 presents
the respective supply and demand curves averaged across complex trading rounds with equal
pricing schemes. Overall, average supply and demand for complex risks look very similar between
the two pricing mechanisms. The p-values of the corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank test are
plotted in Figure D1.4 in Appendix D1. The patterns in Figure D1.4 indicate that there exists no
statistical evidence against the hypothesis of a globally (across pricing schemes) adopted price-
taking behavior. Hence, neither the limited number of subjects, nor asymmetric information,
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Figure 1.8. Average supply and demand adjusted for subjective beliefs
Notes: This figure shows the average adjusted supply and demand curves across subjects
and trading rounds. Average curves for complex risks are adjusted as described in Ap-
pendix C1 in order to account for deviations of average beliefs from the true underlying
payoff distribution. In the top (bottom) row, averages are computed across sessions where
complex (simple) trading rounds are followed by simple (complex) trading rounds. In the
left (right) column, averages are computed across trading rounds where pi is equal to 1/2
(1/3). The black horizontal line corresponds to the risky asset’s expected payoff.
nor strategic uncertainty has an effect on local price sensitivity under complex risks.
1.3.3 Individual Behavior
Aggregate market outcomes appear to corroborate the predictions from theory: Equilibrium
quantities are less price-sensitive under complex than simple risks, thereby mitigating the sub-
optimality in the former’s allocation. I subsequently turn to the analysis of individual trading
behavior. Therefore, I propose two measures of local price sensitivity at the subject level.
First, from a quantity perspective, I count for each subject i the number of consecutive prices
for which her submitted supply (demand) schedule equals Q̂ shares, i.e.,
M1i := |{Q = Q̂}i|, (1.7)
where the bars denote the cardinality of the considered set. When determining M1i , I focus
on subjects who adopt the perfect hedging strategy at least once. Note that this is a direct
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Figure 1.9. Differences in average supply and demand for simple and complex
risks
Notes: This figure shows the average adjusted supply and demand curves across subjects
and trading rounds. Average curves for complex risks are adjusted as described in Ap-
pendix C1 in order to account for deviations of average beliefs from the true underlying
payoff distribution. In the top (bottom) row, average supply (demand) curves are computed
across all sessions. In the left (right) column, averages are computed across trading rounds
where pi is equal to 1/2 (1/3).
implication of risk- and ambiguity-aversion. Additionally, subjects who adopt the perfect hedging
strategy more than once but for nonconsecutive prices, i.e., whose supply (demand) functions
must be nonmonotonic, are excluded.26
Second, from a price sensitivity perspective, I compute the slope of each subject i’s supply
(demand) function at her individual point estimate Ei[X], i.e.,
M2i := ∆Qi(Ei[X]), (1.8)
where for sellers
∆Qi(Ei[X]) =̂Qi(Pl+2)−Qi(Pl),
26As demonstrated in Figure D1.1 in Appendix D1, there exist strictly concave (piece-wise defined) utility
functions that imply nonmonotonic supply (demand) curves. Therefore, I also compute M1i across all subjects,
even allowing for zero values. None of the herein presented qualitative results are affected.
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Figure 1.10. Average supply and demand across pricing schemes
Notes: This figure shows the average adjusted supply and demand curves for complex risks
across subjects and the two different pricing schemes: market clearing (MC) and random
price draws (random). Average curves are adjusted as described in Appendix C1 in order
to account for deviations of average beliefs from the true underlying payoff distribution. In
the top (bottom) row, average supply (demand) curves are computed across all sessions. In
the left (right) column, averages are computed across complex trading rounds where pi is
equal to 1/2 (1/3).
and for buyers
∆Qi(Ei[X]) =̂Qi(Pf−2)−Qi(Pf ),
respectively, with Pl (Pf ) denoting the last (first) price strictly below (above) seller (buyer)
i’s point estimate Ei[X]. The ‘±2’ in the index ensures that Pl < Ei[X] < Pl+2 for sellers
and Pf−2 < Ei[X] < Pf for buyers, respectively. By construction, M2i can only be computed
if Pl+2 (Pf ) is smaller or equal to max(P ) = 150. Under simple risks it holds of course that
Ei[X] = E[X] ∀i ∈ I. Moreover, M2 can be interpreted as a less extreme measure of price
sensitivity thanM1, where the latter only accounts for perfect price inelasticity.
Figure 1.11 displays the between-treatment average values ofM1 andM2 across all subjects.
Subfigure (a) plots the average frequency with which the perfect hedging strategy is adopted.
The average price range for which subjects choose to trade Q̂ shares increases by 0.225 under
complex relative to simple risks (p-value = 0.726, t-test). Average slopes of pooled supply and
demand curves as defined in Eq. (1.8) are plotted in Subfigure (b). Price sensitivity locally
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(a) Average frequency of perfect hedging strategy (b) Average local slope
Figure 1.11. Individual measures of price sensitivity
Notes: This figure shows average individual trading behavior under simple and complex
risks across all subjects. Subfigure (a) plots the average consecutive price range for which
subjects adopt the perfect hedging strategy, i.e., aiming to trade Q̂ shares (see Eq. (1.7)).
Subfigure (b) plots the average slope of subjects’ supply and demand curves at their individ-
ual point estimates of the risky asset’s expected payoff (see Eq. (1.8)). Error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean.
decreases by 0.232 when moving from complex to simple risks (p-value = 0.003, t-test).
The results presented in Figure 1.11 are somewhat inconclusive. While, from a price sen-
sitivity perspective, the empirical evidence conforms well to the theoretical predictions, from a
pure quantity perspective, no significant increase in the average frequency of the perfect hedg-
ing strategy is observed. One can think of two possible reasons: (i) subjects exhibit smooth
ambiguity preferences instead of multiple-priors utility, or (ii) subjects fail to trade in their best
interest when risks are too complex.
The second argument requires some more elaboration. There exists no theory-consistent
reason, why agents failing to trade Q̂ shares at a price equal to Ei[X] should adopt the per-
fect hedging strategy more frequently under complex relative to simple risks. Put differently,
increasing complexity of traded risks may tighten the bounds on traders’ rationality as, thereby
(partially) detracting the explanatory power of the proposed preference-based theory.
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Complexity Bounds on Rationality
In order to control for varying bounds on rationality, I follow Biais et al. (2017) by contrasting
individual trading data to a setting of bounded rationality in the spirit of McKelvey and Palfrey’s
(1995; 1998) quantal response models.27 As proposed by Luce (1959), I hereafter assume that
agent i’s trading decisions follow a random choice model. Specifically, for a given price P , her
probability density of trading Qj shares under simple risks is given by
fi(Qj |P ) = ψi (E[Ui(Qj |P )])∫
ψi (E[Ui(Q|P )]) dQ
, (1.9)
where ψi(·) denotes an increasing differentiable function and Q runs from zero to the maximum
number of tradable shares.
Since ψi(·) is increasing in E[Ui(Qj |P )], Eq. (1.9) implies that the likelihood with which
agent i decides to sell (buy) Qj shares is also increasing in E[Ui(Qj |P )]. In other words, the
higher the expected utility from trading Qj shares for a price P , the greater the probability that
agent i actually ends up doing so. Hence, the lower the slope of ψi(·), the more frequently she
deviates from her optimal strategy, i.e., the more severe are the bounds on her rationality.
As in Biais et al. (2017), applying bounded rational behavior as formalized in Eq. (1.9) to
the above theory of trading simple risks imposes the following three implications:28
S1 For P = E[X], the distribution of supplied and demanded shares has a unique mode at Q̂.
S2 For P < E[X], the distribution of supplied and demanded shares is asymmetric around Q̂
and decreasing above (below) Q̂ for sellers (buyers).
S3 For P > E[X], the distribution of supplied and demanded shares asymmetric around Q̂
and decreasing below (above) Q̂ for sellers (buyers).
According to Proposition 1.1, every risk-averse agent whose rationality is bounded as in Eq. (1.9)
most likely aims to trade Q̂ shares for P = E[X]. Similarly, such risk-averse sellers and buyers
more often adopt dominating instead of dominated strategies. Moreover, for a given price,
the larger the distance between the chosen quantity and the corresponding set of dominating
trades, the less frequently should they opt for the former. Because of the randomness implied by
Eq. (1.9), all three implications are convergence results. Hence, if subjects’ behavior is indeed
governed by Eq. (1.9), whether the limited number of subjects in my sample suffices to yield
according results remains an empirical question.
27A somewhat stricter caveat as in Biais et al. (2017) applies: In my competitive setting with sufficiently
imperfect price informativeness (see above), agents solely trade according to their own beliefs. By differentiating
between market-clearing and random pricing, I control for any deviations from such individual behavior.
28In contrast to Biais et al. (2017), risk-aversion, i.e., the accordance of agents’ expected utilities with second
order stochastic dominance, is a necessary condition for the decreasing quantity distributions for prices different
than Ei[X]. If pi = 1/2, which always holds in Biais et al. (2017), first order stochastic dominance is sufficient.
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Figure 1.12. Supply distribution for prices equal to expected payoffs
Notes: This figure shows the number of shares supplied by sellers for prices equal to (es-
timated) expected payoffs. The empirical distributions are computed across subjects and
sessions. The left (right) plot contrasts average distributions between simple and complex
trading rounds with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3). If, under complex risks, sellers’ point estimate
Ei[X] lies between two elements of the predefined price vector, linearly interpolated quan-
tities are reported.
Similarly, under complex risks, agent i’s decides to trade Qj shares for a price P with
probability
f
i
(Qj |P ) =
ψ
i
(Ei[Ui(Qj |P )])∫
ψ
i
(Ei[Ui(Q|P )]) dQ , (1.10)
where, again, ψ
i
(·) denotes an increasing differentiable function. There are two differences
between Eq. (1.9) and Eq. (1.10): On the one hand, given the complexity of traded risks under
Eq. (1.10), agents rely on their individual expectation operator Ei[·]. On the other hand, due to
the different informational precision levels at hand, ψi(·) and ψi(·) most likely compose different
functions. In particular, postulating more severe (global) bounds on agent i’s rationality in the
presence of complex risks is equivalent to
ψi(x) > ψi(x) and ψ
′
i(x) > ψ′i(x) ∀x ∈ Ei[Ui(·)], (1.11)
which implies more frequent deviations from her optimal trading strategy. Eq. (1.11) translates
to the following three implications regarding individual trading behavior under complex risks:
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C1 For P = Ei[X], the distribution of supplied and demanded shares still exhibits a unique
mode at Q̂, but is more dispersed than under simple risks.
C2 For P < Ei[X], the distribution of supplied and demanded shares is less asymmetric
around Q̂ and decreases less above (below) Q̂ for sellers (buyers) than under simple risks.
C3 For P > Ei[X], the distribution of supplied and demanded shares is less asymmetric
around Q̂ and decreases less below (above) Q̂ for sellers (buyers) than under simple risks.
Analogously to S1–S3, the three distribution results C1–C3 hold if the number of agents behaving
according to Eq. (1.10) goes to infinity.
Figure 1.12 presents the supply distribution for P = Ei[X]. While integer numbers are more
frequently supplied than fractions of shares, both distributions are roughly symmetric around Q̂
= 2 shares, constituting the clear mode under simple risks and complex risks with pi = 1/2 (left
plot in Figure 1.12). When moving from simple to complex risks, the frequency of the perfect
hedging strategy decreases sharply, i.e., from 0.694 to 0.235 for pi = 1/2 and from 0.469 to 0.163
for pi = 1/3 (p-values for differences = 0.000, t-test). In the case of pi = 1/3, the frequencies of
the most extreme deviations from Q̂ increase considerably under complex risks. These results
are in line with both implications S1 and C1.
Figure 1.13 depicts the distribution of shares supplied for P < Ei[X] and P > Ei[X],
respectively. Under both simple and complex risks, supplies of less (more) than Q̂ shares clearly
occur most often for low (high) prices. Additionally, except for complex risks with pi = 1/3 (upper
right plot in Figure 1.13), the frequency of supplying more (less) than Q̂ shares is decreasing
(increasing) in Qi for P < Ei[X] (P > Ei[X]), with generally lower frequency levels under simple
risks. The supply distributions presented in Figure 1.13 reconcile well with the above proposed
implications. First, subjects more often choose dominating instead of dominated actions, where
the occurrence of the latter is decreasing in their inferiority (see implications C2–C3). Second,
under complex risks, subjects deviate more frequently from utility-maximizing actions than
under simple risks (S2–S3). The analogous analysis of the corresponding demand distributions
(see Figure D1.5 and Figure D1.6 in Appendix D1) reveals similar evidence in support of S1–S3
and C1–C3 for buyers.
In summary, my empirical findings reconcile well with the random choice models postulated
in Eq. (1.9) and Eq. (1.10): Complexity tightens the bounds on risk-averse agents’ rational
behavior, where, rationality under complex risks is defined in line with decision theory under
ambiguity. A simple counting exercise further underpins this hypothesis. Figure 1.14 shows
the distributions of dominated action frequencies between risk types. As expected, subjects
more frequently fall for dominated trading strategies if risks are complex. Although, as can
be deduced from Figure D1.7 in Appendix D1, some limited learning takes place while trading
complex risks.
Once varying levels of rationality are controlled for, the inconclusiveness regarding the above
two price sensitivity measures disappears. Figure 1.15 shows the between-treatment average
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Figure 1.13. Supply distribution for prices different from expected payoffs
Notes: This figure shows the number of shares supplied by sellers for prices different from
expected payoffs. The empirical distributions between simple and complex risks are com-
puted across subjects and sessions. In the top (bottom) row, total supplies for prices below
(above) Ei[X] are reported. The left (right) column shows average supply distributions
across trading rounds with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3).
values ofM1, where two different rationality conditions are applied. In Subfigure (a), averages
are only computed for subjects who prefer to be perfectly hedged for P = Ei[X] under complex
risks. For these subjects, the price range for which they supply (demand) Q̂ shares increases by
5.172 under complex relative to simple risks (p-value = 0.000, t-test).
In contrast, Subfigure (b) plots averages computed across potentially different subjects: Un-
der simple risks, only nondominated supply and demand curves (as presented in Figure 1.14)
are considered. Accordingly, the corresponding average for complex risks is solely based on
nondominated supply and demand curves equal to Q̂ at P = Ei[X]. Relying on these con-
ditions, the average cardinality of continuous prices for which the perfect hedging strategy is
adopted increases by 3.853 under complex risks (p-value = 0.012, t-test). Hence, for both cases
in Figure 1.15, the conditionalM1 measure relates strikingly well with the theory’s predictions,
particularly so with those implied by kinked ambiguity preferences.
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Figure 1.14. Frequency of dominated trading strategies
Notes: This figure shows the distributions of dominated action frequencies across all sub-
jects. Under simple risks, dominated actions correspond to offered (demanded) quantities
above (below) Q̂ shares for P < E[X] and vice versa for P > E[X]. Under complex risks,
dominated actions correspond to offered (demanded) quantities above (below) Q̂ shares for
P < Ei[X] and vice versa for P > Ei[X]. Note that in the presence of complex risks, the
price thresholds depend on subjects’ individual point estimates.
Regression Analysis and Comparison to Ambiguity
For a full regression analysis, I additionally include the remaining data from each session’s last
trading round (see Table 1.3), where tradable risks are based on the draw from the nontrans-
parent Ellsberg (1961)-like urn depicted in Figure 1.5. Since subjects’ beliefs in these rounds
are unknown, classifying individual trades involving ambiguous risks into dominated and non-
dominated actions is no longer possible.
Table 1.6 reports OLS coefficient estimates of the following pooled regression model:
M1,2ir = β0 + β1Complexityr + β2Ambiguityr + β3RAi
+ β4 (AAi × Complexityr) + β5 (AAi ×Ambiguityr) + bXir + ir, (1.12)
where the dependent variable is either one of the above introduced sensitivity measures for
subject i in trading round r. Complexityr and Ambiguityr are dummy variables indicating
trading rounds with complex and ambiguous risks, respectively. RAi and AAi measure subject
i’s risk and ambiguity aversion (see Table 1.3). Finally, Xir contains socio-economic and trading
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(a) Same subjects (b) No dominated actions
Figure 1.15. Conditional frequency of perfect hedging strategy
Notes: This figure shows the average frequency of the perfect hedging strategy under simple
and complex risks, conditional on rational trading behavior. Both subfigures plot condi-
tional average cardinalities of the consecutive price ranges for which subjects supply (de-
mand) Q̂ shares (see Eq. (1.7)). In Subfigure (a), averages are only based on subjects who,
under complex risks, supply (demand) Q̂ shares at P = Ei[X]. In Subfigure (b), the av-
erage value for simple risks is computed across all nondominated (see Figure 1.14) supply
(demand) curves. The corresponding average for complex risks is determined across all non-
dominated supply (demand) curves that additionally go through Q̂ at P = Ei[X]. Error
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
round specific control variables, and ir denotes the idiosyncratic error term. Corrected standard
errors clustered at the subject level are reported in parenthesis.
The reported coefficients in Table 1.6 affirm the findings from Figure 1.11. The second and
fourth columns show that complex risks significantly decrease the slope of local supply (demand)
by approximately 0.25 on average. As revealed by columns one and three, no such unconditional
effect is observed on subjects’ adopted frequency of the perfect hedging strategy. Nevertheless,
as expected, the latter is higher in rounds with ambiguous risks and increases with subjects’
risk aversion. When regressing local slopes on the ambiguity dummy and risk aversion, both
coefficients exhibit the anticipated sign but lack statistical significance.
Controlling for a potential order effect, I find evidence for Fox and Tversky’s (1995) com-
parative ignorance effect: If complex risks are proceeded by simple risks, the adopted perfect
hedging frequency increases significantly. Furthermore, female subjects more often follow the
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Table 1.6. Unconditional regression Analysis
Dependent variable
M1 M2 M1 M2
Constant 3.974a 0.661a 3.413 0.685b
(0.511) (0.096) (2.373) (0.335)
Complexity (dummy) 0.408 -0.240a -0.645 -0.249a
(0.646) (0.065) (0.709) (0.085)
Ambiguity (dummy) 1.617c 0.017 1.727c 0.009
(0.959) (0.123) (0.955) (0.122)
RA (risk aversion) 5.389b -0.216 5.302b -0.263
(2.111) (0.252) (2.137) (0.229)
AA (ambig. aversion) × Complexity 1.935 -0.142 0.305 -0.061
(1.978) (0.156) (1.817) (0.150)
AA × Ambiguity 5.360 -0.299 4.573 -0.216
(3.940) (0.334) (3.847) (0.294)
Order × Complexity - - 2.269b 0.005
- - (0.959) (0.087)
Gender - - 1.534c -0.294a
- - (0.830) (0.098)
Controls No No Yes Yes
N 465 653 465 653
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates. The dependent variables are uncondi-
tional measures of local price sensitivity. M1 denotes the cardinality of consecutive prices
for which subjects adopt the perfect hedging strategy, i.e., aiming to trade Q̂ shares. M2
measures the average slope of subjects’ supply and demand curves at their individual point
estimates of the risky asset’s expected payoff. ‘Complexity’ and ‘Ambiguity’ are dummy
variables indicating trading rounds with complex and ambiguous risks, respectively. ‘Risk
aversion’ measures the normalized difference between the simple lottery’s expected payoff
and subjects’ respective certainty equivalents. The first two interaction terms control for
different effects of ‘Ambiguity aversion’ across trading rounds with simple and complex
risks, where ambiguity aversion is measured as the difference between subjects’ certainty
equivalents for the simple and the ambiguous lottery. The term ‘Order × Complexity’ in-
teracts the dummy variable ‘Order’, indicating sessions where complex risks were proceeded
by simple risks, with complex trading rounds. ‘Gender’ is a dummy variable indicating fe-
male subjects. ‘Controls’ comprise subjects’ age, their attended university, and number of
completed semesters. Furthermore, ‘Controls’ contain subjects’ self-evaluated understand-
ing and difficulty level of the assigned task (measured by integers from one to five) and two
additional dummy variables controlling for their familiarity and knowledge regarding the
Brownian motion. Numbers in parenthesis denote robust standard errors clustered at the
subject level. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10%-level, respectively.
perfect hedging strategy and submit significantly less (locally) sensitive supply (demand) func-
tions. This contrasts the findings in Borghans et al. (2009) that men require higher compensation
for the introduction of ambiguity than do women.
Despite having the expected sign in all eight cases, none of the estimates of β4 and β5
as defined in Eq. (1.12) are statistically significant. Under kinked ambiguity preferences, an
affection for ambiguous risks potentially causes supply (demand) discontinuities. Although
technically in line with the above predictions, such discontinuities likely augment the inherent
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noise level of empirically observed supply (demand) functions. Therefore, I reestimate Eq. (1.12)
for only nonambiguity-averse subjects. The corresponding coefficient estimates are reported in
Table D1.1 in Appendix D1.
The results with respect to the complexity dummy as well as subjects’ risk aversion remain
qualitatively the same. Similar holds true for the above described order and gender effects.
However, four of the eight coefficients interacted with ambiguity aversion become statistically
significant (at least at the 5%-level). Strikingly, both magnitudes and statistical significance are
clearly higher for the trading round with ambiguous risks relative to those with complex risks
(despite the latter’s fourfold larger sample size).
In summary, these findings point towards three important implications. First, ambiguity
preferences appear to possess the highest explanatory power in the presence of purely ambiguous
rather than complex risks. This comes as little surprise, but reassures the design’s effectiveness
in translating ambiguity preferences into measurable model-based trading predictions. Second,
and more importantly, complex risks reduce local supply (demand) slopes more substantially
than does pure ambiguity. In particular, this can be seen from comparing the coefficient esti-
mates for the complexity and ambiguity dummies and recalling the small values of the applied
ambiguity aversion measure. Third, in synthesis, while ambiguity preference-based theories ex-
plain individual behavior under complex risks reasonably well, the aversion to pure ambiguity
underestimates the latter’s impact on market outcomes.
Given the fundamental difference regarding the existence of a uniquely defined risk structure,
it is not surprising that the magnitudes of subjects’ reactions to complex and ambiguous risks
are different. Even though their beliefs under pure ambiguity are unknown, a similar analysis as
presented in Figure 1.12 lends itself as a simplified comparison of relative bounded rationality.
For both simple and ambiguous risks, Figure D1.8 in Appendix D1 presents the joint distri-
butions of supplied and demanded shares at a price of ECU 75. Assuming subjects adopt the
natural reference point of a fifty-fifty chance under pure ambiguity, there is no evidence that
pure ambiguity has any hampering effect on subjects’ rationality.
1.3.4 Market’s Effectiveness in Aggregating Complex Information
In light of the attained insights regarding individual trading behavior, I finally move back to
an equilibrium perspective by returning to this paper’s underlying elementary question: How
well are financial markets suited to cope with complexity? In particular, are they capable of
efficiently allocating complex risks at informative prices? I investigate this question by dissecting
both the equilibration processes and their respective outcomes of the above asset markets.
Figure 1.16 displays bootstrapped distributions of aggregate market outcomes. All densities
are based on ten thousand resamples of 49 individual supply and demand functions. For any
given resample, average supply and demand are crossed and linearly interpolated market-clearing
prices P ? and quantities Q? deduced.
Comparing estimated densities between simple and complex risks unveils three striking char-
acteristics of market equilibrium. First, and not surprisingly, both distributions of P ? under
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Figure 1.16. Bootstrapped equilibrium distributions
Notes: This figure shows bootstrapped densities of market-clearing prices and quantities
for simple and complex risks. Every average supply and demand curve is based on resam-
pling 49 individual supply and demand schedules (same resampling size under simple and
complex risks). For each pair of averaged supply and demand, the linearly interpolated
market-clearing price and quantity are computed. Repeating this procedure ten thousand
times yields the depicted estimated densities of equilibrium prices (top row) and quantities
(bottom row). The left (right) column shows bootstrapped densities for trading rounds
with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3).
simple risks are closer to and more centered around E[X] than those under complex risks. Sec-
ond, and contrary to market-clearing prices, the centers of both Q? distributions under complex
risks are remarkably close to Q̂ = 2 shares, i.e., the perfect hedging strategy. In case of pi = 1/2
(lower left plot in Figure 1.16), complex risks are even more efficiently shared than simple risks.
Both observations are in line with actual market outcomes reported in Table 1.5.
Third but foremost, the relative variation between simple and complex risks is much larger
for market-clearing prices than for market-clearing quantities. Given their predicted decrease in
supply and demand sensitivity, this observation aligns well with the above ambiguity preference-
based theories. Figure D1.9 in Appendix D1 furthermore illustrates how these relative variations
in P ? and Q? depend on the underlying resampling size. All variability ratios are considerably
stable in the number of traders. At the maximum resampling size, both standard deviations
of P ? under complex risks are still more than twice as high as under simple risks. In contrast,
standard deviations of market clearing quantities are consistently much closer for simple and
52 Trading Complex Risks
complex risks. In the limit, the variation in Q? under complex risks only exceeds the one under
simple risks by approximately 30% for pi = 1/2 and less than 10% for pi = 1/3. Hence, throughout
its equilibration path, the variation in markets’ risk sharing ability are remarkably similar for
simple and complex risks.
In order to conclusively evaluate markets’ ability to (partially) aggregate agents’ subjective
information about complex risks, simply referring to the results shown in Figure 1.16 would
not be fair. The above distributions of P ? under complex risks do not yet take into account
the dispersion of subjects’ beliefs regarding the risky asset’s true expected payoff. Therefore, I
propose to consider the following ratio of standard deviations instead:
Std(P ?)-Ratio =
√
V ar(P ?c )
V ar (P ?s + E?c [X])
, (1.13)
where P ?s (P ?c ) denotes the market-clearing price for simple (complex) risks, and E?c [X] indicates
subjects’ average estimate of E[X] under complex risks. When comparing variations in P ?c to
those in P ?s , Eq. (1.13) actually controls for the fluctuations of subjects’ point estimates by
adding E?c [X] to the variance in its denominator.
Whether the ratio in Eq. (1.13) is eventually greater or smaller than unity, i.e., whether
markets efficiently aggregate complex risks or not, is again an empirical question. From a
theoretical perspective, however, the answer is: it depends. The decisive factor is whichever
of the following trade-off effects dominates: increased severity of bounded rationality versus
reduced price sensitivity. In the absence of both effects, the ratio in Eq. (1.13) should equal
one. Whenever risk-averse agents’ behave fully rationally, P ?s coincides with E[X] and is thus
deterministic. Moreover, if agents are neutral to complexity-induced ambiguity, V ar(P ?c ) exactly
corresponds to V ar(E?c [X]), since the market-clearing price always equals the average of agents’
expected asset payoff.
In the presence of ambiguity aversion and a thereby implied decrease in local price sensitivity
under complex risks, V ar(P ?c ) may fall below V ar(E?c [X]), thereby pushing Eq. (1.13) down-
wards. To see this, consider two different agents: an ambiguity-neutral seller and an infinitely
ambiguity-averse buyer. Facing complex risks, the seller shall belief that E[X] ∈ [a, b] with uni-
form probability, while the buyer believes that E[X] is uniformly distributed over [a+b2 , b], where
a < b. Hence, the seller’s supply curve goes through (a+b2 , Q̂), whereas the buyer’s demand
curve is completely flat at Q̂ over the nonempty subset of prices [a+b2 , b]. Therefore, the unique
trading equilibrium equals (a+b2 , Q̂) with P ?c =
a+b
2 and E?c =
3a+5b
8 . However, if instead the
buyer believes that E[X] ∈ [a, a+b2 ], P ?c would still equal a+b2 , but E?c would jump to 5a+3b8 . In
contrary, given more severe bounds on rationality under complex risks, i.e., in case Eq. (1.11)
applies, the noise in P ?c relative to P ?s increases, which ultimately pushes Eq. (1.13) upwards.
Both cases are present in the experimental data. Figure 1.17 shows the respective values of
Eq. (1.13), conditional on subjects’ maximum number of dominated actions (see Figure 1.14).
Unconditionally, the standard deviation ratio for pi = 1/2 lies below one (0.813), whereas for
pi = 1/3 it exceeds one (1.170). This is in line with the observations from Figure 1.12 and
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Figure 1.17. Relative variability of market-clearing prices
Notes: Conditioning on subjects’ maximum number of dominated actions (see Figure 1.14),
this figure shows the ratio
Std(P ?)-Ratio =
√
V ar(P ?c )
V ar (P ?s + E?c [X])
,
where P ?s (P ?c ) denotes the market-clearing price for simple (complex) risks, and E?c [X]
indicates subjects’ average estimate of E[X] under complex risks. Both estimates P ?s and
P ?c are bootstrapped based on resampling and averaging individual supply and demand
schedules. For each pair of averaged supply and demand, the linearly interpolated market-
clearing price is computed. The respective resample size is set to the minimum number of
sellers or buyers who satisfy the given rationality condition (maximum allowed number of
dominated actions). This procedure is repeated ten thousand times. The left (right) plot
shows standard deviation ratios for trading rounds with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3).
Figure 1.13: Relative to pi equal to one half, the number of strongly dominated actions is
substantially higher for pi equal to one third, implying more severe bounds on subjects’ rationality
in the latter case. As shown in the right plot of Figure 1.17, the ratio for pi = 1/3 is decreasing in
the strictness of the applied rationality constraint. Focusing on subjects who completely abstain
from any dominated actions, it eventually also falls below unity.
To sump up, markets’ prove to be notably efficient in pricing and sharing complex risks,
despite increased noise levels in individual trading behavior. Nevertheless, beyond binding
limits to bounded rationality, their information aggregation is severely impaired, while their risk
sharing ability yet prevails.
54 Trading Complex Risks
1.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I study how complex but purely objective risks are traded in a competitive asset
market. Relying on decision theory under ambiguity, the paper provides a novel perspective on
agents’ trading behavior in the presence of imperfectly understood uncertainty. In his seminal
work, Ellsberg (1961) himself characterizes ambiguity as “a quality depending on the amount,
type, and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise to one’s degree of ‘confidence’ in an estimate
of relative likelihoods” (Ellsberg, 1961, p. 657)—an interpretation that advocates a bridging of
ambiguity models and financial markets for increasingly complex assets.
In the absence of aggregate risk, the controlled setting of Biais et al. (2017) offers an ideal
experimental framework to distinctively test for complexity’s impact on individual trading deci-
sions and aggregate market outcomes. Starting from Debreu (1959) and Arrow’s (1964) seminal
benchmark for simple risks, ambiguity preference-based predictions possess significant explana-
tory power regarding both adopted trading strategies and equilibrium allocations under complex
risks. In general, I find asset markets to prove remarkably effective in pricing complex risks and
even more robust in sharing them optimally across risk-averse investors. However, the former
quality crucially depends on the severity by which complexity curtails agents’ rationality under
the perceived ambiguity of complex risks.
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A1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Here I prove the case if agent i is a seller. In the case of a buyer, the
analogous reasoning applies. Relying on the identities in Eq. (1.1), any agent i’s expected utility
from consumption can be rewritten as (neglecting the subscript i)
E
[
U(C(ω))
]
= pi U
(
µ+
√
1− pi
pi
σ
)
+ (1− pi)U
(
µ−
√
pi
1− piσ
)
, f(µ, σ, pi),
and since U is increasing it follows that
∂f
∂µ
= pi U ′
(
µ+
√
1− pi
pi
σ
)
+ (1− pi)U ′
(
µ−
√
pi
1− piσ
)
> 0, (A1.1)
and from decreasing marginal utility from consumption that
∂f
∂σ
= pi U ′
(
µ+
√
1− pi
pi
σ
)√
1− pi
pi
+ (1− pi)U ′
(
µ−
√
pi
1− piσ
)(
−
√
pi
1− pi
)
=
√
pi(1− pi)U ′
(
µ+
√
1− pi
pi
σ
)
−
√
pi(1− pi)U ′
(
µ−
√
pi
1− piσ
)
< 0. (A1.2)
When selling Q shares for a price equal to P , the seller’s consumption in t = 2 equals
C(u) = (S −Q)X(u) + (B +QP ) + I(u) (A1.3)
in state u, and
C(d) = (S −Q)X(d) + (B +QP ) + I(d) (A1.4)
in state d.
Let us now denote the expected asset payoff E[X] by P ?, i.e.,
P ? := piX(u) + (1− pi)X(d).
Furthermore, we define Q̂ as the quantity for which σ2 = 0, i.e.,
σ2 = 0 ⇔ C(u) = C(d)
⇔ (S −Q)X(u) + I(u) = (S −Q)X(d) + I(d)
⇔ Q̂ = S + I(u)− I(d)
X(u)−X(d) , (A1.5)
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where we assume that Q̂ > 0. From the definition of µ together with (Eq. (A1.3)) and
(Eq. (A1.4)) we get
∂µ
∂Q
= pi(P −X(u)) + (1− pi)(P −X(d)),
and thus
∂µ
∂Q

< 0 if P < P ?,
= 0 if P = P ?,
> 0 if P > P ?.
(A1.6)
First, strict concavity now implies
E
[
U(C(ω))
]
< U
(
piµ+
√
pi(1− pi)σ + (1− pi)µ−
√
(1− pi)piσ
)
= U(µ),
hence, from (Eq. (A1.5)) and (Eq. (A1.6)) it follows that, ∀pi ∈ (0, 1), (P ?, Q̂) strictly dominates
all other points on the line (P ?, Q).
Second, (Eq. (A1.1)) & (Eq. (A1.6)) together with (Eq. (A1.2)) & (Eq. (A1.5)) imply that
(i) for any given price P < P ?, any point in the upper left quadrant of Subfigure (a) of
Figure 1.1 is strictly dominated by (P, Q̂);
(ii) for any given price P > P ?, any point in the lower right quadrant of of Subfigure (a) of
Figure 1.1 is strictly dominated by (P, Q̂).
Hence, ∀pi ∈ (0, 1), the seller’s supply curve has to lie somewhere in the lower left and upper
right quadrant and has to go through the point (P ?, Q̂). This completes the proof.
Proof of Remark 1.1. Since  can be arbitrarily small, I directly consider the limit  → 0, i.e.,
lim→0 Ui(C) = c1C, for 0 ≤ C ≤ C. The corresponding first and second derivatives of Ui(C)
are
lim
→0U
′
i(C) = c1, and lim
→0U
′′
i (C) = 0.
For C ≥ C, the respective derivatives are
U ′i(C) = αe−αC , and U ′′i (C) = −α2e−αC .
The following conditions ensure the differentiability of Ui(C) at C:
c1C = c2 − e−αC ⇔ c2 = c1C + e−αC , (A1.7)
c1 = αe−αC . (A1.8)
Given Eq. (A1.3) and Eq. (A1.4), the FOC for E
[
U(C(ω))
]
with respect to Q implies
piU ′(C(u))(P −X(u)) + (1− pi)U ′(C(d))(P −X(d)) = 0. (A1.9)
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Taking the first derivative of the LHS of Eq. (A1.9) with respect to P yields
piU ′(C(u)) + (1− pi)U ′(C(d)) + piU ′′(C(u))Q(P −X(u)) + (1− pi)U ′′(C(d))Q(P −X(d)).
Since δδQ(LHS of Eq. (A1.9)) < 0 ∀(P,Q) ∈ R2≥0, agent i’s supply curve is decreasing in P if
δ
δP (LHS of Eq. (A1.9)) < 0. For the here considered utility function, this is the case whenever
c1 <
1− pi
pi
αeαC(d) (αQ(P −X(d))− 1) .
Together with Eq. (A1.8), this implies that for high enough prices, i.e., if
P > X(d) +
1 + pi1−piαe−α(C−C(d))
αQ
,
seller i’s supply curve can be locally decreasing in P . This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Here I prove the case if the ambiguity-averse agent i, i.e., αi > 1/2, is
a seller. In the case of a buyer, the analogous reasoning applies. Relying on the identities in
Eq. (1.1), any agent i’s utility from consumption according to the α-maxmin in Eq. (1.2) can be
rewritten as (neglecting the subscript i)
U(C(ω)) = αmin
pi∈C
(
E
[
U(pi)
])
+ (1− α) max
pi∈C
(
E
[
U(pi)
])
= α
(
pi U
(
µ+
√
1− pi
pi
σ
)
+ (1− pi)U
(
µ−
√
pi
1− piσ
))
+ (1− α)
(
pi U
(
µ+
√
1− pi
pi
σ
)
+ (1− pi)U
(
µ−
√
pi
1− piσ
))
,
where pi = arg min
pi∈C
E
[
U(pi)
]
(pi = arg max
pi∈C
E
[
U(pi)
]
) and µ (µ) and σ (σ) denote expected
consumption and standard deviation of consumption according to pi (pi). For Q 6= Q̂, i.e., for
strictly positive σ and σ, it directly follows from U ’s strict concavity that
U(C(ω)) < αU(µ) + (1− α)U(µ) < U(αµ+ (1− α)µ).
Eq. (A1.3) and Eq. (A1.4) imply
αµ+ (1− α)µ = α
(
pi ((S −Q)X(u) + (B +QP ) + I(u)) +
(1− pi) ((S −Q)X(d) + (B +QP ) + I(d))
)
+ (1− α)
(
pi ((S −Q)X(u) + (B +QP ) + I(u)) +
(1− pi) ((S −Q)X(d) + (B +QP ) + I(d))
)
= ... terms indep. from Q ...+Q
(
P −
(
αEpi[X] + (1− α)Epi[X]
))
.
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Hence, if P = αEpi[X] + (1 − α)Epi[X], denoted by P˜ hereafter, the linear combination of
expected consumption (for constant pi and pi) does not change for different quantities of shares
sold. Therefore, for P˜ , it is optimal for the seller to exactly sell Q̂ share and get the constant
utility U(αµ+ (1− α)µ) = U(αµ) = U((1− α)µ).
In general, it holds that
U(C(ω)) = α
(
piU(C(u))
)
+ (1− pi)U(C(d))
)
+ (1− α)
(
piU(C(u)) + (1− pi)U(C(d))
)
,
and, for any given price, the corresponding FOC reads
δU
δQ
= α
(
piU ′(C(u))(P −X(u)) + (1− pi)U ′(C(d))(P −X(d))
)
+ (1− α)
(
piU ′(C(u))(P −X(u)) + (1− pi)U ′(C(d))(P −X(d))
)
= 0.(A1.10)
As shown, for P˜ , it is optimal to sell Q̂ shares. Hence, the question now is, for what prices it is
optimal to sell less (more) than Q̂? Or, put differently, starting from P˜ per share, below (above)
which price does it become beneficial to sell less (more) than Q̂ shares?
Since when selling Q̂ shares C(u) = C(d), Eq. (A1.10) yields
δU
δQ
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q̂
= 0 ⇔ P = P˜ .
I denote by P˜ (Q̂ ↓) = L (P˜ (Q̂ ↑) = U) the lowest (highest) price for which the seller prefers
to sell Q̂ shares. Because pi < pi whenever the seller considers to sell less than Q̂, and pi > pi
whenever she thinks about selling more than Q̂, it follows that L < U .
Therefore, in summary, seller i’s supply curve is constant over the closed subset [L,U ] ⊂ P
and the difference U−L becomes larger as her C becomes wider and/or as α→ 1. This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Whenever there is a nonzero mass of ambiguity-averse agent whose
supply (demand) curves do not go through the benchmark equilibrium (E[X], Q̂), they draw
average supply (demand) away from the latter. Given the result in Proposition 1.2, this clearly
occurs if either
L > E[X] or U < E[X]. (A1.11)
For ambiguity-averse agents, L is always strictly smaller than U , hence, the two cases in
Eq. (A1.11) are mutually exclusive.
I begin with the first inequality in Eq. (A1.11). For any ambiguity-averse seller i it holds
that (neglecting the subscript i)
L = αEpi[X] + (1− α)Epi[X],
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where α > 1/2 and pi < pi since L denotes the lower price limit below which she prefers to sell
less than Q̂ shares. Thus, denoting by piM the midpoint and by 2∆ the length of the seller’s set
of priors,29 the inequality L > E[X] can be written as
E[X] < L
E[X] < α ((piM −∆)X(u) + (1− (piM −∆))X(d))
+ (1− α) ((piM + ∆)X(u) + (1− (piM + ∆))X(d))
piX(u) + (1− pi)X(d) < pi′X(u) + (1− pi′)X(d), (A1.12)
where pi′ := piM −∆(2α− 1). By the analogous argument and relying on the same notation, it
follows that the second inequality in Eq. (A1.11) is equivalent to
E[X] > U
piX(u) + (1− pi)X(d) > pi′′X(u) + (1− pi′′)X(d), (A1.13)
whereas now pi′′ := piM + ∆(2α− 1).
Together, Eq. (A1.12) and Eq. (A1.13) imply that
L < E[X] < U ⇔ pi′ < pi < pi′′, (A1.14)
where pi′ < pi′′ because α > 1/2. Hence, whenever pi 6∈ B as defined in Eq. (1.4), the seller’s supply
curve draws average supply away from the benchmark equilibrium. Because of perfect symmetry,
the same condition simultaneously holds for any ambiguity-averse buyer. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. I first prove (ii). Eq. (1.5) can be written as (neglecting the subscript
i)
U(C(ω)) = 1
pi − pi
∫ pi
pi
φ
(
E
[
U(p˜i)
])
dp˜i.
For any given price, the FOC with respect to Q reads
δU
δQ
= 1
pi − pi
∫ pi
pi
φ′
(
E
[
U(p˜i)
]) (
p˜i
∂
∂Q
U(C(u)) + (1− p˜i) ∂
∂Q
U(C(d))
)
dp˜i = 0. (A1.15)
Eq. (A1.3) and Eq. (A1.4) imply
1
pi − pi
∫ pi
pi
φ′
(
E
[
U(p˜i)
]) (
p˜iU ′(C(u))(P −X(u)) + (1− p˜i)U ′(C(d))(P −X(d))
)
dp˜i = 0.
For Q = Q̂ the agent bears no consumption risk, i.e., C(u) = C(d) ∀p˜i and E[U ]⊥ p˜i. At
29Alternatively, for a discrete set of priors, 2∆ refers to the difference max(C)−min(C).
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Q = Q̂, Eq. (A1.15) therefore becomes
1
pi − pi
∫ pi
pi
p˜i(P −X(u)) + (1− p˜i)(P −X(d))dp˜i = 0 ⇔
1
pi − pi
∫ pi
pi
Pdp˜i = 1
pi − pi
∫ pi
pi
p˜iX(u) + (1− p˜i)X(d)dp˜i ⇔
P = 12
pi2 − pi2
pi − pi X(u) +
(
1− 12
pi2 − pi2
pi − pi
)
X(d) ⇔
P = pi − pi2 X(u) +
(
1− pi − pi2
)
X(d). (A1.16)
Hence, any seller’s (buyer’s) supply (demand) curve only goes through the benchmark equilib-
rium (Q̂, E[X]), if the RHS of Eq. (A1.16) equals the stock’s expected dividend, i.e.,
pi − pi
2 X(u) +
(
1− pi − pi2
)
X(d) = E[X] ⇔ pi = pi + pi2 .
Thus, whenever pi does not correspond to the midpoint of her set of priors [pi, pi], she induces
mispricing and suboptimal risk sharing of complex risks.
I hereafter prove (i) for the case where the considered nonzero mass of agents are sellers. In
the case of buyers, the analogous reasoning applies. For a given seller i and price P per share,
let Q?i (P ) denote the number of shares satisfying Eq. (A1.15). Taking the first order derivative
of the second integrand in Eq. (A1.15) with respect to p˜i yields (neglecting again the subscript
i)
∂
∂p˜i
(
p˜iU ′(C(u))(P −X(u)) + (1− p˜i)U ′(C(d))(P −X(d))
)
=
U ′(C(u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(P −X(u))− U ′(C(d))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(P −X(d)) < 0, (A1.17)
i.e., is always strictly negative for X(d) ≤ P ≤ X(u).
Regarding the first integrand in Eq. (A1.15), there are three different cases. First, if seller i
is ambiguity-neutral, i.e., if φ′(·) is a positive constant, only the second integrand is relevant for
determining the optimal number of shares to be sold at P , hereafter denoted by Q?N (P ). Second,
if seller i is ambiguity-averse, i.e., if φ′(·) is a decreasing function, then the first integrand becomes
relevant for determining Q?A(P ). Third, if she is ambiguity-loving, her increasing function φ′(·)
conversely affects Q?L(P ).
Because Eq. (A1.17) strictly decreases at a constant rate over [pi, pi], Eq. (A1.15) can only
hold for Q?N (P ), if the second integrand changes its sign between pi and pi. For Q < Q̂, it holds
that
∂
∂p˜i
E
[
U(p˜i)
]
= U(C(u))− U(C(d)) > 0 ∀Q < Q̂,
i.e., whenever seller i is ambiguity-averse, the first integrand in Eq. (A1.15) is a strictly decreasing
function over [pi, pi]. Hence, for Q?A(P ) the second integrand in Eq. (A1.15) needs to switch its
sign for a smaller p˜i ∈ [pi, pi], relative to Q?N (P ), in order to satisfy the first order condition.
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Taking the first order derivative of the second integrand in Eq. (A1.15) with respect to Q
yields
∂
∂Q
(
p˜iU ′(C(u))(P −X(u)) + (1− p˜i)U ′(C(d))(P −X(d))
)
=
p˜i U ′′(C(u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(P −X(u))2 + (1− p˜i)U ′′(C(d))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(P −X(d))2 < 0,
i.e., is always strictly negative for any risk-averse seller. It therefore follows that Q?A(P ) >
Q?N (P ), i.e., that Q?A(P ) is closer to Q̂ than Q?N (P ). Since, for any ambiguity-loving seller, the
first integrand in Eq. (A1.15) then is a strictly increasing function over [pi, pi], the analogous
reasoning implies Q?L(P ) < Q?N (P ). Thus, the distance between Q̂ and Q?L(P ) is larger than
between Q?N (P ) and Q̂. Finally, the symmetric argument for Q?(P ) > Q̂ yields Q?A(P ) <
Q?N (P ) < Q?L(P ). This completes the proof.
B1 Determining pi in the Presence of Complex Risks
Starting point is the SDE of the geometric Brownian motion in Figure 1.5, i.e.,
dSt = 10%Stdt+ 32%StdWt,
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion. Applying Ito¯ to f := ln(St) yields
S2 = exp
{(
10%− 32%
2
2
)
+ 32%(W2 −W1)
}
.
Hence,
P(S2 ≥ 1.05) = P
(
W2 −W1 ≤
(
ln(1.05)− 10% + 32%
2
2
)
1
32%︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈0
)
.
Recalling that the increment W2 − W1 has a standard normal distribution,30 it follows that
P(S2≥1.05) corresponds to 1/2.31
C1 Adjustment of average supply and demand curves according
to subjective beliefs
For a given case, I denote by E¯S [X] sellers’ average point estimate of the risky asset’s expected
payoff under complex risks. In order to account for deviations of E¯S [X] from E[X], the follow-
ing linear transformation is applied to the predefined price vector used to elicit sellers’ supply
30This information was provided as part of the instructions.
31Strictly speaking, it holds that P(S2≥1.05) = 0.49999. Linearly approximating ln(1.05) by 0.05 implies
P(S2≥1.05) = 0.50150.
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functions:
adj(P ) =

P − (E¯S [X]− E[X]) P−X(d)E¯S [X]−X(d) , for X(d) ≤ P < E¯S [X]
P − (E¯S [X]− E[X]) X(u)−PX(u)−E¯S [X] , for E¯S [X] ≤ P ≤ X(u).
Furthermore, let Q¯S denote the linearly interpolated average supply curve and Q¯S,adj the
corresponding curve plotted against adj(P ) instead of P . It then still holds that Q¯S,adj spans
from X(d) to X(u), but simultaneously that Q¯S,adj(E[X]) = Q¯S(E¯S [X]). The exact same linear
transformation with E¯B[X] instead of E¯S [X], with B for buyers, is also used to adjust average
demand curves under complex risks.
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D1 Additional Tables and Figures
Table D1.1. Regression analysis for nonnegative ambiguity aversion
Dependent variable
M1 M2 M1 M2
Constant 3.954a 0.736a 2.943 0.939b
(0.563) (0.118) (2.190) (0.392)
Complexity (dummy) 0.238 -0.199b -0.452 -0.232b
(0.770) (0.084) (0.702) (0.102)
Ambiguity (dummy) 0.517 0.213 0.926 0.181
(1.208) (0.185) (1.225) (0.196)
RA (risk aversion) 7.721a -0.091 6.931a -0.137
(2.224) (0.347) (2.230) (0.344)
AA (ambig. aversion) × Complexity 3.384 -0.542b 0.096 -0.345
(2.442) (0.259) (2.371) (0.231)
AA × Ambiguity 9.792b -1.233a 7.473 -1.041b
(4.669) (0.472) (4.729) (0.522)
Order × Complexity - - 2.243b 0.000
- - (1.132) (0.114)
Gender - - 1.187 -0.298a
- - (0.908) (0.113)
Controls No No Yes Yes
N 373 518 373 518
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates for subjects with nonnegative ambigu-
ity aversion (as indicated by the variable ‘Ambiguity aversion’—see below). The dependent
variables are unconditional measures of local price sensitivity. M1 denotes the cardinality
of consecutive prices for which subjects adopt the perfect hedging strategy, i.e., aiming to
trade Q̂ shares. M2 measures the average slope of subjects’ supply and demand curves
at their individual point estimates of the risky asset’s expected payoff. ‘Complexity’ and
‘Ambiguity’ are dummy variables indicating trading rounds with complex and ambiguous
risks, respectively. ‘Risk aversion’ measures the normalized difference between the simple
lottery’s expected payoff and subjects’ respective certainty equivalents. The first two inter-
action terms control for different effects of ‘Ambiguity aversion’ across trading rounds with
simple and complex risks, where ambiguity aversion is measured as the difference between
subjects’ certainty equivalents for the simple and the ambiguous lottery. The term ‘Order ×
Complexity’ interacts the dummy variable ‘Order’, indicating sessions where complex risks
were proceeded by simple risks, with complex trading rounds. ‘Gender’ is a dummy variable
indicating female subjects. ‘Controls’ comprise subjects’ age, their attended university, and
number of completed semesters. Furthermore, ‘Controls’ contain subjects’ self-evaluated
understanding and difficulty level of the assigned task (measured by integers from one to
five) and two additional dummy variables controlling for their familiarity and knowledge
regarding the Brownian motion. Numbers in parenthesis denote robust standard errors
clustered at the subject level. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively.
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Figure D1.1. Example of nonmonotonic supply curve
Notes: Supply curve for seller i with utility function as defined in Remark 1.1. Parameters:
X(u) = 1.5, X(d) = 0, pi = 1/10,  = 0, α = 1, C = 3+2piX(u), Ei = 4, Ii(u) = 0, Ii(d) = 3.
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You	earn	600	if										,	
and	300	if										.
1	Ball	is	randomly	drawn.
R G R
G G GR R
GR R G R
G G GR R
GR R G R
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15	x										/	15	x	G R
G
R
Figure D1.2. Lottery based on urn with simple risks
Notes: This figure shows the lottery based on the urn with simple risks. Whenever the
randomly drawn ball is green, the lottery pays ECU 600 (experimental currency units) and
ECU 300 if it is red. Subjects’ respective certainty equivalents were elicited via Abdellaoui
et al.’s (2011) iterative choice list method.
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Figure D1.3. Testing for differences in price sensitivity
Notes: This figure reports the p-values of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the differences
between average supply (demand) curves for simple and complex risks. Averages are com-
puted across subjects and trading rounds. Average curves for complex risks are adjusted as
described in Appendix C1 and linearly interpolated to allow for a direct comparison with
simple risks. In the top (bottom) row, average supply (demand) curves are computed across
all sessions. In the left (right) column, averages are computed across trading rounds where
pi is equal to 1/2 (1/3). The dotted line indicates a p-value equal to 10%.
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Figure D1.4. Testing for price-taking behavior under complex risks
Notes: This figure reports the p-values of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the differences be-
tween average supply (demand) curves for complex risks under market clearing and random
price draws. Averages are computed across subjects and complex trading rounds. Average
curves are adjusted as described in Appendix C1 and linearly interpolated to allow for a
direct comparison with simple risks. In the top (bottom) row, average supply (demand)
curves are computed across all sessions. In the left (right) column, averages are computed
across complex trading rounds where pi is equal to 1/2 (1/3). The dotted line indicates a
p-value equal to 10%.
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Figure D1.5. Demand distribution for prices equal to expected payoffs
Notes: This figure shows the number of shares demanded by buyers for prices equal to
(estimated) expected payoffs. The empirical distributions are computed across subjects
and sessions. The left (right) plot contrasts average distributions between simple and
complex trading rounds with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3). If, under complex risks, buyers’ point
estimate Ei[X] lies between two elements of the predefined price vector, linearly interpolated
quantities are reported.
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Figure D1.6. Demand distribution for prices different from expected payoffs
Notes: This figure shows the number of shares demanded by buyers for prices different from
expected payoffs. The empirical distributions between simple and complex risks are com-
puted across subjects and sessions. In the top (bottom) row, total demands for pries below
(above) Ei[X] are reported. The left (right) column shows average demand distributions
across trading rounds with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3).
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Figure D1.7. Learning under complex risks
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the average percentage of dominated trading
strategies (see Figure 1.14) over the four trading rounds with complex risks (see Table 1.3).
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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Figure D1.8. Distribution for prices equal to expected payoff (reference point)
Notes: This figure shows empirical distributions of supplied and demanded shares at a fixed
price of ECU 75. Percentages are computed across subjects and sessions. For simple risks,
only the trading round with pi equal to 1/2 is considered. For ambiguous risks, a price of
ECU 75 corresponds to the natural reference point, assuming that subjects believe in a
fifty-fifty likelihood under pure ambiguity.
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Figure D1.9. Equilibration variability
Notes: This figure shows bootstrapped standard deviation estimates of market-clearing
prices and quantities for simple and complex risks. Average supply and demand curves
are determined for different resample sizes. For each pair of averaged supply and demand,
linearly interpolated market-clearing prices and quantities are computed. Repeating this
procedure ten thousand times yields the depicted standard deviation estimates of equilib-
rium prices (top row) and quantities (bottom row). The left (right) column shows boot-
strapped moment estimates for trading rounds with pi equal to 1/2 (1/3). Error bars indicate
99%-confidence intervals.
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E1 Experimental Instructions
The subsequent three pages present the experimental instructions for sellers. The analogous
instructions for buyers are available upon request.
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Instructions I/II
Welcome to this experiment at the Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich. This
is the first out of 2 instruction sheets. Please read each sheet very carefully. Fully understanding the
instructions will allow you to perform better on the task, thereby earning more money. Raise your hand
if you have any questions or as soon as you have read everything and are ready to continue.
1 Situation
The experiment consists of a sequence of 7 trading rounds. In each trading round the same number
of buyers and sellers are present. You are a seller. Your role will not change throughout the experiment.
At the beginning of every round, you will receive a fresh supply of 4 shares of a given security. During
each round you can sell between 0 and 4 of these shares. The security either pays a dividend per share
equal to 150 or 0. Besides this dividend per share, the security does not pay anything else (no capital
gains). Additionally, you are provided with some non-tradable income: whenever the security happens
to pay a dividend of 150 per share, you receive 0, and if it does not pay anything (dividend of 0),
you receive 300. This additional income does not depend on how many shares you are selling. The
following graph summarizes your holdings at the beginning of every round:
Shares: 4 ×
per
sha
re Dividend = 150
per share Dividend = 0
+
Income = 0
Income = 300
You can sell up to 4 shares Non-tradable
Your wealth at the end of each round is the sum of received proceeds from trading, collected dividends,
and additional income. It is not carried over to the subsequent round, this means you always start out
with 4 shares. At the end of every round, the trading outcome, realized dividends, and your respective
wealth are displayed.
2 Trading
Trading happens in 2 phases. First, you have to select how many shares you want to sell in case the
price equals 0, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, or 150. The computer then linearly fills up your selling quantities
for the remaining 5-unit steps between 0 and 150 (5, 10, 15, ...). Second, you are asked to make further
adjustments until you end up with the exact quantities you want to sell for any given price. Note,
quantities can be entered with up to 2 decimal places of precision.
The price determination method of the current round is always displayed in the upper right corner of
your screen. There are two ways how prices are determined. If there is market clearing, the computer
sets the price such that the number of traded shares is maximized. Alternatively, the computer will
choose the price randomly (random price) with equal probabilities across the full list of given prices.
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
You will now go through a first practice round. This practice round will not impact your payment.
1
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Instructions II/II
Please read this sheet very carefully. Raise your hand if you have any questions or as soon as you have
read everything and answered the comprehension questions at the end.
3 How Dividends Are Determined
The computer randomly determines whether the security is going to pay a dividend or not. However,
the information about the structure that governs the computer’s random choices varies between trading
rounds. There are 2 different cases:
1. Urn.—The computer draws 1 ball out of an urn with 30 balls. The balls are either green or red, the
respective composition is revealed at the beginning of the trading round. Whenever the color of the
drawn ball is green, the security pays a dividend equal to 150 per share (and 0 if red).
2. Simulated reference path.—The computer simulates the evolution of a reference path over 2 time
periods, but only the first period will be displayed. Whenever the path ends up above a certain limit,
the security pays a dividend equal to 150 per share (and 0 if the path ends up below this limit). The
only purpose of this path is to determine whether the security pays a dividend or not.
What you will see.—You are provided with a formal description of the reference path St, where the
random component is denoted by Wt. Wt follows a normal distribution with mean equal to 0 and
variance equal to the corresponding change in time. For example, the full description of the path St
could look like this
dSt = 5%Stdt+ 10%StdWt,
where dSt denotes the change of St over the very small (infinitesimal) time change of length dt. Addi-
tionally, you will see a video of the path St between time 0 and the end of period 1:
(a) Beginning of period 1 (b) Middle of period 1 (c) End of period 1
The difference of the random component Wt between the ends of period 1 and 2, W2 −W1, follows
a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. For simplicity, every path is scaled such that S1 = 1.
Based on this information you can assess the probability of the dividend being equal to 150 (→ path
ends up in the green region at time 2).
4 List of Lotteries, Questionnaire, and Payment
After the 7 trading rounds, you have to repeatedly choose 1 out of 2 options for 2 lists of lotteries. For
both lists, the computer randomly selects and plays 1 of your chosen options. Finally, you will be asked
1
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to fill-in a short questionnaire.
Your final payment will be determined as follows:
1. The computer randomly picks 1 out of the 7 trading rounds or 1 of the 2 lottery outcomes with
equal probability (19 for each). It is therefore critical that you concentrate on every round. You
will be paid either your wealth at the end of the selected trading round or the outcome of the
selected lottery, both in CHF divided by 12.
2. In all rounds with simulated reference paths, you are asked to submit your best guess regarding
the probability of the dividend being equal to 150. If your guess is correct (within +/- 3%), you
earn an additional 3 CHF whenever this round is selected for payment.
5 Comprehension Questions
(1) Assume you have sold 4 shares at a price of 50 per share, what is your wealth in the 2 scenarios?
per
sha
re Dividend = 150 → Wealth =
per share Dividend = 0 → Wealth =
(2) Assume you have sold 4 shares at a price of 150 per share, what is your wealth in the 2 scenarios?
per
sha
re Dividend = 150 → Wealth =
per share Dividend = 0 → Wealth =
(3) Assume you have sold 2 shares at a price of 50 per share, what is your wealth in the 2 scenarios?
per
sha
re Dividend = 150 → Wealth =
per share Dividend = 0 → Wealth =
(4) Does the difference between your wealth in the green and the red scenario depend on...?
 The paid price  The number of sold shares
(5) What is the difference between your wealth in the 2 scenarios, if you exactly sell 2 shares?
Difference =
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Raise your hand after you have answered the comprehension questions. After double-checking, you will
go through 2 last practice rounds. These practice rounds will not impact your payment.
2
2 Risk and Return around the Clock
Joint with Alexandre Ziegler
We investigate price discovery over the 24-hour trading day for equities, currencies, bonds,
and commodities. Sizable price discovery occurs around the clock for most assets. For a
given asset, intraday risk and return distributions are fairly similar, indicating a broadly
constant risk-return-relationship during the day. Although the amount of price discovery
varies significantly during the day and differs across assets, price discovery is generally
efficient around the clock. Most assets do not exhibit the U-shaped intraday volatility
pattern that has been documented for US equities, even if only main trading hours are
considered. Intraday spikes in volatility are driven by the open or close of the market
for the respective asset or other assets and by macroeconomic announcements. Both
diffusion and jump risk are important drivers of intraday volatility patterns, and US
macroeconomic news account for a sizable fraction of jump-driven volatility. For some
– but not all – assets, the relationship between volume and volatility that can generally
be observed during the trading day does not hold at the time of jumps, suggesting that
traders anticipate large price moves at the time of scheduled announcements and market
depth falls accordingly.
2.1 Introduction
How important are news coming from different parts of the world for asset prices, and how is this
reflected in the distribution of risk and return during the trading day? While intuition allows
making qualitative statements about these issues for some assets, actual figures are unknown. For
example, one would expect US equity prices at large to be driven mostly by US macroeconomic
news, but to also react – probably to a lesser extent – to macroeconomic news coming out of
Europe and Asia. What share of equities’ returns and volatility can be attributed to these
different sources? Turning to a less intuitive case, what intraday return and volatility patterns
should we expect for oil, which is consumed around the world and largely produced in the
Middle East and Russia, where political risk can be sizable? How about gold, whose two largest
producers are China and Australia, but which is used globally both in industrial applications and
as a monetary asset? In this paper we investigate price discovery around the clock for a number
of benchmark assets from the main asset classes equities, currencies, bonds, and commodities.
While price discovery has been studied extensively in the literature, around-the-clock analy-
ses have not been possible for most assets (with the exception of currencies) because of limited
We thank Ramo Gençay and Michel Habib for valuable suggestions.
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trading hours. During the last couple of years, however, the trading hours of futures contracts on
a number of global benchmark assets have been progressively extended, with some contracts now
trading almost 24 hours a day. This recent development offers an unique opportunity to investi-
gate price discovery around the clock. In addition to trading hours that are longer than those of
the underlying cash market for most instruments, the use of futures contracts has a number of
advantages. First, it allows performing a comprehensive analysis using a unified methodology,
thus ensuring that differences in price behavior across assets are not driven by differences in the
way the market is organized. Second, trading on futures markets is subject to relatively few
institutional or regulatory restrictions; in particular, taking long and short positions is equally
easy and short-selling bans cannot be imposed by construction. To our knowledge, this paper
is the first comprehensive analysis of price discovery across time zones and asset classes.
Our analysis considers 13 contracts from the asset classes equities, bonds, currencies, and
commodities; for the latter we focus on oil and metals. Specifically, we consider the S&P 500,
EuroStoxx 50, and Nikkei equity index futures; the 10-year US Treasury Note, 10-year German
Bund, and 10-year Japanese Bond futures; the EUR/USD and JPY/USD currency futures;
West Texas Intermediate and Brent oil futures; as well as gold, silver, and high-grade copper
futures. These contracts are widely regarded as global benchmarks and are all very liquid. By
contrast with individual stocks, where after-hours trading volume is typically a small fraction
of total volume, most of these contracts have sizable trading volume outside of the underlying
cash market’s trading hours.
The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, sizable price dis-
covery takes place around the clock for almost all assets, but its distribution during the day
is considerably different across assets. While the amount of price discovery per unit time is
larger when underlying cash markets are open, a large amount of price discovery nonetheless
takes place when they are closed. Indeed, adjusted for trading volume, price discovery is higher
outside of main trading hours. Generally, the distribution of price discovery during the day
is similar for equities and bonds from the same region. Moreover, for a given instrument and
even within some asset classes (currencies, oil, and metals), the distribution of risk and return
during the day is fairly similar, indicating a broadly constant risk-return-relationship during the
trading day. Put differently, it is not the case that returns accrue in the morning and risk in the
afternoon or vice versa.
Second, although the amount of price discovery varies significantly during the day and across
assets, price discovery is quite efficient around the clock for most assets. Nevertheless, efficiency
tends to be higher during an asset’s main market hours, and there exist short periods where
price discovery is inefficient. For most instruments, inefficiency is concentrated before the open
of Asian markets and during the first few hours of trading on Asian markets.
Third, while all assets exhibit strong intraday volatility patterns, the precise shapes of these
patterns vary substantially. Strikingly, most assets do not exhibit the U-shaped intraday volatil-
ity pattern that has been widely documented for US equities, even if only the trading hours of
the underlying or pit market are considered. Generally, intraday spikes in volatility occur at
four sets of times: (i) at the open or close of the market for the respective asset, (ii) at the
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open or close of the futures pit for the respective asset, (iii) at the open or close of other mar-
kets (both the underlying cash market and markets for other assets), and (iv) at the time of
macroeconomic news releases. Most assets react strongly to US macroeconomic news releases
and have higher volatility during US trading hours, but also exhibit strong volatility outside of
US trading hours. This is in particular the case for metals and currencies. The S&P 500 is the
only asset in our sample that exhibits a clear-cut U-shaped volatility pattern, and that pattern
only holds during hours when the underlying cash market is open. This observation calls for
new theories to explain intraday volatility patterns for around-the-clock markets.
Fourth, when decomposing intraday volatility into its diffusion and jump components, we find
both diffusion and jump volatility to be important drivers of overall intraday volatility patterns.
The contribution of jumps to overall volatility is substantial, accounting for approximately 5%
to 13% of total daily return variance. A sizable fraction of jump-driven volatility occurs around
US macroeconomic news announcements, affecting all assets in our sample.
Finally, while there is strong comovement between trading volume and volatility during the
trading day, the relationship is far from perfect. Volume generally significantly exceeds volatility
during US trading hours. Interestingly, the relationship between volume and volatility that can
generally be observed during the trading day often does not hold at jump times. Specifically,
while both volume and volatility spike at the time of jumps, the difference between the two
sometimes does and sometimes does not. This suggests that in some – but not all – markets,
traders anticipate large price moves at the time of scheduled announcements and market depth
falls accordingly. Furthermore, the opening and closing of stock markets or futures pits tend
to be associated with spikes in trading volume that are much larger than the contemporaneous
spikes in volatility. Moreover, these spikes in volume are often substantially larger than those
associated with price jumps.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a concise review
of the related literature. Section 2.3 describes the assets that we consider in the study and our
dataset. Section 2.4 analyzes the distribution of returns during the trading day. Section 2.5 in-
vestigates the rate and efficiency of price discovery during the trading day. Section 2.6 describes
intraday volatility patterns, and Section 2.7 performs a decomposition of intraday volatility
into its diffusion and jump components. Section 2.8 investigates the intraday relationship be-
tween trading volume and volatility with particular emphasis on the behavior at jump times.
Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
A large literature investigates return and volatility patterns across weekdays and during the
trading day. As mentioned above, however, most of this literature only describes intraday risk
and return patterns for limited hours – usually between seven and nine depending on the country
– during which exchanges are typically open, with price discovery between the close and the open
reflected in highly variable overnight returns.
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Wood et al. (1985) find unusually high returns and volatilities at the beginning and the end
of the trading day for NYSE stocks. Similar U-shaped volatility patterns have been documented
in several markets (see, for example, Jordan et al. (1988) for soybean futures and Ekman (1992)
as well as Lee and Linn (1994) for S&P 500 futures). Daigler (1997) takes advantage of the
fact that futures market trading hours are longer than those of cash markets to investigate the
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Brock and Kleidon (1992) intraday volatility pattern theories
using S&P 500, Eurodollar, and Treasury Bond Futures. However, at the time his study was
conducted, futures trading hours were not much longer than those of the cash market.1 He
finds that the U-shaped volatility pattern is present in the data, but that for S&P 500 and
Eurodollar futures, volatility decreases before the close of the cash market. Cyree and Winters
(2001) document the presence of a U-shaped pattern in the Fed Funds (cash) market. Batten
and Lucey (2010) also observe such a U-shaped intraday volatility pattern in the gold futures
market; however, their analysis is restricted to trading hours between 8:20 and 15:30 US Eastern
time.2 Zwergel and Heiden (2012) analyze intraday volatility patterns for DAX futures that are
traded from 8:00 to 22:00 central European time, i.e., covering both European and US main
market hours. They find a W-shaped volatility pattern, with a first burst of volatility at the
open of European stock markets, a second one at the open of US stock markets, and a third
one at the close of US markets. Their results also reveal short volatility spikes at the open of
futures trading and at the time of US macroeconomic announcements.
Studies seeking to investigate price discovery around the clock have generally had to use
cross-listed securities or currencies. Papers using cross-listed securities include Neumark et al.
(1991), Craig et al. (1995) as well as Werner and Kleidon (1996). Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)
is one of the few studies providing a characterization of intraday volatility patterns around the
clock. Analyzing Deutsche Mark-Dollar foreign exchange quotes, they document pronounced
intraday volatility patterns. Volatility is subdued during Pacific hours, picks up at the time
of the Tokyo market open, increases again during European trading hours until about 16:00
central European time, then declines monotonically towards the level associated with Pacific
hours. Interestingly, they find no signs of elevated volatility when trading closes in New York.
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) use the extension of trading hours brought by the emergence
of electronic communications networks to investigate price discovery for Nasdaq stocks during
the preopen (8:00 to 9:30 US Eastern time) and the postclose (16:00 to 18:30). They find that
although after-hours trading volume is relatively low, it generates significant price discovery,
but that prices after hours are noisier, implying that price discovery is less efficient. Breedon
and Ranaldo (2013) analyze aggregated hourly trading data on the most important currency
crosses and document a significant tendency of both a depreciation as well as more seller- than
buyer-initiated trades of the base currency during local trading hours. They conclude that local
1In 1988 and 1989, the S&P 500 futures opened at the same time as the cash market but closed 15 minutes
later, the Eurodollar futures opened 15 minutes before the cash market and closed at the same time as the S&P
500 futures, while the Treasury Bond futures traded from 8:20 to 15:00 US Eastern time and then reopened for
a night session lasting from 18:00 to 21:30.
2At the time of their study, 8:20 to 13:30 were main market hours and available extended hours were from
13:30 to 15:30.
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market participants tend to be net purchasers of foreign currencies.
A large literature relates interday and intraday volatility patterns to macroeconomic an-
nouncements. Harvey and Huang (1991) find no U-shaped pattern in foreign exchange futures
volatilities during US trading hours (which were from about 7:30 to 13:30 US Central time in
their sample). Intraday volatility is hump-shaped on Mondays through Wednesdays, while on
Thursdays and Fridays, volatility is highest during the first hour of trading. The authors explain
this by the fact that the most important macroeconomic announcements take place during the
opening hour of trading on Thursdays and Fridays. Ederington and Lee (1993) specifically inves-
tigate the impact of macroeconomic announcements and find that they are responsible for most
of the time-of-day and day-of-the-week volatility patterns for the Treasury Bond, Eurodollar,
and Deutsche Mark futures. Moreover, after controlling for these announcements, volatility is
basically flat both across the trading day and across the trading week.3 Christie-David et al.
(2000) consider the responses of 15-minute prices of gold and silver futures to monthly US
macroeconomic news. While macroeconomic news overall affect metal prices less than interest
rates, gold and silver futures both respond strongly to Capacity Utilization and Unemployment
Rate news releases. Almeida et al. (1998) investigate the reaction of the DEM/USD exchange
rate to both US and German macroeconomic news at the five-minute frequency. They provide
evidence that the exchange rate quickly and significantly reacts to unexpected news and that its
reaction generally reflects anticipated policy responses by monetary authorities. They also find
German announcements to have a smaller impact on the exchange rate and to be incorporated
more slowly into prices than US ones. Evans and Lyons (2008) consider DEM/USD returns
both at the five-minute and daily frequency and find the arrival of broad macroeconomic news
to account for over 30% of total daily price variance. Importantly, they show that the indirect
order flow effect – the effect attributable to an increase in the order flow subsequent to the news
release – turns out to be about twice as large as the direct news effect.
Another strand of the literature is concerned with cross-market information transmission,
both across countries and across different markets within the same country. Lin et al. (1994)
investigate the transmission of stock returns and volatility across country indices (specifically
the S&P 500 and the Nikkei), while Engle et al. (1990) consider the transmission of volatility in
the Yen/Dollar exchange rate across markets. Booth et al. (1997) investigate the transmission
of intraday volatility between the S&P 500, FTSE 100, and Nikkei 225 futures. They find
evidence that volatilities of S&P 500 and FTSE 100 futures significantly react to information
from other markets, whereas the volatility shocks of Nikkei 225 futures are mainly country-
specific. Fleming et al. (1998) estimate correlation coefficients of bivariate AR(1) volatility
processes of daily returns on S&P 500 index futures, T-bond futures, and T-bill futures and
find strong volatility linkages, which they partially attribute to cross-hedging spillovers. Booth
and So (2003) investigate intraday information transmission between the German DAX index,
futures, and options and document volatility spillover effects for all three markets. Analyzing
the VIX and five European implied volatility indices at a daily frequency, Jiang et al. (2012)
3At the time their study was conducted, however, trading hours for the futures contracts they investigate
were only from 8:20 to 15:00.
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provide evidence of mutual volatility spillovers and find implied volatilities to drop (rise) on
days with scheduled (unscheduled) news events.
A number of papers relate return and volatility linkages across markets to macroeconomic
announcements. Becker et al. (1995) analyze 30-minute returns of both S&P 500 and FTSE 100
futures during main market hours.4 Focusing on the most important macroeconomic announce-
ments in both countries, both markets appear to respond similarly but independently to US
news. However, while FTSE prices react to UK news, the S&P 500 ignores them. Their find-
ing that international stock markets respond to US information but US markets ignore foreign
news suggests that US returns lead foreign prices. Andersen et al. (2007) analyze five-minute
returns on futures across different countries and asset classes (S&P 500, FTSE 100, Euro Stoxx
50, 30-Year-Treasury Bond, British Long Gilt, German Euro Bobl, USD/GBP, USD/JPY, and
USD/EUR) around essentially all US macroeconomic news announcements. However, their
analysis focuses on open auction regular trading hours and does not include after hours trading.
In general, they observe very quick price discovery, i.e., the price response to macroeconomic
news occurs within the first five minutes after the actual announcement. Furthermore, many
of the US macroeconomic fundamentals also significantly impact foreign bond markets, and in
the same direction. Finally, using return spillover regressions, they provide empirical evidence
of international stock market cross-correlations (not only from the US to Europe but also vice
versa) even when controlling for the effect of US macroeconomic news releases.
2.3 Sample and Data
Since futures contracts exist on a wide range of assets, the number of contracts that could be
investigated is very large. Our analysis focuses on 13 contracts from the main asset classes,
namely equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities; for the latter we focus on oil and metals.
Specifically, we consider the E-Mini S&P 500 (ES), Nikkei (NK), and EuroStoxx 50 (XX) equity
index futures; the 10-year US Treasury Note (TY), 10-year German Bund (BN), and 10-year
Japanese Bond (JB) futures; the EUR/USD (EC) and JPY/USD (JY) currency futures; West
Texas Intermediate (CL) and Brent (CO) oil futures; as well as gold (GC), silver (SV), and
high-grade copper (HG) futures. All these contracts are widely regarded as global benchmarks
and are very liquid, with the daily volume in the front-month contract alone generally exceeding
100,000 contracts.
We obtain five-minute data on these contracts from TickData for the period from April 10,
2010 (the beginning of around-the-clock trading for the Nikkei futures) to August 30, 2013.
Our choice of a five-minute frequency balances our aim of obtaining a precise picture of price
behavior around specific times such as the opening of trading on the cash market and the time
of scheduled news releases, while avoiding distortions caused by microstructure noise.
For each instrument, we use the front-month contract as it is generally the most liquid. We
rollover to the first back-month contract when the latter becomes more liquid. This usually
4At the time of their study, main market hours were from 9:30 to 16:15 US Eastern time for the S&P 500 and
from 09:35 to 17:10 central European time for the FTSE 100.
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occurs about a week before the front-month contract’s last trading date, with the exception
of metals, which exhibit a number of peculiarities. For gold, although contracts exist for each
calendar month, only the February, April, June, August, October, and December contracts (G,
J, M, Q, V, and Z) are liquid at some point during their lifetime. Moreover, trading volume in
the front-month contract declines sharply before the first notice date, which is about one month
before the last trade date. Therefore, we only make use of data for these six expiration months
and perform the contract rollover 35 calendar days prior to expiration. Similarly, for copper
and silver, only the March, May, July, September, and December contracts (H, K, N, U, and Z)
are liquid at some point during their lifetime, and volume also declines sharply before the first
notice date, which is again about one month before the last trade date. Hence, we only consider
data for these five expiration months and perform the contract rollover 35 calendar days prior
to expiration. For equity index, bond, and currency futures, contracts mature on the March
quarterly cycle (H, M, U, and Z), while oil contracts mature each calendar month.
Trading hours for the different instruments and their trading volume are summarized in
Table 2.1.5 For those contracts that have trading pits, we also report pit trading hours since
they will turn out to be important when interpreting our results. For comparability, we convert
all times to central European time (CET). As is apparent in Table 2.1, CET is the most natural
time zone to use in our setting since when expressed in CET, trading in all contracts ends before
midnight and reopens either at midnight or in early morning hours. Moreover, cash markets for
most instruments are closed at midnight CET, i.e., when we switch from one day to the next.
Using US Eastern time, for example, would cause us to switch from one trading day to the next
when Japanese cash bond and equity markets are open, while using Japanese time would mean
switching trade dates while cash markets in Europe and the US are open. Some care must be
used in order to deal with daylight savings time (DST). While both the US and Europe have
DST, Japan does not. Furthermore, the DST switch dates in Europe and the US often differ,
with US DST generally starting earlier and finishing later in the year. In order not to introduce
additional noise in our results, we delete days where the US has DST but Europe does not from
the sample, which eliminates about four weeks of data each year. We adjust for DST when
converting Japanese trade times and dates to CET.
As can be seen in Table 2.1, most contracts in our sample are traded almost around the
clock, with nine of the 13 contracts (namely ES, NK, TY, EC, JY, CL, GC, SV, and HG)
trading 23 hours a day or more. Brent Oil (CO) is traded 22 hours a day, while the EuroStoxx
(XX) and Bund (BN) futures are traded 14 hours per day. Accounting for two trading halts of
28 minutes each, Japanese Bond futures (JB) have the shortest trading hours; nevertheless, this
contract trades 13 hours and 44 minutes per day. Trading volume in the different contracts is
quite large, and ranges from about 10’000 contracts for the Nikkei futures to almost two million
contracts for the S&P 500 E-Mini future (ES). Average volume per five-minute interval ranges
from 35 contracts for the Nikkei to almost 7’000 contracts for ES. Moreover, with the exception
of the Nikkei and Japanese Bond futures, trading occurs throughout the day, with the share of
5In this chapter, due to their large size, all tables and figures are provided at the end of the paper.
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five-minute intervals with zero trading volume at most a couple of percentage points.
Table 2.2 reports the distribution of daily volume during the trading day. We divide the
trading day into eight periods constructed based on cash market trading hours and the timing
of macroeconomic announcements in the different regions as follows (all times are in CET):
1. 00:00-01:00, when all cash markets except currencies are closed but several futures con-
tracts are trading and most Japanese macroeconomic news announcements are released;
2. 01:00-08:00, corresponding to Japanese main market hours;
3. 08:00-09:00, corresponding to European pre-market trading, where Eurex futures are trad-
ing but European cash markets are closed;
4. 09:00-13:00, when European cash markets are open, most European macroeconomic an-
nouncements are made, but no US macroeconomic news announcements occur;
5. 13:00-15:30, when European cash markets are open, US cash markets are closed, and most
US macroeconomic news announcements take place;6
6. 15:30-17:30, when both European and US cash markets are open and a few US macroeco-
nomic news announcements are released;7
7. 17:30-22:00, when European cash markets are closed, US cash markets are open, and US
Federal Reserve announcements occur;
8. 22:00-00:00, when all cash markets except currencies are closed but several futures con-
tracts are trading.
The results in Table 2.2 reveal sizable trading volume outside of the trading hours of the in-
struments’ main cash markets. For example, about 25% of S&P 500 futures trading volume
is transacted outside of the periods when US stock exchanges are open. Similarly, over 30%
of Brent trading volume is observed after the close of European markets. The lowest share of
volume outside of main market hours is observed for Japanese government bonds, for which
over 85% of volume is transacted between 01:00 and 08:00 CET. While the share of volume
transacted during Asian hours is quite small for oil, it is sizable for metals.
Throughout our analysis, we use log-returns to ensure time additivity. At the beginning of
each trading day and following each trading halt, we compute the return from the previous close
to the open and record it as the return for the previous five-minute interval (whose endpoint
matches the time of the opening of trading).8 The return for the first five-minute interval of the
trading day and following each trading halt is computed as the open-to-close return during that
6The pre-market period for the US starts at 13.00 CET, which is the time of the first US macroeconomic news
announcements (i.e., MBA Mortgage Applications).
7For example, ISM, leading indicators and consumer confidence are released at 16:00; see Table 2.6 for details.
8Two contracts in our sample have intraday trading halts: the S&P 500 E-Mini futures (from 22:15 to 22:30
CET) and Japanese government bond futures (from 3.02/4.02 to 4.30/5.30 CET and from 7.02/8.02 to 7.30/8.30
CET in winter/summer).
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interval. Finally, the returns for all subsequent five-minute intervals until the close or the next
trading halt are computed as the logarithm of the ratio of the closing price in that interval to
the closing price in the previous interval in which the instrument traded. Using this approach
guarantees a complete set of returns – one for each period in which the instrument traded –
whose sum over our sample period equals the return of a long position in the front-month futures
that was systematically rolled over before maturity.
2.4 Price and Variance Contribution during the Day
As is custom in the literature, we use price contribution to measure the amount of information
incorporated into prices during a given time period. Price contribution reflects the fraction of
the daily return that has occurred during a given period, i.e.,
PCi =
ri
r
, (2.1)
where ri denotes the return during period i and r the total return for the day (from the close
of after hours trading on the previous day to the close of after hours trading on the current
day). Since we use log-returns, price contribution sums to unity on each day. As recommended
in Barclay and Hendershott (2003), we calculate the mean price contribution of each interval
across days and use its time-series standard error for statistical inference.
Table 2.3 reports price contribution for the different assets during the eight periods defined
in Section 2.3; periods where an instrument is not traded are marked with dashes. The results in
Table 2.3 reveal sizable price discovery for most instruments outside of their cash market trading
hours. For example, over half of both S&P 500 and EuroStoxx 50 and almost half of Nikkei
returns accrue while their respective cash markets are closed. Although price discovery outside
of main hours is somewhat smaller for bonds, it remains sizable perhaps with the exception
of Japanese bonds. Interestingly, WTI oil exhibits significant price discovery during European
trading hours, and Brent oil significant price discovery during US trading hours.
We know from Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 that both volume and price contribution are sizable
outside of main market hours. This raises the natural question of how much price discovery is
achieved relative to volume during the different periods of the trading day. To answer this ques-
tion, we compute the ratio of price contribution relative to the share of daily volume transacted
in each period; we call this measure the volume-weighted price contribution
VWPCi =
ri/r
Vi/V
, (2.2)
where Vi denotes trading volume during period i and V total daily volume. As was the case
for price contribution, volume-weighted price contribution is calculated for each day and then
averaged across days.9 Barclay and Hendershott (2003) perform a similar analysis on their data,
9Note that since ri can be both positive and negative, differences in weighting between price contribution and
volume-weighted price contribution can result in sample averages with opposite signs.
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but scaling price contribution by the number of trades instead of volume. If trading volume were
equally informative at different times of the day, the volume-weighted price contribution would
be unity for all periods.
The results in Table 2.4 reveal that this is by far not the case. While consistent patterns are
difficult to identify, it is clearly apparent that many instruments have sizable price contribution
per unit of volume outside of their main trading hours. For example, the S&P 500 has large
price contribution during European hours, the EuroStoxx during European pre-market trading,
and the Nikkei during Japanese pre-market hours. US and Japanese bonds have high price
contribution during the US pre-market period. The Euro has large price contribution during
Asian and European pre-market trading. Brent oil has high price contribution during Japanese
main hours and the US pre-market period, while WTI oil has high price contribution during
European main hours.
An analysis similar to that of price contribution can be performed for variance. For each
day, we compute the variance contribution as the sum of the squared returns across all five-
minute intervals falling in a given period (plus the squared open return if the market opened at
the beginning or during the period in question) divided by the sum of all squared returns for
the day. In a second step, we calculate the mean variance contribution of each period across
days. As was the case for price contribution, this definition ensures that the sum of the variance
contributions of the different periods sum to unity. The results are reported in Table 2.5. They
once again reveal substantial return variation outside of most instruments’ main trading hours.
To take a few extreme examples, almost 50% of S&P 500 return variance and about 60% of Nikkei
return variance occur outside of the trading hours of their respective cash markets. Although
they are somewhat more variable when both European and US markets are open, metal prices
exhibit sizable variability throughout the day.
Figure 2.1 reports cumulative price and variance contribution during the day for all instru-
ments grouped by market segment. Four key observations can be made. First, sizable price
discovery takes place around the clock for almost all assets. Second, the patterns of price and
variance contribution are quite different across assets. Third, price discovery patterns for equi-
ties and bonds from the same region are very similar. Finally, for most assets, price and variance
contribution appear to move broadly in line. Put differently, it is not the case that risk and
return mainly accrue at different times during the trading day.
Taking a closer look at the price contributions for the different assets reveals some intuitive
patterns and some surprising ones. As one would expect, a large part of price contribution for the
Nikkei and Japanese government bonds and, to a lesser extent, for the Yen are realized during
Japanese trading hours. Also consistent with intuition, price discovery happens earlier in the day
for the Yen than for the Euro; for both currencies, however, price discovery is essentially complete
by the close of European markets. Interestingly, price discovery also happens earlier for Brent
oil than for WTI oil, in spite of the fact that the two are close substitutes. It is noteworthy that
price contribution for Brent oil is virtually zero and that for WTI oil is negative but insignificant
until European markets open. Here again, price discovery is essentially completed by the close of
European markets. More surprisingly, price contribution for the S&P 500 is virtually zero until
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European markets open. The same holds for gold and copper, although China and India are
the two largest consumers of gold and the former is the largest consumer of copper. Strikingly,
price contribution is sizable for silver during Asian market hours, even though the distribution
of consumption across continents is quite similar to that for gold, with India, China, and Japan
together accounting for over 35% of world consumption.
As mentioned above, price and variance contribution appear to move broadly in line during
the day for most instruments. To substantiate this observation, Figure 2.2 reports the difference
between price and variance contribution for the asset in each category for which this difference
is largest, as well as 90% confidence bounds computed from the empirical distribution of the
difference in the sample. It is apparent that the difference between price and variance contribu-
tion is generally not statistically different from zero. However, interestingly enough, Figure 2.2
does provide evidence of some persistent deviations between the two. For both the S&P 500
(during most of US main hours) and WTI Oil (almost until US pre-market hours) variance
contribution appears to lead price contribution, while the opposite holds for the Yen (during
most of European main hours) and silver (until US pre-market hours).
2.5 Efficiency of Price Discovery
In order to assess the efficiency of price discovery, we estimate so-called unbiasedness regressions
for each time period i during the day,
r = αi + βirci + i , (2.3)
where r is the total return for the day (from the close of after-hours trading on the previous day
to the close of after-hours trading on the current day) and rci the return from the close of after-
hours trading on the previous day to the end of period i on the current day. Such regressions
have previously been used by Biais et al. (1999) as well as Barclay and Hendershott (2003),
who show that if the true return process is serially uncorrelated, the slope coefficient from the
unbiasedness regression is equal to the ratio of signal to signal plus noise in the return process.
Accordingly, estimates of βi around one indicate efficient price discovery, while estimates below
one indicate noisy price discovery.
In order to measure how the rate of price discovery changes during the day, we also consider
the behavior of the regression R2 over time. If the amount of price discovery were constant
throughout the day, R2 would lie on a straight line starting at zero at the time corresponding to
the close of the previous day and reaching one at the time of the close of after-hours trading.10
Price discovery is stronger (weaker) than average whenever R2 is steeper (flatter) than that
benchmark straight line.
Two factors will cause the rate of price discovery to vary during the day: (i) variation in
the rate at which new information is released, and (ii) variation in the efficiency with which
10For example, for an instrument closing at 23:15, the line would start at zero at a time of −0.75 and reach
one at a time of 23.25.
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new information is processed. In order to assess the extent to which these two effects drive the
intraday R2 patterns, we compute the difference between the regression R2 for period i and the
share of overall daily price variance that accrues up to the end of period i, i.e.,
ψi = R2i −
var(rci)
var(r) . (2.4)
Positive values imply that price discovery between the previous close and the end of period i
exceeds price variability, indicating that price discovery up to that time is relatively efficient.
Conversely, negative values indicate lower price discovery than price variability, implying inef-
ficient price discovery. If price discovery were equally efficient throughout the day, the slope of
R2 plotted against time would vary according to the rate at which new information is released,
but ψi would be zero throughout. Summarizing, plotting βi against time informs us about the
average ratio of signal to signal plus noise from the previous close to the end of period i, plot-
ting R2i against time reveals what share of overall daily price discovery occurs up to the end
of period i, and plotting ψi against time indicates whether the share of accrued price discovery
taking place up to the end of period i is higher or lower than could be expected based on the
corresponding share of accrued daily price variability.
Figure 2.3 reports the results of this analysis for each of the 13 assets. The upper panels
show the slope estimates βi from the unbiasedness regressions, their 95% confidence bounds,
and the regression R2s, while the lower panels report the differences between R2 and the share
of accrued variance, ψi. Almost all slope coefficients are statistically different from zero and
most are not statistically different from unity, indicating that price discovery takes place and
is quite efficient around the clock. There are a few noteworthy exceptions, most of which lie
during Asian market hours. For example, Japanese government bond price discovery (Panel (d))
is noisy around 2:00, as is Yen price discovery (Panel (g)) until the beginning of Japanese main
market hours. Price discovery is also noisy for US Treasuries, the Euro, gold, silver, and WTI
oil (Panels (f), (h), (i), (j), and (l)) during the first two to five hours of trading. Thus, while
there is evidence of some inefficiency at specific times, price discovery appears fairly efficient
around the clock.
Considering the R2 patterns shown in the upper panel for each instrument reveals a number
of interesting facts. First, most R2 curves are far from linear. Second, the curves are increasing
almost everywhere, confirming that price discovery occurs around the clock. There are a couple
of essentially flat segments indicating a low rate of price discovery at some times. Most of
these segments appear during Asian pre-market hours, the first few hours of Asian trading or
after US main market hours. Third, as one would expect, the R2 curves are generally steeper
during an instrument’s main market hours. For example, R2 is steeper during Japanese market
hours for the Nikkei (Panel (a)), during European hours for the EuroStoxx (Panel (b)), and
during US exchange hours for the S&P 500 (Panel (c)). A similar picture emerges for the three
bond markets (Panels (d)-(f)). Fourth, for European assets (EuroStoxx, Bund, and the Euro, see
Panels (b), (e), and (h)), the rate of price discovery is highest when both European and US main
markets are open. Fifth, the distribution of price discovery during the day differs across metals
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(Panels (i)-(k)): while silver price discovery is very low during Asian hours, price discovery for
copper is quite high, with gold lying somewhere in-between. Finally, there is very little price
discovery for both oil contracts (Panels (l) and (m)) until the open of European markets, at
which point price discovery accelerates. The rate of price discovery then increases again once
US markets open, but the increase is more pronounced for WTI than for Brent. Here again, the
rate of price discovery is highest when both European and US markets are open.
The lower panels of Figure 2.3 reveal large differences across assets in the efficiency of price
discovery during the day. Overall, efficiency tends to be largest during an instrument’s main
market hours. For example, for the Nikkei, efficiency is high during Japanese hours, fair during
European hours, but low during US hours. For the EuroStoxx, efficiency is highest when both
European and US markets are open. By contrast, for the S&P 500, efficiency is low in early
Asian hours, increases during European hours, and is highest during US main market hours.
For Japanese bonds, efficiency is low during the first couple of hours of trading, then fair, and
then drops sharply at the close of Japanese main markets. For the German Bund, efficiency
is high during main market hours and declines around the close of European markets. For US
Treasuries, efficiency is low until the release of US macroeconomic news at 14:30 and increases
substantially afterwards, before dropping sharply at the close of pit trading at 21:00. Efficiency is
quite erratic during the day for the Yen, but exhibits a clear pattern for the Euro: low efficiency
until the early afternoon, high efficiency after the release of US macroeconomic news, decreasing
efficiency towards the close of European markets, and increasing efficiency during afternoon US
trading. All three metals have low efficiency for the first three to four hours of trading. Gold
and silver have high efficiency mostly during US hours, but copper also exhibits a period of high
efficiency during late Asian hours. For all metals, efficiency drops sharply between the close of
Asian markets and the open of European ones. Finally, both oil contracts have low efficiency
until about 11:00 and high efficiency afterwards, while for Brent it declines earlier in the evening
than for WTI.
Summarizing, the results in this section reveal that there is substantial price discovery around
the clock for most assets and that it is quite efficient most of the time. Nevertheless, efficiency
tends to be larger during an instrument’s main market hours. For most instruments, inefficiency
is concentrated before the open of Asian markets or during the first few hours of trading on
Asian markets.
2.6 Intraday Volatility Patterns
Figure 2.4 shows the average return volatility of the different instruments for each five-minute
interval during the trading day, computed as the square root of the average squared return
during each interval. While all instruments exhibit strong intraday volatility patterns, the
precise shapes of these patterns vary substantially. Strikingly, most assets do not exhibit the
U-shaped intraday volatility pattern that has been widely documented for US equities, even
if only the trading hours of the underlying or pit market are considered. Generally, intraday
spikes in volatility occur at four sets of times: (i) at the open or close of the market for the
90 Risk and Return around the Clock
respective instrument, (ii) at the open or close of the pit for the respective instrument, (iii)
at the open or close of other markets (both the cash market for the contract’s underlying and
markets for other assets), and (iv) at the time of macroeconomic news releases. The remainder of
this section describes these effects for the different instruments. The role of US macroeconomic
announcements will be investigated in detail in Section 2.7; for the current discussion, it suffices
to note that the main news releases occur in three waves, one at 14:30, one at 16:00, and the
last one between 20:00 and 20:45 (details will be provided in Table 2.6).
Considering equities first (see Panel (a)), S&P 500 volatility is very low during Asian market
hours. This is followed by a short rise in volatility at the start of European pre-market trading
at 8:00 and a substantial increase at the open of European stock markets at 9:00. Afterwards, a
U-shaped pattern similar to that documented in the literature during US cash market hours is
clearly visible. At the release of US macroeconomic news at 14:30, volatility spikes and declines
quickly thereafter. Volatility spikes again at the open of US stock markets at 15:30. During US
cash market hours, the above mentioned U-shaped pattern is visible; however, two short spikes
in volatility occur at the time of the second and third waves of US macroeconomic releases
(16:00 and 20:00-20:45). S&P 500 volatility then falls sharply around the time of the close of
the cash market. For the EuroStoxx, volatility is very high at the open of pre-market trading at
8:00, as the information accumulated during the night gets incorporated into prices. Afterwards
volatility is rather low during the rest of pre-market trading and increases sharply at the open
of European cash markets at 9:00. It thereafter exhibits a U-shaped pattern before spiking at
the time of US macroeconomic news releases at 14:30. While that pattern is quite similar to
that for the S&P 500 during the same period, EuroStoxx volatility is much higher, even at the
exact time of US macroeconomic news releases. Volatility then decreases slowly before rising
substantially at the open of US stock markets at 15:30. It remains elevated and much higher
than S&P 500 volatility until the close of European stock markets at 17:30, and is thereafter
virtually equal to S&P 500 volatility for the rest of the day. Finally, the Nikkei has elevated
volatility during Japanese market hours, but no U-shape pattern is apparent during that time.
Its volatility declines sharply at the close of Japanese cash markets and, after a brief increase
at the beginning of European cash market trading, decreases progressively towards the level of
S&P 500 volatility during European hours. Nikkei volatility then spikes twice, at the time of US
macroeconomic news announcements and at the open of US stock markets. During US stock
market hours, it is very similar to S&P 500 volatility, increases substantially towards the close
of US stock markets, before declining somewhat towards the close of after-hours trading.
Turning to bonds (see Panel (b)), after initial spikes at the open and at the release of Japanese
macroeconomic news shortly thereafter, US Treasury volatility is quite low during Asian trading
hours, increases at the open of European pre-market and main market trading, afterwards rises
progressively before spiking at the time of US macroeconomic news releases at 14:30. No major
increase in volatility occurs at the open of US stock markets at 15:30, but there is a large spike in
volatility at the time of the second wave of US macroeconomic news releases at 16:00, followed by
one at 19:00 and one at the time of Federal Reserve policy announcements at 20:00. Interestingly,
no U-shaped pattern is visible. For German Bunds, the early part of the day exhibits a pattern
Chapter 2 91
similar to the EuroStoxx: volatility is very high at the open of pre-market trading when the
information accumulated during the night gets incorporated into prices, then falls during the
rest of pre-market trading and increases sharply at the open of cash markets at 9:00. It declines
thereafter with short increases at 10:00, 10:30, and 11:00, when some European macroeconomic
news are released. During this period Bund volatility is much larger than US Treasury volatility.
At 14:30, volatility spikes as it does for US Treasuries. Bund volatility exceeds US Treasury
volatility until the close of European cash markets and thereafter decreases. The three volatility
spikes at 16:00, 19:00, and 20:00 that were observed for Treasuries are also clearly visible for
Bunds, but are somewhat smaller. Finally, Japanese bond volatility is largest at the open of
Japanese markets, fairly large during Japanese main market hours, especially in the afternoon
(4:00-7:00 CET), declines during European hours and spikes at the time of the 14:30 and 16:00
US macroeconomic news releases.
As can be seen in Panel (c), volatility patterns for currencies are much less smooth than
for bonds and equities. Overall, the patterns for the Euro and the Yen are quite similar; the
main difference between the two is that – as one could expect – Yen volatility exceeds Euro
volatility during Asian hours and Euro volatility exceeds Yen volatility during European hours.
Put differently, Yen volatility is similar during Asian and European hours, while Euro volatility
is much higher during European hours than during Asian hours. Both Euro and Yen volatility
spike at the time of the 14:30 and 16:00 US macroeconomic news releases. After the close of
European markets, Yen and Euro volatility remain pretty similar.
Turning to oil (see Panel (d)), Brent volatility exceeds WTI volatility in early trading; there
is a spike in Brent volatility at 2:00, corresponding to the open of Brent futures trading on
weekdays. Afterwards, the volatility of both contracts is quite similar until US markets open,
hovering at low levels during Asian hours, increasing sharply when European markets open, and
spiking at the time of the 14:30 macroeconomic announcements. Once US markets open, WTI
volatility exceeds Brent volatility. There are numerous spikes during US trading hours: one at
the open of the WTI futures pit at 15:00, one at the open of US stock markets at 15:30, one at
the time of the second wave of macroeconomic releases at 16:00, one at the time of the release
of US oil inventory data at 16:30, and one at the close of the WTI futures pit at 20:30. After
20:30, oil volatility declines substantially and remains rather low until the end of the day.
Panel (e) reveals that metals exhibit the most erratic intraday volatility patterns across
all asset classes. Out of the three metals, gold is the least and silver the most volatile. The
volatility patterns for both are quite similar: large volatility at the open, spikes at the open of
Japanese cash markets, an increase in the volatility level until the open of European markets,
and large spikes at the time of the 14:30 and 16:00 US macroeconomic news releases. There
are also substantial volatility spikes at 19:25 for silver and 19:30 for gold, which correspond
to the close of pit trading for these two metals. Volatility then declines before increasing at
the time of the Federal Reserve announcements at 20:00; thereafter it decreases before spiking
again at the close of US stock markets at 22:00 and drops sharply afterwards. Finally, copper
volatility spikes at the open, decreases thereafter before spiking again at the open of Japanese
cash markets, then declines until the open of European cash markets. It spikes at the time of
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US macroeconomic announcements, remains fairly elevated until the close of European markets,
falls thereafter before spiking twice – once at 19:00, the close of pit trading for copper, and once
at 20:00, the time of Federal Reserve announcements. Overall, copper volatility differs somewhat
less between the main trading hours of the different regions than gold and silver volatility.
2.7 Diffusion and Jump Risk During the Trading Day
The sharp spikes in intraday volatility documented in Section 2.6 are consistent with the strong
empirical evidence for the presence of both diffusion and jump components in asset returns (see,
e.g., Chernov et al. (2003), Eraker (2004), Broadie et al. (2007), Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2009),
Lahaye et al. (2011), and the references therein). In this section, we aim to disentangle the two
for every five-minute interval of the trading day. This is a non-trivial task since when considering
individual high frequency returns, there is no guarantee that standard measures of diffusion risk
are actually bounded by total return variance. We propose the following procedure in order to
mitigate this issue.
Our starting point is the fact that the total variance TV of any given five-minute return ri
is the sum of its diffusion component DV and jump component JV , i.e.,
TVi = DVi + JVi . (2.5)
To estimate the diffusion component, we use the jump-robust integrated variance estimator
MedRV proposed by Andersen et al. (2012). Formally, our estimator of the diffusion component
of total variance during interval i is
DVi =
pi
6− 4√3 + pi med ( |ri−1|, |ri|, |ri+1| )
2 , (2.6)
where “med” denotes the median and the scaling factor ensures the unbiasedness of DV as an
estimator of spot variance if returns are i.i.d. Gaussian.
Each day, for each five-minute interval i, we use Lee and Lee and Mykland (2008) jump
detection test to assess the likelihood that a jump in the return process has occurred during
that interval. The test statistic proposed by Lee and Mykland (2008) is given by
Li ≡ ri
σ̂i
, (2.7)
where σ̂i denotes the estimate of the underlying price process’ instantaneous volatility. Intu-
itively, the larger the absolute value of Li (i.e., the absolute size of the return ri relative to the
current volatility estimate) during interval i on a given trading day, the higher the probability
that a jump occurred during that interval. To be consistent with our definition of DV , we
again rely on the jump-robust MedRV to estimate instantaneous volatility in Eq. (2.7), i.e., we
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estimate σ̂i using
σ̂i =
1
K − 2
i−2∑
j=i−K+1
pi
6− 4√3 + pi med ( |rj−1|, |rj |, |rj+1| )
2 , (2.8)
where K denotes the window size.
Following Lee and Mykland (2008), we then compute the centered test statistic
|Li| − Cn
Sn
, (2.9)
where
Cn =
√
2 lnn
c
− ln pi + ln(lnn)
2c
√
2 lnn
, Sn =
1
c
√
2 lnn
, c =
√
2
pi
, (2.10)
and n denotes the number of observations per day. The null hypothesis of no jump during interval
i is rejected whenever the centered test statistic exceeds the critical value qα = − ln(− ln(α)),
where α corresponds to the test’s confidence level. Consistent with Lee and Mykland’s (2008)
proposed implementation, we choose the window size K equal to 288 (the number of five-minute
intervals per day) and set the confidence level to 99.9% (α = 0.999).
Finally, we compute the diffusion and jump components DVi and JVi using the following
decomposition algorithm:
1. For each five-minute return ri, compute the corresponding centered test statistic |Li|−CnSn
in order to determine whether a jump has occurred during interval i.
2. If no jump has occurred during interval i, then JVi = 0 and TVi = DVi.
3. If a jump has occurred during interval i, then JVi = max{r2i−DVi, 0} and TVi = DVi+JVi.
Although this procedure imposes the non-negativity of JV , the constraint will only be binding if
|Li|−Cn
Sn
> q0.999 and either (i) |ri| is the median or the smallest absolute return in Eq. (2.6) or (ii)
|ri| is the largest absolute return in Eq. (2.6) but at least one of |ri−1| and |ri+1| is greater than
|ri| divided by the scaling factor in Eq. (2.6). Essentially, a binding non-negativity constraint
requires the presence of at least one additional jump in the immediately adjacent intervals.11
When we relax the above non-negativity constraint, only six average jump components are below
−0.0005 across all intervals and contracts (of which there are over 3,000 in total).12 The results
presented below are not affected by the non-negativity restriction on JV .
Figure 2.5 presents the average total variance TV and its diffusion and jump components DV
and JV during the trading day for all 13 contracts. For three contracts (EuroStoxx, Bund, and
Brent oil) we report the value for the opening interval instead of its corresponding data point
in order to enhance visibility. The results in Figure 2.5 clearly demonstrate that both diffusion
and jump variance components are important drivers of overall intraday variance patterns.
11For case (i) to occur, there must be at least one additional, larger jump in an adjacent interval. For case (ii)
to occur, the size of the return in at least one of the adjacent intervals must be over 6−4
√
3+pi
pi
= 70.45% of the size
of the return in interval i, implying a second jump or extremely high diffusion volatility in an adjacent interval.
12There are three for NK, one for SV and one each at the open of CO and XX.
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Considering first the diffusion component, intraday variance patterns for the three equity
indices are rather different (see Panels (a)-(c)). In general, most diffusive price fluctuations occur
during the main trading hours of the respective underlying asset, but Nikkei volatility increases
when US stock markets are open. The well-documented U-shape of S&P 500 intraday volatility
during US main market hours is strikingly clear once the jump component is removed from total
variance. The U-shapes for the EuroStoxx, however, are much less pronounced. Confirming the
findings in Section 2.6, none of the other assets has a U-shaped intraday volatility pattern, even
when only considering diffusive risk. The results in Figure 2.5 also reveal that once the effect of
jumps is removed, gold and silver variances appear strikingly similar, as do those of WTI and
Brent oil (see Panels (i)-(j) and (l)-(m), respectively).
Turning to the jump component, the three main release times of US macroeconomic news
(14:30, 16:00, and 20:00-20:45) are strikingly visible for all three equity indices. For the Bund,
US Treasury bonds, the Yen, and gold, the 14:30 macroeconomic announcements account for the
bulk of jump risk. By contrast, both oil contracts, copper, and to a lesser extent silver exhibit
sizable jumps at numerous times during the day. Both oil contracts have strikingly similar jump
variance patterns.
Finally, we provide a quantitative assessment of the variance contribution of jumps associ-
ated with US macroeconomic announcements. In contrast to most previous studies, our aim
is not to quantify the variance impact of individual announcement types, but to assess their
overall relevance for intraday variance patterns. Accordingly, we group the announcements in
three groups based on their scheduled release times (14:30, 16:00, and 20:00-20:45). Table 2.6
provides an overview of all announcements considered in each group, their frequency, source, and
scheduled release time in CET. Since the release time of Federal Reserve announcements varies
somewhat by announcement type and changed slightly during our sample period, we include all
such announcements in the third group; their release times all lie between 20:00 and 20:45 CET.
For each announcement group, Table 2.7 provides the size rank and contribution to total
daily return variance of the jump component for the five-minute interval immediately following
the release time. Because of the slight changes in the time of Federal Reserve announcements
discussed above, for the third announcement group we report the values for the largest jump
between 20:00 and 20:45 as well as the time at which it occurs. The results in Table 2.7 clearly
indicate that for almost all assets, the largest jump occurs right after the first announcements at
14:30 CET, the only exceptions being the Nikkei and both oil contracts. For both oil contracts,
the largest jump (not reported in the table) happens at the release of US oil inventory data at
16:30 CET. The largest contributions of the 14:30 announcement jump to total daily variance
are observed for US Treasuries (4.77%), the S&P 500 (1.69%), the Bund (1.54%), and gold
(1.22%). The size of these contributions is remarkable since they represent averages across all
trading days and the announcements listed in Table 2.6 are released monthly or weekly at most.
For equities, the second most important announcements are the FOMC press conferences. By
contrast, for metals and perhaps surprisingly bonds, the second group of announcements appears
to be more likely to cause large jumps.
The right-most column in Table 2.7 reports the total contribution of jumps to overall daily
Chapter 2 95
return variance. The contribution of jumps is important, accounting for approximately 5% to
13% of total daily return variance even though most days do not have any announcements. The
contribution of jumps is largest for the Yen, US, and Japanese government bonds, as well as for
gold and silver.
Summarizing, the results in this section show that the contribution of jumps to overall daily
volatility is substantial, that both diffusion and jump components are significant drivers of
observed intraday volatility patterns, and that a sizable fraction of jump-driven volatility occurs
around US macroeconomic news announcements, which strongly affect all assets classes.
2.8 The Volume-Volatility Relationship during the Day
Previous research documents that volatility and trading volume are strongly positively corre-
lated, and a number of theoretical results suggest that one should expect a linear relationship
between the two Huberman and Stanzl (2004) and the references therein). The standard ex-
planation for the existence of a relationship between volume and volatility is that asymmetric
information gets incorporated into prices through trading. As shown in Section 2.7, however,
jumps are mostly associated with the public release of information. This suggests that the
relationship between volume and volatility could be very different at the time of jumps.
Figure 2.6 reports the share of overall trading volume and of price volatility for each five-
minute interval during the day, as well as the difference between the two. While there is clearly
strong comovement between volume and volatility, the relationship is far from perfect. Three
main observations can be made. First, with the exception of Japanese government bonds,
volume is generally significantly higher than volatility during US trading hours. Second, the
relationship between volume and volatility that can be observed during most of the day often
does not hold at the time of jumps. Specifically, while both volume and volatility spike at the
time of jumps, the difference between the two sometimes does and sometimes does not. This
suggests that in some – but not all – markets, traders anticipate large moves in the price at the
time of scheduled announcements and market depth falls accordingly. Third, the opening and
closing of stock markets or futures pits tend to be associated with spikes in trading volume that
are much larger than the contemporaneous spikes in volatility. Moreover, these spikes in volume
are often substantially greater than those associated with price jumps. We now discuss these
effects for the different instruments.
Considering first equities, for the Nikkei (Panel (a)), volume is much smaller than volatility
during Japanese main market hours, somewhat greater during European hours, and sizably larger
than volatility during US hours.13 Volume spikes more strongly than volatility at the time of the
14:30 and 16:00 US macroeconomic releases, at the close of European stock markets at 17:30,
and at the close of US stock markets at 22:00. For the EuroStoxx (see Panel (b)), volume is
13To some extent, the fact that volume is smaller than volatility during Japanese hours could be caused by
the fact that a competing contract with essentially the same specifications is traded on the Osaka stock exchange
and is likely to be preferred by Japanese investors. We have chosen to use the CME contract as its trading hours
are much longer.
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considerably lower than volatility during European pre-market trading but exceeds volatility
during the first hour after the open of European stock markets. Both volume and volatility
are about the same until the open of US stock markets, at which point volume increases more
strongly than volatility. Interestingly, the spikes in volume and volatility at the time of the
14:30 US macroeconomic news releases are equally large. Volume spikes at the time of the
close of European stock markets at 17:30, but volatility increases only slightly. After the close
of European markets, volatility is much higher than volume. No sizable change in volume is
apparent at the time of the price jump associated with Federal Reserve announcements around
20:00. For the S&P 500 (see Panel (c)), volume is lower than volatility until the open of US
stock markets, after which it is substantially larger. Volume spikes slightly less than volatility
at the time of the jumps associated with 14:30 US macroeconomic news releases and the Federal
reserve announcements at 20:00. The opposite is true for the second wave of US macroeconomic
announcements at 16:00.
Turning to bonds, the relationship between volume and volatility is quite erratic at the open
for Japanese government bonds (see Panel (d)). Overall, volume is much larger than volatility
during Japanese main market hours and lower afterwards. There is a large increase in volume
at the close of the main market at 7:00/8:00 (winter/summer), but it is not associated with
a commensurate spike in volatility. For the German Bund (see Panel (e)), volume exceeds
volatility during European morning hours and from the 14:30 US macroeconomic news releases
until the close of European markets at 17:30. Volume spikes more sharply than volatility at the
time of the 14:30 price jump. For US Treasuries (see Panel (f)), volume is notably lower than
volatility outside of US trading hours. There are two spikes in volume that are larger than those
in volatility, one at the open of the pit market at 14:20, and a second at the time of the 14:30
US macroeconomic news releases. The open of US stock markets at 15:30 is associated with a
sharp rise in volume but very little movement in volatility. Volume spikes more strongly than
volatility when the second wave of US macroeconomic releases is issued at 16:00. Both volume
and volatility spike about equally strongly at the time of Federal Reserve announcements at
20:00. Finally, there is a very large spike in volume, but a much smaller increase in volatility
right before the close of the pit market at 21:00.
For currencies, the relationship between volume and volatility is quite similar for the Yen
and the Euro (Panels (g) and (h)): volume is lower than volatility during Asian trading hours,
about the same during European hours, and much larger between the time of the 14:30 US
macroeconomic releases and the close of European stock markets. After the close of the futures
pit at 21:00, volume is considerably lower than volatility. Volume spikes more strongly than
volatility at the time of the price jumps associated with US macroeconomic announcements,
14:30 and 16:00. The same can be observed before the close of European markets at 17:30.
There are also two spikes in volume that are stronger than those in volatility at the open and
close of the futures pits, 14:20 and 21:00.
Considering metals (Panels (i)-(k)), trading volume is lower than volatility outside of pit
trading hours and higher than volatility during pit trading hours. Volume spikes more strongly
than volatility at the open and close of the pits (14:20 and 19:30 for gold, 14:25 and 19:25 for
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silver, and 14:10 and 19:00 for copper), at the time of the price jumps associated with the 14:30
and 16:00 US macroeconomic releases, and at the open of US stock markets at 15:30.
For WTI oil (see Panel (l)), volume is lower than volatility outside of pit hours (15:00-20:30)
and exceeds it during pit hours. At the open and close of the pit, volume spikes much more
strongly than volatility. The same holds at the open of US stock markets, at the time of the
16:00 macroeconomic announcements, and when oil inventory data is released at 16:30. For
Brent oil (see Panel (m)), volume is lower than volatility during Asian hours, about the same
during European hours, and higher when both European and US markets are open. The largest
spikes in volume occur at the close of European stock markets and of the WTI pit. The spikes
in volume at the times of the main price jumps – the 14:30 macroeconomic releases, the 16:30 oil
inventory releases, and the 20:00 Federal reserve releases – are somewhat, but not much, larger
than the associated spikes in volatility.
Overall, two facts about intraday volume-volatility relationships are especially striking. First,
the behavior at jump times differs significantly across instruments. To illustrate, at 14:30, the
spikes in volume are much larger than those in volatility for some assets – the Nikkei, the Bund,
US Treasuries, both currencies and all metals – while they are of about the same magnitude
for others – the EuroStoxx, the S&P 500, and oil. This suggests differences across markets in
traders’ anticipation of large price moves at the time of scheduled announcements. Second, a
number of assets have very large spikes in volume that are not associated with commensurate
spikes in volatility not just at times when the underlying cash market or futures pit opens or
closes, but also when markets for other assets open or close. The most striking examples are the
rise in Nikkei volume at the open of US stock markets and that in Brent volume at the close of
European stock markets.
2.9 Conclusion
We investigate price discovery around the clock for 13 global benchmark assets from the main
asset classes equities, currencies, bonds, and commodities. We document that sizable price
discovery occurs around the clock for almost all assets. For a given asset, the distribution of risk
and return during the day is fairly similar, indicating a broadly constant risk-return-relationship
during the trading day.
Although the amount of price discovery varies significantly during the day and across as-
sets, price discovery generally is quite efficient around the clock for most assets. Nevertheless,
efficiency tends to be higher during an asset’s main market hours, and there exist short periods
where price discovery is inefficient. For most instruments, inefficiency is concentrated before the
open of Asian markets or during the first few hours of trading on Asian markets.
All assets show strong intraday volatility patterns, but the precise shapes of these patterns
vary substantially across assets. Strikingly, most assets do not exhibit the U-shaped intraday
volatility pattern that has been widely documented for US equities, even if only the trading
hours of the underlying or pit market are considered. Intraday spikes in volatility occur at four
sets of times: (i) at the open or close of the market for the respective asset, (ii) at the open or
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close of the futures pit for the respective asset, (iii) at the open or close of other markets (both
the underlying cash market and markets for other assets), and (iv) at the time of macroeconomic
news releases. Most assets react strongly to US macroeconomic news releases and have higher
volatility during US trading hours, but also exhibit strong volatility outside of US trading hours.
The decomposition of intraday volatility into its diffusion and jump components reveals that
both diffusion and jump volatility are important drivers of overall intraday volatility patterns.
The contribution of jumps to overall volatility is substantial, accounting for approximately 5%
to 13% of total daily return variance. A sizable fraction of jump-driven volatility occurs around
US macroeconomic news announcements, which affect all assets in our sample.
In general, volume significantly exceeds volatility during US trading hours. The relationship
between volume and volatility that can be observed during most of the day often does not
hold at jump times. Both volume and volatility spike at the time of jumps, but the difference
between the two sometimes does and sometimes does not. This suggests that in some – but not
all – markets, traders anticipate large price moves at the time of scheduled announcements and
market depth falls accordingly. The opening and closing of stock markets or futures pits tend
to be associated with spikes in trading volume that are much larger than the contemporaneous
spikes in volatility. Strikingly, these spikes in volume are often considerably greater than those
associated with price jumps. For some assets, such spikes even occur at the open or close of
markets for other assets.
Overall, our results highlight the importance of around-the-clock trading for price discovery.
Explaining the observed differences in intraday volume and volatility patterns across assets that
are traded around the clock is a promising avenue for future research.
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his
table
reports
the
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transacted
during
different
periods
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day.
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w
ere
defined
to
capture
the
pre-m
arket
and
m
ain
hours
ofthe
three
globalfinancialcenters
Japan,Europe,and
the
U
S
(see
Section
2.3
for
details).
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lllisted
tim
e
periods
are
left-closed
and
right-open
tim
e
intervals
in
C
ET
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price
contribution
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different
periods
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day.
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ere
defined
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capture
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pre-m
arket
and
m
ain
hours
ofthe
three
globalfinancialcenters
Japan,Europe,and
the
U
S
(see
Section
2.3
for
details).
A
lllisted
tim
e
periods
are
left-closed
and
right-open
tim
e
intervals
in
C
ET
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each
period
i
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trading
day,the
volum
e-w
eighted
price
contribution
is
com
puted
as
V
W
P
C
i =
r
i
/
r
V
i
/
V
,w
here
r
i
denotes
the
return
during
period
i,
r
the
totalreturn
for
the
day,
V
i
trading
volum
e
during
period
i
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V
totaldaily
volum
e.
Volum
e-w
eighted
price
contribution
is
calculated
for
each
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and
then
averaged
across
days.
a,
b,
and
c
denote
statistical
significance
(difference
from
zero)
at
the
10%
,
5%
and
1%
-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.6. Scheduled US News Announcements
Announcements Frequency Source Time (CET)
1st Announcements
Consumer Price Index Monthly Bureau of Labor Statistics 14:30
Durable Goods Orders Monthly US Census Bureau 14:30
Gross Domestic Product Monthly Bureau of Economic Analysis 14:30
Initial Jobless Claims Weekly Department of Labor 14:30
Non-Farm Payroll Employment Monthly Bureau of Labor Statistics 14:30
Producer Price Index Monthly Bureau of Labor Statistics 14:30
Retails Sales Less Automotive Monthly US Census Bureau 14:30
2nd Announcements
Consumer Confidence Index Monthly Conference Board 16:00
ISM Manufacturing Index Monthly Inst. for Supply Management 16:00
ISM Non-Manuf. Index Monthly Inst. for Supply Management 16:00
Leading Indicators Monthly Conference Board 16:00
New Home Sales Monthly US Census Bureau 16:00
3rd Announcement
Federal Reserve Beige Book Eight
times per
year
Federal Reserve Bank 20:00
FOMC Rate Decision Federal Reserve Bank 20:00/20:15
FOMC Meeting Minutes Federal Reserve Bank 20:00
FOMC Meeting Press Conference Federal Reserve Bank 20:30-45
This table reports the most important scheduled US news announcements (divided into three chronologically
ordered groups). The time of FOMC Rate Decision announcements changed during our sample period (20:15 CET
until March 2013 and 20:00 CET afterwards). The beginning of the chairman/chairwoman’s press conference is
scheduled at approximately 20:30 CET.
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Figure 2.1. Cumulative price and variance contribution.
This figure shows the cumulative price and variance contributions for each asset during the trading day. For each five-
minute interval i during the trading day, the price contribution is computed as PCi = rir , where ri denotes the return
during interval i and r the total return for the day. The variance contribution is computed as the squared return for
each interval i divided by the sum of all squared returns for the day. Price and variance contribution are calculated for
each day and then averaged across days.
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Figure 2.2. Difference between price and variance contribution for selected
assets.
This figure shows the cumulative price and variance contributions during the day, the difference between the two, as well
as 90% confidence bounds for this difference. In each category, we select the asset for which the difference is largest.
Price and variance contribution are computed for each day as described in Figure 2.1 and then averaged across days.
The confidence intervals for the difference are obtained using its empirical distribution in the sample.
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Figure 2.4. Volatility during the trading day.
This figure shows the average return volatility of the different instruments for each five-minute interval during the trading
day. Volatility is computed as the square root of the average squared return during each interval.
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3 Multimarket Informed Trading and Risk Aversion
This paper investigates the triangular trade-off between leverage, market depth, and risk
in informed traders’ choice of their preferred trading venue upon a private signal with a
potentially big price impact (jump). Within a sequential trading model involving a stock
and an options market, I study the utility maximizing trading strategy of heterogeneously
risk-averse and imperfectly informed traders. I find a semi-separating equilibrium that
separates more risk-averse traders into the stock and less risk-averse traders into the
options market to be a robust outcome of the model. Relative to the risk-neutral bench-
mark, the proportion of conditional informed stock trading is always higher under a
semi-separating equilibrium. Furthermore, the model predicts that conditional informed
stock trading is increasing in market makers’ assessment of the cross-market adverse se-
lection risk, but with decreasing sensitivity as the latter increases. An analysis of trading
data prior to US M&A announcements provides empirical evidence for the equilibrium
characteristics postulated by the model.
3.1 Introduction
Where do informed traders trade? The answer to this question is crucial in understanding
how decentralized asymmetric information about joint underlying risks manifests itself in asset
prices that are traded on different venues. Economically, a keen knowledge of this process is of
fundamental importance as information revealing prices are indispensable for achieving efficient
resource allocations within any market economy.
Given the past decades’ dramatically growing derivative markets, one important setting in
which multimarket informed trading has been studied extensively is that of a stock and coexisting
options market. Option contracts, as first pointed out by Black (1975), offer a considerable
leverage advantage compared to the underlying stock and therefore represent a natural habitat
for informed traders. However, the existing literature is inconclusive regarding the informational
content of option trades with respect to future stock price movements (see below).
In this paper, I reflect upon two elements that are usually not jointly accounted for in the
literature and combine them within a framework of sequential multimarket trading à la Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). First, I model underlying stock dynamics to be driven by (i) ‘regular’
and relatively small value changes, represented by a binomial lattice, and (ii) an uncertain
jump component which follows an asymmetric exponential distribution. Such stock dynamics
constitute a reasonable trade-off between real-world return statistics and analytical tractability,
I am indebted to my advisor Marc Chesney for his support and guidance. I thank Jerôme Detemple, René
Stulz, Yuan Zhang, Alexandre Ziegler, and participants at the University of Zurich PhD seminar and the SFI
Research Days 2014 for helpful comments.
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as they allow for benchmark option prices in semi-closed form. Second, I assume informed
traders to be only imperfectly informed about the sign of a future jump when choosing to trade
in either the stock or the options market. Importantly, I allow for heterogeneity among their
distaste towards the risk from trading upon their private but imperfect signal.1
I find that, in general, an informed trading equilibrium is semi-separating in the sense that
more risk-averse traders prefer to trade in the stock market, whereas less risk-averse traders
choose to trade options. Furthermore, such a semi-separating equilibrium exhibits two distinct
features. First, the higher market makers’ perceived risk of asymmetric information θ, the bigger
the proportion of informed stock relative to informed options trading and vice versa. This result
could explain why in some empirical studies informed option trading is less likely discernible
than its initial comparative leverage advantage would suggest.
Second, conditional informed stock trading is strongly concave in market makers’ perceived
risk of informed trading. Specifically, for low values of θ, the proportion of informed traders who
choose the stock over the options market increases rapidly in the latter, but becomes less and less
sensitive as θ increases further. The intuition behind both features requires some elaboration
and is provided in the subsequent paragraphs. By jointly analyzing pre-M&A announcement
abnormal trading volume of target firms’ stocks and call options, I provide empirical evidence
for both patterns of multimarket informed trading.
Most existing models of multimarket informed trading that involve both stocks and equity
options (see literature review below) point to the two securities’ implicit leverage and relative
market liquidity as main forces behind informed traders’ choice of their preferred trading venue.
I argue that accounting for option contracts’ higher inherent risk in combination with informed
traders’ risk aversion provides an intuitive explanation for the above described characteristics
of a semi-separating equilibrium.
Equity options’ comparative leverage advantage is a direct consequence of their asymmetric
payoff profile. Given informed traders’ imperfect information regarding the final stock value,
they face the risk of big adverse price movements such that previously purchased options end
up being out-of-the-money (OTM) ex post, i.e., expiring worthless at maturity.2 Moreover,
this risk is particularly pronounced for options that are already OTM when acquired, which in
turn, however, provide the highest possible leverage ex ante. Thus, the more risk-averse a given
informed trader is, the more likely she is willing to trade-off options’ leverage advantage in return
for the stock’s linear and therefore less risky payoff structure. Irrespectively of the security’s
type, a deeper market with more liquidity trading always makes it easier for the informed traders
to trade without being detected by market makers, thereby avoiding higher spreads. Figure 3.1
summarizes the three cornerstones of my model.
Now, based on the above argument, it is possible to provide the intuition of how informed
1More specifically, I consider a continuum of informed traders, all having a CRRA utility function, but with
varying risk aversion parameter γ.
2For simplicity, I only consider European options. However, a similar argument is also valid for American
options’ nonlinear payoff structure.
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Leverage Market depth
Risk
Figure 3.1. Triangle of multimarket informed trading
traders’ varying risk aversion explains (i) why a semi-separating equilibrium occurs even when
market makers’ perceived risk of informed trading θ is low, and (ii) why the conditional pro-
portion of informed stock trading is an increasing and concave function in θ. If θ is low and
the corresponding spreads in market makers’ price quotes are small, the very risk-averse traders
still prefer to forgo the options’ big leverage advantage and trade in the less risky stock market
instead. This explains (i) for low values of θ.
Regarding (ii), as θ increases, market makers revise their respective price quotes to account
for the increased risk of engaging with superior informed traders. By doing so, they reduce
option’s initial leverage advantage relative to the stock, which again causes more and more
risk-averse traders to switch from trading options to trading the stock. However, as this is
anticipated by rational market makers, stock quotes are adjusted more strongly than options
quotes. Eventually, i.e., as θ becomes high enough, the initially lower stock spread starts to catch
up, which then makes it relatively more attractive for the less risk-averse traders to continue
trading in the options market. Thus, this explains both (ii) as well as (i) for high values of θ.
In summary, the narrative that motivates my model’s sequential trading setup is the follow-
ing. At the beginning of any given trading day, an unobserved fraction of traders may receive
a private signal about the stock’s future value. Based on the above introduced stock dynam-
ics, this piece of private information is assumed to have a specific but realistic structure. In
particular, I assume that informed traders learn about the certain occurrence of an upcoming
jump in the stock value, however, they only know its sign and distribution but have no further
information about its exact size and timing. Moreover, their private signal neither rules out the
possibility of additional jumps, nor does it affect ‘regular’ stock value movements.
In order to rule out no-trading equilibria due to fully revealing prices (see Grossman (1981)
and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)), I adopt the literature’s common assumption of exogenously
given liquidity traders. As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the presence of such liquidity traders
provides competitive market makers with the possibility to protect themselves against the risk of
adverse selection by charging bid-ask spreads in return for market clearing. I assume trading is
carried out sequentially, i.e., traders willing to buy or sell at current market quotes are randomly
selected and provided with the opportunity to trade. Hence, market makers generally do not
know ex-ante, whether an arriving trader is informed or is solely trading for exogenous liquidity
reasons. Throughout the sequential trading process, market makers continuously update their
ex-ante beliefs about the potential presence of informed traders and adjust their bid and ask
quotes accordingly. In the rational expectation equilibrium, informed traders maximize expected
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utility and market makers set price quotes to break even in expectation. The so achieved
separation of potentially informed traders between the stock and the options market thus needs
to be as conjectured by market makers when setting their quotes.
I test the model’s equilibrium prediction by looking at both stock and options trading data of
US target firms prior to their respective M&A announcements. There are two reasons why this
data is particularly well suited for an empirical test of my model. On the one hand, post-M&A
announcement returns of US target firms are generally huge (on average around 20% per day
when conditioning on nonnegative returns (see below)) and nicely fit an exponential jump distri-
bution. On the other hand, there exists strong empirical evidence (see below) for both informed
stock and informed options trading involving a target firm’s stock prior to the announcement.
Consistent with the theory, I find that the higher the overall proportion of abnormal trading
volume, the greater the relative amount of abnormal stock trading. Furthermore, as predicted
by the theory, the sensitivity of this positive relation becomes weaker as the overall level of
abnormal trading increases.
My paper relates to the rich and steadily growing literature on lead-lag relationships between
the options and the underlying stock market. As mentioned above however, its findings are
somewhat inconclusive. Depending on the analyzed explanatory variable(s) and the considered
time horizon, certain contributions do whereas others do not find any empirical evidence for
nonredundant information in option trading data. For instance, in a recent paper An et al. (2014)
show that past call implied volatilities predict underlying stock returns over a window of up to six
months. In contrast, based on tick-by-tick quote data, Muravyev et al. (2013) reject the notion
that equity option quotes comprise any economically significant information regarding future
stock price changes. Both papers provide a comprehensive review of the respective empirical
literature. Chesney et al. (2015) propose an econometric approach to identify abnormal option
trades that are unlikely to have been initiated by liquidity traders.
Moreover, this paper is closely related to previous theoretical investigations of informed
trading strategies in the joint presence of stock and options markets. Biais and Hillion (1994)
analyze informed and liquidity trading in a complete market setting including a risk free bond,
a stock, and a European option. Assuming a perfectly informed and risk-neutral insider, they
determine equilibrium informed (and liquidity) trading patterns for all three asset classes. Fur-
thermore, they show that options can have both a positive (by avoiding market breakdowns) as
well as a negative (by enlarging the set of trading activities) effect on markets’ informational
efficiency. Easley et al. (1998) derive a profit condition such that informed traders’ expected
gains from trading options exceed those from trading the stock. The authors consider this con-
dition necessary for the existence of a pooling equilibrium, in which both homogeneous informed
traders and liquidity traders are pooled together in the options market.3 Similarly to Biais and
Hillion (1994), Easley et al. (1998) assume informed traders to be perfectly informed about next
period’s stock value.
In line with my model’s stock value dynamics, Johnson and So (2013) assume that informed
3Note that due to the heterogeneity of informed traders’ degree of risk aversion, a semi-separating equilibrium
in my model refers to the separation of a continuum of informed traders into two markets.
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traders receive a signal about an ‘information arrival shock’ but none regarding the stock’s
regular ‘diffusive shock’ component. Like Easley et al. (1998), they do not specify informed
traders’ utility function. According to their model, homogeneous informed traders almost surely
prefer one market over the other. In the model by An et al. (2014), informed traders, uninformed
traders, and one market dealer are all risk-averse with CARA utility and an identical risk aversion
coefficient. Based on a simplified option value that is linear in the stock price, they show how
changes in the option price are endogenously correlated with next period’s stock return and
realized volatility. However, neither do An et al. (2014) introduce a sequential trading process
that allows market makers’ beliefs about the prevailing risk of asymmetric information to change,
nor do they discuss the role of risk aversion in informed agents’ trading decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model and
reviews its assumptions. Section 3.3 derives the condition for a semi-separating equilibrium of
multimarket informed trading. Section 3.4 presents numerically obtained equilibria and discusses
their comparative statics. Based on trading data prior to M&A announcements, Section 3.5
provides an empirical test of the model’s main predictions. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
Following Easley et al. (1998), I introduce a sequential trading model à la Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) to a setting with two markets and three risky assets: (i) an equity market that trades
shares in a risky stock and (ii) an options market simultaneously trading a European call and
put option on one share of the stock. In the presence of imperfectly informed and exogenous
liquidity traders, each market is made by a competitive market maker observing the complete
order flow in both the equity and the derivatives market. In contrast to Kyle’s (1985) gradual
trading model, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assume informed traders to behave competitively,
i.e., to fully exploit their informational advantage as soon as being offered the opportunity to
trade. In equilibrium, both market makers apply rational expectations in order to quote bid
and ask prices such as to break even in expectation.
3.2.1 Stock Value Dynamics
In this simple trading economy, risky assets are exchanged against a risk-free security earning a
constant rate r (continuously compounded) per unit of time. The stock’s value process is com-
posed of two independent components: (i) a binomial lattice, representing regular, i.e., relatively
small value changes, and (ii) a jump component that incorporates sudden and potentially big
value shifts implied by the rare arrival of extreme information shocks.
Formally, under the physical probability measure P, the commonly observable stock value
between t and t+ ∆t evolves as follows
St+∆t = St ×X × V Nt+∆t−Nt , (3.1)
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where X is a discrete random variable taking values u with probability p and d with probability
1− p, 0 < d < 1 < u, Nt is a Poisson counting process with intensity λ and Y := log V has an
asymmetric double exponential distribution with density
fY = p˜× η1e−η1y1{y≥0} + (1− p˜)× η2eη2y1{y<0}, (3.2)
where η1 > 1, η2 > 0, and 0 < p˜ < 1.4 The parameter p˜ in Eq. (3.2) can be interpreted as
the probability of a positive jump, i.e., 1− p˜ corresponds to the probability of a negative jump.
Based on Eq. (3.1), one can write the stock value at T , where T := t+ n∆t and n ∈ N, as
ST = St ×
n∏
t=1
Xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
lattice
component
×
NT−Nt∏
j=1
Vj︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump
component
, (3.3)
where I assume both sequences {Xi} and {Vj} to be i.i.d.5 Additionally, all three sources of
randomness, the Xs, V s, and Nt are assumed to be mutually independent. Note that, in the
presence of asymmetric information about future jumps, i.e., about future realizations of NT ,
the actual trading price will likely deviate from the value process in Eq. (3.1).
Given its obvious discontinuous structure, the specification of the stock value dynamics
in Eq. (3.3) requires some further elaboration on its jump component. Recalling that V is
a globally differentiable transformation of Y , one easily computes EP[V |Y ≥ 0] = η1η1−1 and
EP[V |Y < 0] = η2η2+1 , respectively.6 Note that, if Y ≥ 0, than V ∈ [1,∞) and, if Y < 0,
than V ∈ (0, 1). Hence, p˜ and 1 − p˜ in Eq. (3.2) can be interpreted as the probabilities of a
positive and negative jump with expected values equal to η1η1−1 > 1 and
η2
η2+1 < 1, respectively.
Therefore, the values u and d of the Xs in Eq. (3.3)’s lattice component are chosen subject to
u EP[V |Y ≥ 0] = η1
η1 − 1 , and d E
P[V |Y < 0] = η2
η2 + 1
, (3.4)
i.e., such that the absolute value shift caused by an average positive or negative jump is sub-
stantially greater than the respective value changes due to regular up and down movements.
In particular, if one sets u = eσ
√
∆t and d = 1u as proposed by Cox et al. (1979) (for any
σ > 0 satisfying the inequalities in Eq. (3.4)) and p = 12(1 +
µ
σ
√
∆t), the lattice part of Eq. (3.3)
converges, as n → ∞ for a fixed T (i.e., as ∆t → 0), to a geometric Brownian motion with
4See, e.g., Kou (2002) for a detailed discussion on the asymmetric double exponential jump distribution.
5For the stock dynamics in Eq. (3.1), I implicitly assume P(Nt+∆t −Nt > 1) = 0 a.s.
6Since V is a globally differentiable, strictly monotone transformation of Y , it holds that
EP[V |Y ≥ 0] =
∫ e∞
e0
v · η1 exp(−η1 log(v)) 1
v
dv = η1
η1 − 1 ,
and analogously
EP[V |Y < 0] =
∫ e0
e−∞
v · η2 exp(η2 log(v)) 1
v
dv = η2
η2 + 1
.
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Table 3.1. Parameters for path simulations
St 100 λ 1
u 1.01 η1 8
d 1/u η2 8
p 0.51 p˜ 0.5
T 1 ∆t 1/250
Notes: This table provides the parameter values of Eq. (3.3) as used for the path simulations
displayed in Figure 3.2.
drift µ and volatility σ. In contrast to these specifications of u and d, the distribution of the V s
does not depend on n. Hence, in the limit as n → ∞, the only part responsible for potential
discontinuities in the stock value is its jump component.
As illustration, Figure 3.2 shows four stock value realizations generated by simulating Eq. (3.3)
with parameter choices as in Table 3.1. The base scenario of the numerical analysis in Section 3.4
relies on the same parameter values. Given the specifications in Table 3.1, the holding period
return equals 8.1% in expectation with a standard deviation of 26.8%.7 On average, the stock
value jumps once every 250 time steps (λ = 1), with positive and negative jumps occurring with
equal probability (p˜ = 0.5). The expected jump size is substantial, i.e., 14.3% for positive and
-11.1% for negative jumps, respectively.
Additionally, there exist a call option c and a put option p, each controlling one share of the
stock described in Eq. (3.3). Both contracts are of the European type, i.e., they can be exercised
at maturity T only. Their respective payoffs Πc and Πp at T are given by
ΠcT = max(ST −Kc, 0), and ΠpT = max(Kp − ST , 0),
where Kc and Kp denote the strike price of the call and the put, respectively.
3.2.2 Informed and Liquidity Traders
Trading occurs sequentially between stock value realizations and is initiated by two types of
agents: informed and uninformed traders arriving one by one. Whereas the former only trade
upon their private information, the latter are assumed to solely trade for liquidity purposes that
are exogenous to the model. As noted by Easley et al. (1998), liquidity trading is a natural
feature of derivatives markets, which frequently witness purely hedging motivated trades.
Exogenous liquidity trading is realistically assumed to be evenly distributed across all possi-
ble trades within each asset class. More specifically, for both the stock and the call (put) option,
buyer and seller initiated transactions occur with equal probability. Additionally, retaining the
7The second moment of ST can easily be calculated given
V ar(V ) = p˜η1
(
1
η1 − 2 −
2EP[V ]
η1 − 1 +
EP[V ]2
η1
)
+ (1− p˜)η2
(
1
η2 + 2
− 2E
P[V ]
η2 + 1
+ E
P[V ]2
η2
)
for all η1 > 2, where EP[V ] = p˜ η1η1−1 + (1− p˜)
η2
η2+1 .
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Figure 3.2. Simulations of the stock value process
Notes: This figure shows four simulations of the stock value process as defined in Eq. (3.3)
with parameter value choices as in Table 3.1. For every sample path, the respective return
and realized volatility are computed.
symmetry between both option contracts, liquidity traders are assumed to engage in as many
call as put trades. By α I denote liquidity traders’ proportion of stock to total (stock and option)
orders. Thus, on average, α2 of all liquidity orders are placed to buy (sell) shares in the stock,
while 1−α4 are liquidity-based buy (sell) call (put) orders.
Informed traders are wealth constrained, i.e., they are endowed with initial capital Wt0 .
Moreover, they are homogeneous with respect to (i) their investment opportunity set, and (ii)
the functional form of their utility U(·) in terminal wealth WT . Importantly, by imposing power
utility, i.e., U(WT ) = W γT /γ, informed traders are assumed to be risk-averse. However, they are
heterogeneous with regard to their respective degree of risk aversion. In particular, I assume a
continuum of competitive informed traders uniformly distributed over γ ∈ (0, 1).8
This specification has two main advantages. First, it is well documented in the experimental
literature that the majority of individuals’ estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 − γ
lies between 0 and 1 (see, e.g., Holt and Laury (2002), Goeree et al. (2002), Goeree et al. (2003),
Goeree and Holt (2004), Biais et al. (2017), and Fattinger (2017)). Second, the average risk
aversion parameter measured in the lab lies close to γ = 1/2, i.e., reasonably approximates the
‘median informed trader’ in my model.
At any stock value realization prior to the options’ expiration T , an unknown proportion of
8As pointed out by Easley and O’Hara (1987), the factor that affects equilibrium asset prices is not the number
of informed traders per se, but rather the ratio of informed to uninformed trades.
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informed traders may receive a private signal regarding the occurrence and the sign of a future
stock value jump to take place with certainty until T . Denoting such an information event by
t? ∈ {t0, t0 + ∆t, ..., T − ∆t}, the informed traders thus know that there will be at least one
positive (negative) jump with distribution fY = η1e−η1y1{y≥0} (fY = η2eη2y1{y<0}) between
t? + ∆t and T .9
I assume informed traders’ signal to be independent of the stock value process in Eq. (3.3).
Hence, at t?, the actual value process—only known to informed traders—then reads (for t = t?)
ST =
ST := St? ×
∏n
i=1Xi ×
∏NT−Nt?
j=1 Vj × V , if signal is positive,
ST := St? ×
∏n
i=1Xi ×
∏NT−Nt?
j=1 Vj × V , if signal is negative,
(3.5)
where Y := log V and Y := log V follow an exponential distribution with densities fY =
η1e−η1y1{y≥0} and fY = η2eη2y1{y<0}, respectively. In other words, at t?, informed traders know
with certainty that there either will be one positive or one negative jump until T , independently
of the realizations of the Xs, V s, and Nt.
In line with Glosten and Milgrom (1985), I assume informed traders to enter expected utility
maximizing trades, as soon as given the chance to profit from their informational advantage.
Thus, whenever they are randomly offered the opportunity to trade, they do trade as much
as possible. Put differently, informed traders are not behaving strategically when timing their
market transactions. Note that this is not only consistent with their competitive nature, but
also with the fact that their private signal carries no information regarding the exact jump time,
which itself is an element of {t? + ∆t, t? + 2∆t, ..., T}. Hence, by trading as soon as possible,
they are minimizing the risk of missing out on their private information.
Following Easley et al. (1998), I assume that informed traders only trade in either the stock
or the options market.10 Comparing these two alternatives, Black (1975) was the first to point
to options’ inherent leverage advantage that is particularly attractive to informed traders. Pan
and Poteshman (2006) find deep out-of-the-money (OTM) option transactions to exhibit strong
predictability regarding future underlying stock returns, whereas less leveraged contracts contain
very little, if any, predictive power.
Ensuring options’ inherent leverage advantage, I assume both the call and the put option
to be OTM, i.e., Kc > St? and Kp < St? , respectively. Finally, motivated by the options’
moneyness, I assume that informed traders either trade (buy or short sell) the stock or buy
options instead. If recipients of a negative signal decide to short sell the stock, they are required
to deposit their short sale proceeds together with their initial wealth as collateral with the stock
9For simplicity, I assume that potential private signals simultaneously occur with stock value realizations, i.e.,
informed traders know that the stock value may jump at t? + ∆t the earliest.
10An alternative assumption yielding similar equilibrium implications would be to consider a large number of
identically risk-averse (same γ) informed traders who can simultaneously trade in both markets. Depending on
their risk aversion, they then either invest a higher proportion of their wealth in the less risky stock or the more
levered options.
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market maker.11 Due to their relatively low price, selling an OTM put (call) upon a positive
(negative) signal would be comparably unattractive. In reality, OTM options are generally
more frequently traded than their in-the-money (ITM) counterparts, thereby giving the former
a comparative liquidity advantage over the latter. Moreover, investors intending to write options
are usually subject to substantial margin requirements, which leaves the selling of options even
less compelling. In line with my model’s private nature of the received signal, Cremers et al.
(2015) find that option purchases but not sales predict stock returns ahead of unscheduled news
events.
3.2.3 Market Makers
There are two market makers, one that sets buy (ask) and sell (bid) prices for the stock and
one that sets buy and sell prices for both option contracts. I follow the literature’s common
assumption that market making is a perfectly competitive business. Thus, each market maker
sets bid and ask prices to break even in expectation.
As in Easley et al. (1998), I assume that both market makers observe all incoming orders in
either market. Hence, their bid and ask prices always equal the respective conditional expected
asset values implied by the complete order history. More specifically, at any time t′i during
trading period i, i.e., ∀t′i ∈ [ti, ti + ∆t), both market makers compute conditional expectations
based on the same set of beliefs: (i) the likelihood of a previous information event θt′i and (ii) the
conditional probability that a potentially informed trader decides to trade in the stock (options)
market θS,t′i (1− θS,t′i).
For simplification, I assume both market makers to be risk-neutral. This considerably simpli-
fies the computation of their asset evaluations in both cases, i.e., with or without conditioning on
asymmetric information. Importantly, since informed traders are risk-averse, risk-neutral pricing
induces trading incentives driven by differing risk preferences. Specifically, due to their asym-
metric payoff profile, options become relatively more expensive for risk-averse traders than the
stock when priced by risk-neutral market makers. Hence, this might bias multimarket trading
equilibria towards informed stock trading.
In order to control for such an effect, I repeat the numerical analysis presented in Section 3.4
for risk-adjusted asset prices. However, due to the model’s incomplete market, the therefore
applied risk-neutral pricing measure derived in Appendix A3 is not unique. Hence, to avoid
further assumptions regarding informed traders’ preferences towards the model’s different risk
sources, I henceforth focus on risk-neutral market makers. Most importantly, the qualitative
results are the same for both approaches and the respective small differences are pointed out
throughout the various parts of Section 3.4.12
Following Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Easley et al. (1998), I assume sequential trading,
i.e., after every stock value realization, sequentially and randomly selected traders have the
11In order to retain the symmetry between informed stock purchases and informed stock sales, I assume that
neither the stock market maker nor the informed traders earn any interests on such deposits.
12Detailed results are available on request.
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time
t0 t1
t?
t2 T −∆t T
market makers
oberserve order flows
when quoting ask and
bid prices
in total n periods
of length ∆t
information event
Figure 3.3. Illustration of sequential trading between stock value realizations.
opportunity to trade in either the stock or the options market. Subsequently to any given
value realization, each market maker continuously updates her beliefs regarding the probability
of being matched with an informed trader. This sequential trading process thus allows for
additional stock price fluctuations between two value realizations. For the purpose of this study,
I focus on trading periods starting after value realizations for which prior accumulating trading
patterns have led market makers to correctly rule out the occurrence of any preceding information
events. Hence, while providing bid and ask prices, market makers are aware that maximum one
price signal has occurred so far.13 Figure 3.3 illustrates the sequence of value realizations at
t0, t1, ..., T and the market makers’ sequential trading with anonymous traders in between.
3.3 Equilibrium Informed Trading
In equilibrium, all agents take optimal actions given their rational expectations. I impose the
following two equilibrium conditions (ECs):
1. By simultaneously observing stock price realizations and the complete history of order
flows, the market makers set price quotes to earn zero expected profits. (EC1 )
2. Based on market makers’ updated price quotes, the informed traders’ expected utility
maximizing trades are as conjectured by the former. (EC2 )
Clearly, any potential equilibrium has to satisfy both conditions simultaneously.
3.3.1 Market Prices in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
In order to compute expected break-even market prices (as imposed by EC1 ), two cases have to
be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the benchmark case in which both market makers
13In case of several information events, the same logic regarding market makers’ continuous updating process
applies. However, the corresponding spread calculations (see below) become more involved since they not only
have to account for multiple stock value jumps, but, given the random jump size, also continually evaluate whether
these jumps have already been part of the gradually observable stock value realizations.
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assign a zero probability to the risk of trading with an informed trader. On the other hand,
there is the complementary case in which either one considers it possible that certain stock or
option orders have been placed by informed traders. Hence, assuming the latter, each market
maker believes the probability θ to be nonzero and therefore adds (subtracts) a probability-
weighted information premium (haircut) to the benchmark asset value. I henceforth refer to
such deviations from benchmark values as ‘information spreads’.14
3.3.1.1 Benchmark Asset Values
I start by deriving risk-neutral asset values for the benchmark case, i.e., in the absence of asym-
metric information. If market makers can rule out the presence of informed traders with cer-
tainty, information spreads for all risky assets equal zero. The stock value at t, t ∈ {t0, t1, ..., T},
is then simply given by the observable value process St. For the analysis of informed trading
in the remainder of the paper, the focus lies on short-lived private signals, e.g., referring to one
trading week or one month. Hence, for the computations of the options’ benchmark values, I
assume, without severely restricting the original model setup, that the probability of more than
one unanticipated jump between t and T is close to zero, i.e., P(NT −Nt > 1) ≈ 0. Thus, the
possibility of several unanticipated jumps can be neglected.15 However, the initial modelling in-
tention of confronting potentially informed traders with the risk of unknown positive or negative
jumps until T is preserved.
Based on this assumption, I can compute the benchmark European call value as its expected
discounted payoff under P, i.e.,
ct = EPt [e−r(T−t)ΠcT ],
where the discount rate r is justified by the option market maker’s risk neutrality. Appendix B3
summarizes the derivation of the time-t call value given in semi-closed form by
ct = e−r(T−t)
[
e−λ¯
(
n¯∑
i=l∗
φ[i, n¯; p](Stuidn¯−i −Kc)
)
+
λ¯e−λ¯
{
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{
(1− p˜)η2
(
Stu
idn¯−i
1− (bil ∧ 1)η2+1
η2 + 1
−Kc 1− (b
i
l ∧ 1)η2
η2
)
+ p˜η1
(
Stu
idn¯−i
(bil ∨ 1)−η1+1
η1 − 1 −K
c (bil ∨ 1)−η1
η1
)}}]
,
(3.6)
where φ[i, n¯; p] ≡ n¯!i!(n¯−i)!pi(1 − p)n¯−i, n¯ := n − t−t0∆t , λ¯ := λ(T − t), bil = K
c
uidn−iSt denotes the
necessary jump size such that the call option ends up in the money at maturity, and l∗ is the
smallest nonnegative integer such that the same holds true in the case of no jumps. The first
14In the market microstructure literature these deviations are often referred to as adverse selection spreads.
15This assumption is mathematically justified whenever the intensity parameter λ of the counting process
Nt and the length of the considered time period (T − t) are small enough such that P(NT − Nt = 2) =
λ(T−t)2
2! e
−λ(T−t) ≈ 0. This is ensured throughout the numerical analysis in Section 3.4.
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term in Eq. (3.6) refers to the case where there is no stock value jump between t and the call’s
maturity T , whereas the second term corresponds to the case where one jump occurs until T .
Analogously, one can show that the benchmark European put value
pt = EPt [e−r(T−t)Π
p
T ]
is given by
pt = e−r(T−t)
[
e−λ¯
(
u∗∧n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p](Kp − Stuidn¯−i)
)
+
λ¯e−λ¯
{
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{
(1− p˜)η2
(
Kp
(biu ∧ 1)η2
η2
− Stuidn¯−i (b
i
u ∧ 1)η2+1
η2 + 1
)
+ p˜η1
(
Kp
(biu ∧ 1)−η1 − (biu)−η1
η1
− Stuidn¯−i (b
i
u)1−η1 − (biu ∧ 1)1−η1
1− η1
)}}]
, (3.7)
where biu = K
p
uidn¯−iSt denotes the necessary jump size such that the put option ends up in the
money at maturity and u∗ is the largest nonnegative integer such that the same holds true in
the case of no jumps.
3.3.1.2 Information Spreads
Based on informed traders’ set of possible trades, it is evident that market makers might consider
any stock and call buy order to stem from a potentially informed trader who has received
a positive jump signal. Equivalently, any stock sell and put buy order could be submitted
by an informed trader whose signal has been negative. I denote market makers’ perceived
risk regarding the presence of ‘positively’ (‘negatively’) informed traders by θ+ (θ−) and the
corresponding conditional probability of an informed stock trade by θS , respectively. Note that
θS may be different for positive and negative signals.
In the case of abnormally high levels of stock and/or call buy orders during trading period i,
both market makers sequentially update their estimates of θ+ and θS . By {informed, uninformed}
and {shares, options} I denote the two possible event space partitions of any randomly arriving
trader. Bayes’ rule then implies that at t′i, t′i ∈ [ti, ti + ∆t), the probability of a newly arriving
informed stock buyer equals (henceforth neglecting subscript i)
P(informed|shares) = P(informed)P(shares|informed)
P(informed)P(shares|informed) + P(uninformed)P(shares|uninformed)
= θ
+
t′ θS,t′
θ+t′ θS,t′ + (1− θ+t′ )α2
,
where α/2 represents the proportion of stock buys among all liquidity trades. By condition EC1,
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the equilibrium stock ask price set by the stock market maker at t′ needs to satisfy
aSt′ = St +
value of
pos. jump︷ ︸︸ ︷
(St − St) θ
+
t′ θS,t′
θ+t′ θS,t′ + (1− θ+t′ )α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
information spread stock
, (3.8)
where St denotes the market maker’s time-t stock value in the certain case of a future positive
jump and is given below.
Accordingly, the time-t′ probability with which the options market maker sells a call to a
newly arriving informed trader equals
P(informed|options) = θ
+
t′ (1− θS,t′)
θ+t′ (1− θS,t′) + (1− θ+t′ )1−α4
,
where (1− α)/4 represents the proportion of call buys among all liquidity trades. Thus, the time-t′
equilibrium call ask price set by the options market maker has to satisfy
act′ = ct +
value of
pos. jump︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ct − ct) θ
+
t′ (1− θS,t′)
θ+t′ (1− θS,t′) + (1− θ+t′ )1−α4︸ ︷︷ ︸
information spread call option
, (3.9)
where ct denotes her time-t call value in the case of a positive signal and is derived below.
The information spreads in Eq. (3.8) and Eq. (3.9) correspond to the assets’ excess values
due to a priced in future jump times the respective probability of informed trading. Since the
excess values only depend on the last realization of the observable stock value, they remain
constant between t and t+ ∆t. In contrast, the conditional probabilities of informed trading are
likely to fluctuate between value realizations, thereby reflecting market makers’ updated beliefs
regarding the presence of informed traders.
Recalling market makers’ risk neutrality, St in Eq. (3.8) is given by the product of the current
stock value realization St and the expected positive jump size, i.e.,
St = StEP
[
V
]
= St
η1
η1 − 1 .
Accounting for the future positive jump, ct in Eq. (3.9) is given by
ct = EPt [e−r(T−t) max(ST −Kc, 0)]
= e−r(T−t)e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{∫ ∞
bi
l
∨1
(Stuidn¯−iv −Kc)η1v(−η1−1)dv
+ λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
1
max(Stuidn¯−ivv −Kc, 0)η1v(−η1−1)dv dFV
}
.
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Solving the first integral yields
ct = e−r(T−t)e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{
η1
(
Stu
idn¯−i
(bil ∨ 1)−η1+1
η1 − 1 −K
c (bil ∨ 1)−η1
η1
)
+ λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
1
max(Stuidn¯−ivv −Kc, 0)η1v(−η1−1)dv dFV
}
.
In the case of abnormally high levels of arriving stock sell and/or put buy orders, market
makers sequentially adjust their estimates of θ− and θS . Thus, again implied by Bayes’ rule
and condition EC1, the time-t′ equilibrium stock bid price set by the stock market maker has
to satisfy
bSt′ = St +
value of
neg. jump︷ ︸︸ ︷
(St − St)
θ+t′ θS,t′
θ−t′ θS,t′ + (1− θ−t′ )α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
information spread stock
, (3.10)
where St denotes the market maker’s time-t′ stock value in the sure case of dealing with a
negatively informed stock buyer. Analogously, the time-t′ equilibrium put ask price set by the
options market maker needs to satisfy
apt′ = pt +
value of
neg. jump︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p
t
− pt) θ
−
t′ (1− θS,t′)
θ−t′ (1− θS,t′) + (1− θ−t′ )1−α4︸ ︷︷ ︸
information spread put option
, (3.11)
where p
t
denotes her time-t put value in the case of a negative signal.
Note that in Eq. (3.10), the information spread is actually negative since St − St < 0. It
indeed makes sense that the stock market maker is only willing to pay less than St per share, if
she assigns a nonzero probability to the risk of being matched with a negatively informed trader.
St in Eq. (3.10) and pt in Eq. (3.11) are given by
St = StEPt [V ] = St
η2
η2 + 1
,
and
p
t
= e−r(T−t)e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{
η2
(
Kp
(biu ∧ 1)η2+1
η2 + 1
− Stuidn¯−i (b
i
u ∧ 1)η2
η2
)
+ λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ 1
0
max(Kp − Stuidn¯−ivv, 0)η2v(η2−1)dv dFV
}
,
respectively.
As in Easley et al. (1998), both market makers protect themselves against the adverse se-
lection risk from privately informed traders by quoting divergent bid and ask prices. However,
given my assumption that informed traders only buy options, the bid-ask spreads in the options
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market are solely driven by increasing ask prices. Options’ bid prices are therefore always equal
to their respective benchmark values. Via the sequential trading process market makers learn
about potential preceding signals. Hence, in the limit, bid and ask prices converge to the asset
values that fully reveal any price relevant information. After having determined market mak-
ers’ bid and ask prices that yield zero expected profits conditional on EC2, I now turn to the
derivation of the equilibrium probability of informed stock trading θ?S .
3.3.2 Equilibrium Informed Stock and Options Trading
Informed traders maximize their expected utility of terminal wealth WT by trading in either
the stock or the options market. Therefore, there exist three fundamentally different types
of informed trading equilibria: (i) all informed traders only trade in the stock market, i.e.,
θ?S = 1, (ii) some trade in the stock and others in the options market, i.e., θ?S ∈ (0, 1), and
(iii) they exclusively trade in the options market, i.e., θ?S = 0. I refer to θ?S ∈ (0, 1) as a
‘semi-separating equilibrium of informed trading’ in which heterogeneously risk-averse informed
traders are separated between the stock and the options market. Due to the exogenous liquidity
trading of the uninformed, the bid and ask prices in Eq. (3.8) – Eq. (3.11) are sufficient to
determine the equilibrium proportion θ?S satisfying EC1 and EC2.
As it turns out, a given informed trader’s risk-aversion is the key variable which determines
whether she prefers to trade shares or to buy OTM options. This is intuitive, given the stock’s
and the options’ different risk-return profiles: Whereas the latter’s leverage potential is much
higher, the former thus is clearly less risky. To see this, one recalls that informed traders’ private
signal is imperfect. Hence, it is possible that the post-trading stock value realizations until T
are to the disadvantage of the informed traders. If they have bought (sold) shares, their final
wealth nevertheless is almost surely strictly positive. In contrast, if they have decided to buy
OTM options, these derivative contracts are then likely to expire worthless, thereby completely
eliminating informed traders’ wealth.
The following proposition establishes the condition for a semi-separating equilibrium in both
cases, i.e., for a positive and negative signal.
Proposition (Semi-separating equilibrium). In the case of a positive signal at t and given
market makers’ time-t′ beliefs regarding θ+, t′ ∈ [t, t+ ∆t), θ?S,t′ corresponds to a time-t′ semi-
separating equilibrium satisfying EC1 and EC2 iff
EPt′
U ( Wt0
aS(θ?S,t′ |θ+t′ )
ST
)∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
 != EPt′
U ( Wt0
ac(θ?S,t′ |θ+t′ )
cT
)∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
 , (3.12)
such that θ?S,t′ ∈ (0, 1). In the case of a negative signal at t, assuming short selling requires
an interest-free deposit of all time-t′ proceeds, θ?S,t′ corresponds to a time-t′ semi-separating
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equilibrium iff
EPt′
U (Wt0
(
1 +
bS(θ?S,t′ |θ−t′ )− ST
bS(θ?S,t′ |θ−t′ )
))∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
 != EPt′
U ( Wt0
ap(θ?S,t′ |θ−t′ )
p
T
)∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
 , (3.13)
such that θ?S,t′ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Recall that informed traders are uniformly distributed over γ ∈ (0, 1). In the case of a
positive signal, the LHS of Eq. (3.12) equals the θ?S,t′-th informed trader’s expected utility from
buying Wt0
aS(θ?S,t′ |θ
+
t′ )
shares of the stock at t′, whereas the RHS corresponds to her expected utility
from buying Wt0
ac(θ?S,t′ |θ
+
t′ )
units of the call option (in both cases the initial endowment is fully
invested). If Eq. (3.12) holds, she is indifferent between the two trades. Moreover, the relative
attractiveness (in expected utility terms) of buying shares is strictly decreasing in γ, i.e., strictly
increasing in her risk aversion 1 − γ (see proof of Result 3.2 in Appendix D3). Therefore, if
Eq. (3.12) holds, exactly θ?S,t′ percent of informed traders buy shares and 1 − θ?S,t′ percent buy
calls, which again corresponds to the market makers’ beliefs underlying their respective ask
prices in Eq. (3.8) and Eq. (3.9).
In the case of a negative signal, the LHS of Eq. (3.13) equals the θ?S,t′-th informed trader’s
expected utility from short selling Wt0
bS(θ?S,t′ |θ
−
t′ )
shares of the stock, whereas the RHS corresponds to
her expected utility from buying Wt0
ap(θ?S,t′ |θ
−
t′ )
units of the put option. The relative attractiveness of
short selling shares is strictly decreasing in γ (see proof of Result 3.2 in Appendix D3). Hence,
the exact analogue argument as in the case of a positive signal applies. This completes the
proof.
The intuition behind a semi-separating equilibrium is simple. Based on market makers’ price
quotes, informed traders choose the trading venue that allows them to maximize their expected
utility. Relatively more risk-averse traders will prefer to trade shares, whereas relatively less risk-
averse traders will decide to buy options. In equilibrium, these two proportions must exactly
equal market makers’ anticipations thereof, i.e., θ?S percent of informed traders have to choose
the stock over the options market. Because informed traders are uniformly distributed over
γ ∈ (0, 1), this indeed is the case if the informed trader with γ = θ?S is indifferent between
trading shares or options. Furthermore, since ask and bid prices are functions of θ+ (θ−), it
follows that θ?S also depends on market makers’ beliefs regarding the aggregated presence of
informed traders across markets.
The condition for a semi-separating equilibrium in Eq. (3.12) is equivalent to
Eq. (3.12) ⇔
EPt′
[
S
γ
T
]
aS(θ?S,t′ |θ+t′ )γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
!= E
P
t′ [ c
γ
T ]
ac(θ?S,t′ |θ+t′ )γ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
, (3.14)
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and Eq. (3.13) is equivalent to
Eq. (3.13) ⇔ EPt′
(1 + bS(θ?S,t′ |θ−t′ )− ST
bS(θ?S,t′ |θ−t′ )
)γ∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
 != EPt′
[
pγT
]
ap(θ?S,t′ |θ−t′ )γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=θ?
S,t′
. (3.15)
Hence, θ?S does not depend on informed traders’ initial capital endowment. In order to solve for
θ?S , one has to separately compute the two expectations in Eq. (3.14) and Eq. (3.15), respectively,
whose explicit forms are provided in Appendix C3.
Given the explicit expressions of Eq. (3.14) and Eq. (3.15), it is possible to iteratively solve
for a semi-separating equilibrium. Before turning to the numerical analysis of the model, I
briefly discuss the existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium.
Result 3.1 (Existence). If, for , δ > 0, there exists a θS ∈ (, 1] and a θδS ∈ [0, 1 − δ) both
satisfying the equality in Eq. (3.12) (Eq. (3.13)) but with γ =  and γδ = 1 − δ, respectively,
then there also exists a semi-separating equilibrium θ?S ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix D3.
Thus, if there exists (i) a relatively more risk-averse informed trader who is indifferent between
trading in the two markets at the maximum stock and minimum option spread and (ii) a rela-
tively less risk-averse informed trader who is indifferent between the two markets at the minimum
stock and maximum option spread, then there also exists a semi-separating equilibrium. For a
high n, i.e., for many remaining stock value movements until T , the above result allows for a
simple check regarding the existence of a semi-separating equilibrium. The subsequent numeri-
cal analysis in Section 3.4 asserts that, for a wide range of parameter values, such an equilibrium
indeed exists.
Result 3.2 (Uniqueness). If there exists a semi-separating equilibrium θ?S satisfying Eq. (3.12)
(Eq. (3.13)), then it is unique.
Proof. See Appendix D3.
Hence, it is known ex-ante that any interior solution θ?S to Eq. (3.12) (Eq. (3.13)) found by
numerical iteration corresponds to the only existing equilibrium. Furthermore, in the special
case of a positive signal, the following statement regarding the functional form of θ?S can be
made.
Result 3.3 (Equilibrium trading upon positive signal). In the case of a positive signal, the
semi-separating equilibrium θ?S is given by a fixed point of the solution to a quadratic equation.
Proof. See Appendix D3.
Relying on the above result significantly simplifies (and speeds-up) the numerical computation
of θ?S .
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Table 3.2. Parameters for numerical analysis
Base Case
St0 100 Kc 105 r 0.02
d 1/u Kp 95 n {5, 25}
p 0.51 ∆t 1/250 α 0.9
Jump Scenario 1
η1 8 p˜ 0.5 u 1.01
η2 8 λ 1
Jump Scenario 2
η1 10 p˜ 0.4 u 1.02
η2 5 λ 1
Notes: This table provides the parameter values for the numerical analysis. The parameters
in the top panel are thereby combined with those of either jump scenario. r denotes the
risk-free interest rate (continuously compounded) and Kc (Kp) the call (put) option’s strike
price. λP is the jump frequency under the risk-neutral measure. All remaining parameters
specify the stock value process as given in Eq. (3.3).
3.4 Numerical Analysis
Based on the above derived sufficient conditions for a semi-separating equilibrium, θ?S can be
obtained numerically given market makers’ beliefs about θ+ or θ−, respectively. However, it
proves helpful to first disentangle θS from the indifferent trader’s risk aversion and separately
analyze the equalities in Eq. (3.12) and Eq. (3.13) with respect to ceteris paribus changes in θ+
(θ−) and γ.
Throughout the following numerical analysis, all results are based on the parameters given
in Table 3.2. For ease of notation, all calculations are carried out for ti = t′i = t0, i.e., focusing
on the very beginning of the first trading period, while the time subscript is omitted. However,
since I consider the whole range of market makers’ beliefs, this can be done without loss of
generality. If one thinks of years as the respective time unit, n ∈ {5, 25} in combination with
a duration ∆t of 1/250 between stock value realizations implies a remaining number of five or
25 trading days until T , respectively. This is consistent with a rather short-lived private signal.
As postulated above, strike prices are set such that both options are OTM at t0. On average,
there is one jump per time unit unrelated to private information. If not otherwise specified,
liquidity traders’ proportion of stock to total orders α is set to 0.9. This is closely in line with
the empirically observed proportions in Section 3.5.16
The parameters of the first jump scenario are those of Table 3.1 that underlie the path
simulations in Figure 3.2. The parameters of the second scenario correspond to the one of the
numerical option pricing example in Kou (2002). The second scenario complements the first one
16Based on the respective measures in Section 3.5, 47.5% of pre-M&A announcement liquidity-based trading
volume correspond to stock buys, whereas 2.6% are call purchases.
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by allowing for a higher asymmetry between positive and negative jumps.17 Under scenario 2,
the average size of positive jumps equals 11.1% and -16.7% for negative jumps. Moreover, the
latter are somewhat more likely (with a probability p˜ of 60%) than the former.
Finally, the up movement parameter u in scenario 2 (1.02) is set slightly higher than in
scenario 1 (1.01). This is because I aim for reasonable first and second moments of unconditional
holding period returns. Overall, the parameter values in scenario 1 imply an expected return
over one time unit of 8.1% with a standard deviation equal to 26.8%, whereas under scenario 2
the corresponding values are 9.7% and 42.1%, respectively. This is approximately in line with
an average realized volatility of single-name S&P 100 constituents of around 32% per annum
(see, e.g., Buraschi et al. (2009)).
3.4.1 The Indifference Surface
A semi-separating equilibrium θ?S(θ+/−) is reached if the θ?S-th informed trader is indifferent be-
tween trading shares or buying options. By construction, the θ?S-th informed trader’s coefficient
of relative risk aversion γ equals θ?S . Hence, both market makers’ beliefs regarding the potential
presence of informed traders θ+/− as well as their respective risk aversion 1 − γ are crucial for
determining θ?S .
The analysis of what henceforth shall be referred to as ‘indifference surfaces’ lends itself for
a better understanding of the structure behind any semi-separating equilibrium. If an informed
trader with risk aversion 1− γ could split her orders between shares and options, then, for any
given pair (γ, θ+/−), the indifference surface indicates her proportion of stock to total orders that
equalizes her expected utility across trading venues. Naturally, if there exists no such proportion
θS ∈ (0, 1) the surface is bounded between zero and one. Formally speaking, all points on the
indifference surface which are strictly positive but smaller than one do satisfy the same condition
as in Eq. (3.12) or Eq. (3.13), respectively, but with differing values for θS and γ.
Distinguishing between positive and negative private signals, Figure 3.4 shows the indiffer-
ence surfaces for both jump scenarios in Table 3.2 with n = 25. The first dimension of each
indifference surface corresponds to the risk aversion parameter γ, where 1− γ measures relative
risk aversion. The conditional proportion of stock orders is decreasing in γ, i.e., θS(γ, θ+/−) is
larger for informed traders who are more risk-averse. This result is not surprising, considering
the options’ asymmetric and hence more risky payoff profile. Due to their nonzero probability
of expiring OTM, i.e., to be completely worthless at T , any sufficiently risk-averse trader prefers
to exclusively invest in shares, which almost surely yield a strictly positive payoff.
The second dimension of the indifference surfaces in Figure 3.4 corresponds to the market
makers’ beliefs regarding the potential presence of informed traders θ+/−. My numerical analysis
shows that the proportion of stock orders is increasing in θ+/−. Again, this is very intuitive.
The call’s (put’s) comparative leverage advantage over the stock is decreasing in θ+ (θ−), as
the market makers’ quote adjustments as given in Eq. (3.8) – Eq. (3.11) are relatively larger
17This corresponds to the empirical fact that stock price time series usually exhibit greater negative than
positive jumps (in absolute values).
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Figure 3.4. Indifference surfaces
Notes: This figure plots the indifference surfaces for scenario 1 (S1) and scenario 2 (S2)
as specified in Table 3.2 with n = 25 stock value realizations. Given market makers’
beliefs regarding the likelihood of informed trading θ+ (θ−), each surface corresponds to
the anticipated proportion θS of informed stock trading for which the γ-informed trader is
indifferent between trading in the stock or the options market.
for options than for the stock. Hence, the corresponding spreads effectively lessen the options’
leverage advantage. Therefore, the higher θ+/−, the smaller this leverage advantage and the
larger θS in Figure 3.4. The sensitivity of θS with respect to θ+/− moreover negatively depends
on a given informed trader’s risk aversion 1− γ. As soon as her risk aversion exceeds a certain
threshold, she prefers to only trade shares, independently of the level of θ+/−.18
Overall, the four surfaces in Figure 3.4 look quite similar. In order to better visualize
the differences in θS(γ, θ+/−) across the four different cases, Figure 3.5 shows the respective
difference plots. The top two plots depict positive differences θ+S − θ−S for most (γ, θ+/−)-values,
indicating a higher proportion of informed stock trading for a positive signal. Equivalently, over
the same neighborhood of the (γ, θ+/−)-plane, informed traders buy more puts than calls. For
both jump scenarios, these differences are increasing in γ and decreasing in θ+/−. This higher
attractiveness of the put relative to the call is clearly most pronounced for high values of γ in
scenario 1 and small values of θ+/− in scenario 2.
18The general validity of this behavior of θS(γ, θ+/−) is verified by the proof of Result 3.2 in Appendix D3.
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Figure 3.5. Differences between indifference surfaces
Notes: This figure plots the differences between the indifferent surfaces in Figure 3.4. The
top two plots show the differences between the likelihood of a positive signal θ+ and the
likelihood of a negative signal θ−. The bottom two plots show the differences between
scenarios 1 (S1) and scenario 2 (S2) as specified in Table 3.2.
First, due to the stock value process’ positive drift, the call is more expensive than the put
in scenario 1. For any given level of θ+/−, the put therefore provides a higher leverage compared
to the call. At the same time, the former’s risk of expiring OTM is also higher. Thus, the less
risk-averse a given informed trader is, the more options she buys in the case of a negative relative
to a positive signal. Second, in scenario 2, this effect is mitigated by a higher probability of a
strongly negative jump. Furthermore, due to the larger negative than positive price shock (in
expectation), the put’s leverage advantage for informed traders still outweighs the one by the
call, as long as information spreads are low.
The bottom two plots in Figure 3.5 show the differences in relative informed stock trading
across the two jump scenarios in Table 3.2. Independently of the signal’s sign, for most values
of (γ, θ+/−), informed traders are willing to buy more options in the case of bigger positive and
smaller negative jumps (scenario 1). As shown in the lower left plot, below a certain level of risk
aversion, informed traders buy more calls under scenario 1 when θ+ is low. The reason is that
the higher volatility from regular stock value movements (larger u) increases the call’s ask price
under scenario 2. This in turn decreases the call’s leverage for an informed trader, especially
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when information spreads are low.
However, referring to the case of a negative signal shown in the lower right plot, this same
effect is dominated by the put’s higher potential leverage when trading against the unconditional
expected jump size.19 More specifically, the unconditional expected jump multiplier is 1.016 in
scenario 1 and 0.944 in scenario 2. Hence, solely the put under scenario 2 can be pushed into
the money by an average jump only.20 In other words, buying puts upon a negative signal may
provide a higher leverage under scenario 1, even though the conditional expected impact of a
negative jump is bigger under scenario 2. As shown in Figure 3.5, this is exactly the case for
the here considered parameters: The less risk-averse a given informed trader is, the more puts
she is willing to buy under scenario 1, despite having to bear the risk of another jump whose
mean is positive.
In case both market makers are risk-averse and thus rely on the risk-neutral probability
measure in Appendix A3 when quoting their break-even ask and bid prices, the call becomes
somewhat less and the put somewhat more expensive.21 This lowers the differences between
relative informed call and put purchases in the top row of Figure 3.5, as the stock value process’
drift is reduced to the risk-free rate r.
3.4.2 Multimarket Equilibrium
The above indifference analysis demonstrates the driving forces behind a potential semi-separating
equilibrium for which market makers’ price quotes must leave the θ?S-th informed trader indiffer-
ent between trading either in the stock or the options market. Applying the above proposition,
I numerically solve for θ?S considering both jump scenarios in Table 3.2. Figure 3.6 presents
multimarket informed trading equilibria for each combination of jump scenarios and number
of stock value realizations. Every depicted θ?S ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to a semi-separating equi-
librium, where θ?S percent of either positively (circles) or negatively (squares) informed traders
choose to trade in the stock market.
Overall, Figure 3.6 reveals two striking characteristics of multimarket informed trading equi-
libria. First, the existence of a semi-separating equilibrium is very robust with respect to market
makers’ estimate of the overall probability of informed trading. Across the whole range of θ+/−,
the corresponding proportion of conditional informed stock trading θ?S(θ+/−) is strictly bigger
than zero but smaller than one, i.e., there are always some informed traders who prefer to trade
in the stock rather than in the options market. Given the parameter choices of Table 3.2, this
proportion is consistently above 20%, but as θ+/− converges to one, so does the fraction of
informed stock trading.
19I verify this by an additional ceteris paribus analysis keeping u fixed across jump scenarios.
20Recall that the unconditional expected jump size equals EP[V ] = p˜ η1
η1−1 +(1− p˜)
η2
η2+1 . Given the put’s strike
price Kp of 95, it follows that St0 × 0.944 < Kp.
21This is due to the risk-neutral measure’s lower likelihood of an up movement u, which is again implied by
the usual martingale condition with respect to the stock value process.
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Figure 3.6. Multimarket informed trading in equilibrium
Notes: This figure shows proportional informed stock trading θ?S in equilibrium as a function
of market makers’ perceived likelihood of positively (circles) (negatively (squares)) informed
trading θ+ (θ−). The left and middle columns plot trading equilibria based on scenario 1
(S1) and scenario 2 (S2) as specified in Table 3.2, respectively. The right column presents
the respective differences between the two. In the top (bottom) row, the number of stock
value realizations is set to n = 5 (n = 25).
Second, the dependence of θ?S on θ+/− has a very distinctive form: (i) the higher the proba-
bility of informed trading, the bigger is the proportion of informed traders who choose the stock
over the options market in order to benefit from their private information. (ii) up until very high
levels of θ+/−, this relation is clearly concave, i.e., the additional fraction of informed traders
opting for the stock market increases very fast for low values of θ+/−, but less and less so as
θ+/− becomes larger.
The intuition for this specific functional form is simple. If the probability of informed trading
rises, market makers adjust their respective quotes to account for the risk of trading with an
informed trader. By doing so, the options’ initial leverage advantage decreases, leaving the
relatively more risk-averse informed traders to switch from buying options to trading shares.
However, since these more risk-averse traders react very sensitively to a reduction of options’
comparative leverage advantage, the stock’s information spread starts to catch up quickly due to
the fast growing θ?S . Yet, from the perspective of the less risk-averse traders, a high fraction of
informed stock trading diminishes the attractiveness of switching from the stock to the options
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market. Therefore, almost risk-neutral traders, i.e., those whose γ is close to one, keep on buying
options even for very high levels of θ+/−.
More specifically, when comparing informed call to informed put trading, Figure 3.6 unveils
that, given the stock value’s positive drift, the cheaper put is relatively more attractive to
the informed traders than is the call (θ?S-squares below θ?S-circles). This effect becomes more
pronounced under a negatively skewed jump distribution (scenario 2) and as the option’s time
to maturity n×∆t increases.
Furthermore, referring to Figure 3.6’s right column, informed call trading is higher under
scenario 1 (∆θ?S < 0), where the expected size of a positive jump is larger than under scenario
2. Accordingly, at least for low n, informed put trading is more attractive under scenario 2, in
which negative jumps exhibit a larger average price impact. However, as the number of stock
value realizations increases, this clear-cut pattern disappears in the case of the put. The reason
thereof again lies in the put’s higher leverage potential under scenario 1, given that scenario
2’s unconditional expected jump size is sufficient to push the stock value below the put’s strike
price, which itself becomes more likely as n increases.
Finally, informed option trading decreases faster in the probability of informed trading θ+/−
if options’ time to maturity is shorter (not explicitly shown). This is intuitive, given that for
a lower n the private signal’s information precision is greater, which in turn implies higher
information spreads. Consistently, for low values of θ+/−, i.e., when information spreads are
small, informed option trading is higher for n = 5 than for n = 25. Since informed traders
are risk-averse, they ceteris paribus prefer to buy options when the risk of adverse stock value
movements is smaller.
Assuming market makers to be risk-averse only marginally affects mulitmarket trading equi-
libria. The stock value’s lower drift under the risk-neutral measure generally reduces the propor-
tional differences between informed call and put trading across all cases considered in Figure 3.6.
More importantly, however, both the robust existence of a semi-separating equilibrium as well
as the distinct functional form of θ?S(θ+/−) prevail.
3.4.3 Risk Aversion, Equilibrium Spreads, and Market Depth
So far, the implication of the model’s key element, i.e., informed traders’ risk aversion, has
not been discussed in isolation. For one exemplary case, the left plot of Figure 3.7 shows the
difference between equilibrium informed stock trading θ?S and the proportion of stock trades
θRNS for which a risk-neutral (γ = 1) informed trader is indifferent between the two markets.
This simple exercise uncovers two important effects of risk aversion on multimarket informed
trading.
First, the difference between risk-averse and risk-neutral informed stock trading starts around
one third and quickly rises to reach a value close to 70%. Overall, for relatively low probabilities
of informed trading, i.e., up to 20%, the proportion of informed stock trading under a semi-
separating equilibrium is approximately 50% higher (in absolute differences) than under the
risk-neutral benchmark.
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Figure 3.7. Impact of risk aversion & spread comparison
Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of informed traders’ risk aversion on equilibrium
informed trading (left plot) and compares the equilibrium information spreads between
the stock and the call in the case of a positive signal (right plot). Both plots are based
on scenario 1 as given in Table 3.2 and n = 5 value realizations. The left plot shows
the difference between equilibrium informed stock trading θ?S , as shown in top left plot
of Figure 3.6, and the proportion of stock trades θRNS for which a risk-neutral (γ = 1)
informed trader is indifferent between the two markets. Based on θ?S in the left plot, the
right plot shows the ask prices for the stock and the call as given in Eq. (3.8) and Eq. (3.9),
respectively.
Second, as the probability of informed trading further increases, the distance between the two
proportions starts to decrease and eventually approaches zero as the occurrence of a private signal
becomes common knowledge. Formally speaking, the hump shape in the left plot of Figure 3.7
is a direct consequence of a semi-separating equilibrium’s strongly concave dependence on the
probability of informed trading. As θRNS (θ+/−) increases less strongly at the beginning but more
so for higher values of θ+/−, the above pattern arises.
In summary, imperfectly informed traders’ risk aversion offers an intuitive explanation why,
for realistic levels of θ+/−, informed option trading could indeed be lower than relative market
depth and Black’s (1975) leverage argument suggest. Generally, the above described pattern is
robust to the considered sign of the private signal as well as across jump scenarios.
The right plot of Figure 3.7 illustrates why simply testing the predicted equilibrium properties
via empirically observed stock and option bid-ask spreads might be difficult. Based on the
corresponding semi-separating equilibrium for a positive signal, it depicts the stock and the
call ask price as given in Eq. (3.8) and Eq. (3.9), respectively, for different values of θ+. One
notes that the former’s information spread is first smaller than the latter’s but then becomes
larger as θ+ increases, again a direct implication of the semi-separating equilibrium’s concavity.
Moreover, around the median value of my empirical measure for θ, i.e., 8.5% (see below), the
slopes of the two curves more or less coincide.
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Figure 3.8. Impact of relative market depth
Notes: This figure shows equilibrium informed stock trading upon a positive (left plot) and
negative (right plot) signal for varying levels of relative stock market depth. α denotes
the proportion of liquidity stock trades (relative to total liquidity trades) which are evenly
distributed among stock buys and sells. Both plots are based on scenario 1 as given in
Table 3.2 and n = 25 value realizations.
Another interesting question is how equilibrium informed stock trading reacts in response to
exogenous changes in stock market depth. Intuitively, one expects an increase in the proportion
of liquidity-based stock orders α to diminish options’ inherent leverage advantage, as informed
option trading becomes more easily detectable by market makers. Formally, this can be verified
by recalling Eq. (3.9) and Eq. (3.11), where options’ information spreads react more sensitive to
θ+/− as α becomes larger and vice versa.
Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between θ?S and θ+/− for varying values of α. As expected,
a higher α, i.e., a relative increase in stock market depth, ceteris paribus leads to a larger
proportion of conditional informed stock trading. Furthermore, in line with the concavity of a
semi-separating equilibrium, an increased sensitivity of conditional informed stock trading for
lower probabilities of multimarket informed trading is observed.
3.5 Empirical Evidence
My numerical analysis has unveiled two main implications of informed traders’ risk aversion on
equilibrium multimarket trading: On the one hand, the existence of a semi-separating equilib-
rium appears to be a robust phenomenon with regard to varying market makers’ beliefs about
the overall likelihood of informed trading θ+/−. On the other hand, equilibrium informed stock
trading θ?S features a positive and strongly concave relationship with respect to the joint prob-
ability of informed trading θ+/−.
One way of testing these two findings empirically is by simultaneously looking at stock and
options trading activities prior to merger and acquisitions (M&A) announcements. M&A an-
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nouncements are often followed by a substantial jump in the target company’s stock price (see,
e.g., Schwert (1996)). Furthermore, in contrast to, e.g., periodically scheduled earning announce-
ments or other anticipated corporate media releases, pre-M&A announcement periods are less
likely to experience purely speculative trading. Therefore, I consider such pre-announcement
periods as an ideal case study for testing my model’s predictions regarding multimarket informed
trading patterns in the presence of an imminent and extreme informational event.
Unsurprisingly, this paper is not the first to investigate pre-announcement trading volume
in the target’s underlying stock and options contracts. For instance, Cao et al. (2005) find that
both buyer-seller initiated stock volume imbalances as well as call volume imbalances predict
post-announcement returns. In particular, Cao et al. (2005) document that takeover targets with
the highest call-imbalance build-ups exhibit the largest stock returns on the announcement day.
Similarly, by looking at more recent data, Augustin et al. (2015) provide evidence of informed
traders engaging in directional option strategies on the target’s stock before the announcement.22
Since post-announcement jumps in the targets’ stock value are generally positive, the fol-
lowing analysis applies to the case of informed stock and option trading upon a positive signal,
i.e., it focuses on the function θ?S(θ+). To ease readability, I henceforth omit the superscripts ‘?’
and ‘+’.
3.5.1 Data Selection and Sample Description
My empirical analysis relies on data from four different sources: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum
database, OptionMetrics, Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), and the NYSE Trade
and Quote (TAQ) database. The sample period spans from 2005 up to and including 2012,
covering a steady increase of the US stock market (until the end of 2007), the following financial
crisis and its aftermath, as well as the subsequent recovery of US equity prices.
I search for all M&A deals with a US target firm in the SCD Platinum database. By relying
on the targets’ CUSIPs, I then check each deal for the availability of options trading data in
OptionMetrics. Out of 83’945 transactions in the SDC Platinum database, I find options trading
data on a total of 815 target firms. However, in 499 cases the acquirer’s and the targets CUSIP
are identical. Since my main focus lies on transactions where the target is acquired by or merged
with an independent acquirer, these 499 deals are eliminated from the sample. This leaves me
with a final sample of 316 M&A transactions with a median percentage of shares acquired equal
to 100% (mean of 78.9% and standard deviation of 36.2%).
All 316 identified targets with actively traded options are matched with stock and options
trading variables from CRSP and OptionMetrics. Relying on the algorithm proposed by Lee
and Ready (1991), the daily stock trading volume is further divided into buyer and seller ini-
tiated trades. Specifically, trades with transaction prices above (below) the prevailing quote
midpoint are classified as buyer (seller) initiated; trades with transaction prices at the midpoint
are classified as buyer (seller) initiated if the quote midpoint is higher (lower) relative to the
preceding trade. All remaining trades are regarded as cross-trades and excluded. I match trades
22For further references, see the literature review in Augustin et al. (2015).
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Figure 3.9. Daily stock returns on the post-event date
Notes: This figure plots the (conditional) distributions of M&A targets’ daily stock returns
on the post-event date. Returns are measured in decimal numbers, e.g., 0.2 corresponds to
a daily return of 20%. The left plot contains all daily returns, whereas the right plot only
contains nonnegative returns and additionally depicts the density of the fitted exponential
distribution.
to National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quotes with a lag of one second (instead of five seconds
as in Lee and Ready (1991)).23 The therefore required intraday transaction data (ticks and
NBBO quotes) are taken from the NYSE TAQ database.
To ensure that the selected post-event date indeed corresponds to the trading day at which
the stock price is adjusted for the newly revealed information, I move the former to either the
previous or subsequent trading day of the announcement, if its return exceeds the one realized
on the actual announcement date.24 Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of the daily stock returns
on the post-event date. Out of the 316 daily returns (left histogram), 228 are nonnegative (right
histogram). Note that the distribution of the nonnegative returns lies close to its exponential
fit, with an average implied jump size of 0.205, i.e., 20.5%. Consequently, the (positive part)
of our model’s asymmetric double exponential jump distribution seems to describe post-M&A
announcement target returns reasonably well.
Based on this sample, appropriate measures for both θ, the overall likelihood of informed
trading, as well as for θS , the conditional proportion of informed stock trading, have to be
constructed. However, this task is not straightforward. For the former, one could aim for
some kind of measure based on Easley et al. (1996), i.e., developing a likelihood function of a
multimarket version of their well-known PIN measure. Due to the unavailability of the required
23I apply this shorter time lag because of the higher speed with which my sample’s market transactions were
executed compared to the early nineties.
24In case that both the stock return on the previous and the subsequent trading day are higher than the
respective return on the announcement date, the trading day with the highest return is chosen as post-event date.
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options trading data, the construction of such a measure is unfeasible. Moreover, given the
short-lived nature of the considered private signal, the validity and the stability of PIN-based
measures are at least questionable. Instead, as it is usually done, I base my measures of θ and
θS on abnormal stock and options trading volume.
3.5.2 Measures of Multimarket Informed Trading
Basically, I measure the likelihood of informed trading as the proportion of abnormal to total
stock and options trading volume. Equivalently, I measure conditional informed stock trading as
the proportion of abnormal stock relative to total abnormal stock and options trading volume.
In particular, I try to adopt a one-to-one translation of the model’s inherent structure to the
simultaneous measurement of both θ and θS .
Given the models’ assumption of liquidity trades’ (locally) time invariant distribution, both
within and across markets, I estimate multimarket informed trading up to and including the
pre-announcement date t by
θt :=
1
5
4∑
i=0
θt−i & θS,t :=
1
5
4∑
i=0
θS,t−i, (3.16)
where each pair (θt−i, θS,t−i) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the
following simple equation system
θt−iθS,t−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed
stock trading
+ (1− θt−i)
 1
50
60∑
j=11
Bt−i−j
Vt−i−j
 = Bt−i
Vt−i
θt−i (1− θS,t−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed call
options trading
+ (1− θt−i)
 1
50
60∑
j=11
V c,otmt−i−j
Vt−i−j
 = V c,otmt−i
Vt−i
,
(3.17)
where V := B+S+V c,otm+V p,otm is defined as the sum of total stock buys B, total stock sells
S, total OTM call volume V c,otm, and total OTM put volume V p,otm.
Since I am presuming the occurrence of a positive signal, informed stock trading is reflected
in abnormal buyer initiated stock volume. Due to the unavailability of intraday option data, as
well as the limited applicability of a Lee & Ready-like algorithm for infrequently traded stock
options, I do not distinguish between buyer and seller initiated options volume. Hence, I rely
on fluctuations of total call volume as an indicator of informed option trading. Again, sticking
as closely to my model as possible, I only consider short dated OTM options. Specifically, a call
(put) is classified as being OTM, if its ratio of current stock to strike price is smaller (greater) or
equal than 0.95 (1.05). Short dated options are required to have a remaining time to maturity
of no more than 30 days.25 Finally, both stock buys and sells are divided by 100 in order to
25The equity options in OptionMetrics are generally American-style options, i.e., they can be exercised anytime
up to maturity. However, given the considered timing, it would be irrational for informed traders to exercise their
calls before the realization of the informational event that initiated their option trades in the first place.
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make them directly comparable to the observed option volume, where each derivative contract
is written on 100 shares of the stock.
In the literature, it is well documented that potentially informed trading prior to M&A
announcements is in no way limited to the pre-announcement day only. For example, Augustin
et al. (2015) find that abnormal option trading volume is most pronounced during the four days
prior to the announcement. Hence, my measures of informed trading rely on average trading
patterns over the last trading week before the announcement day, henceforth referred to as event
window. Liquidity traders’ proportions of stock buys and total call volume are estimated over
the 50 trading days preceding the last ten days prior to the respective event date and, as pointed
out above, align reasonably well with α = 0.9.
The intuition behind the system in Eq. (3.17) is straight forward. The equations simply
state that the proportion of total stock buys (total call volume) at day t equals the weighted
sum of liquidity traders’ proportional stock buys (call volume) and informed traders’ propor-
tional stock (call) trading, where the weights correspond to the probabilities of the partition
{informed,uninformed} of traders’ information set. The measured degree of informed trading
thus depends on the differences between these weighted values and the system’s RHS, i.e., the
proportions of total stock buys and total call volume relative to total trading volume, averaged
over the pre-announcement trading week.
3.5.3 Summary Statistics and Regression Analysis
The above analysis has shown that an increasing probability of engaging in informed trades
causes market makers to adjust their price quotes in such a way that leads to a higher proportion
of informed stock trading. I test this relation by estimating the following two regressions:
θS,nt = const+ β1θnt + bcnt + nt (3.18)
θS,nt = const+ β1θnt + β2 (θnt)2 + bcnt + nt, (3.19)
where nt refers to the target n at event date t and c is a vector of control variables. My main
explanatory variables of interest in Eq. (3.18) and Eq. (3.19) are θnt and (θnt)2, respectively.
First, I expect the coefficient β1 to be positive in both regressions, capturing the positive effect of
total informed trading on informed stock trading. Second, I expect β2 to be negative, accounting
for the concave relation between θ and θS implied by the model. Third, in accordance with
this postulated concavity of conditional informed stock trading, my expectation is that the
explanatory power of Eq. (3.19) should be considerably higher compared to the one of Eq. (3.18).
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of the regression variables. Starting from my
original data set, I find 239 estimates of (θ, θS) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].26 For 236 event dates, there exist
observations of both (θ, θS) as well as of the controls in c. I consider four additional covariates:
relative abnormal stock volume ASV , average relative bid-ask spreads for the stock BAS and the
26For the remaining 77 announcements there is either one of the variables in Eq. (3.17) missing for every event
date t− 4, ..., t, or there exists no option data for the event date t.
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Table 3.3. Summary statistics of regression variables
Variable Mean Std Q25 Median Q75
θS 0.5423 0.2499 0.3754 0.5626 0.7700
θ 0.0992 0.0710 0.0497 0.0845 0.1264
θ squared 0.0149 0.0283 0.0025 0.0071 0.0160
ASV 0.9912 0.8548 0.9308 0.9961 1.0020
BAS 0.0023 0.0025 0.0008 0.0014 0.0026
MOM 0.0011 0.0044 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0037
BASc,otm 0.5624 0.1982 0.4214 0.5393 0.6723
Notes: This table provides the summary statistics for the full sample period from January
2005 to December 2012. The mean, standard deviation (std), the 25th (Q25), 50th (me-
dian), and 75th (Q75) quantiles are reported. The measures of informed trading θS and θ
are defined in Eq. (3.16). ASV is the average relative abnormal stock volume. BAS and
BASc,otm denote the average relative bid-ask spreads for the stock and the OTM calls, re-
spectively. MOM is a momentum measure based on averaged daily stock returns. The last
four are control variables and lagged relatively to θS and θ (see Section 3.5.3 for details).
The total number of observations equals 236.
OTM calls BASc,otm, and a momentum factor MOM . ASV accounts for the average abnormal
stock volume between six and ten days prior to the announcement and is defined as
ASVt :=
1
5
9∑
i=5
V St−i − V St−i(
V St−i − V St−i
)
+
(
V otmt−i − V otmt−i
) ,
where V S := B + S, V otm := V c,otm + V p,otm, V t := median ({Vt−60, Vt−59, ..., Vt−11}), and all
variables are computed as described above. BAS, BASc,otm, and MOM are calculated over the
past 60 trading days up to and including t − 5. The latter thereby simply corresponds to the
average daily return.
According to Table 3.3, the median proportion of informed trading is around 8.5%. The
median proportion of informed stock trading equals 56.3%. Hence, on average, a little more
than half of the abnormal trading volume is observed in the stock market. Almost all of the
abnormal trading volume during the week prior to the event window stems from stock trading,
where the values of ASV can become greater than one because also negative abnormal (options)
volume is considered. Average relative bid-ask spreads are substantially bigger for OTM calls
than for stocks. The median value of averaged daily stock returns prior to the event window is
slightly positive (0.1%).
The results from running the regressions specified in Eq. (3.18) and Eq. (3.19) are reported
in Table 3.4. In the odd columns, the estimation results for Eq. (3.18) are presented, where
more and more covariates are added when moving from (I) to (V). In all three columns, the
estimated coefficient βˆ1 is positive, providing empirical evidence for a positive dependence be-
tween total informed trading and conditional informed stock trading. The even columns report
the estimation results for Eq. (3.19), which additionally account for the effect of the squared
term (θ)2 on θS . All three columns (II), (IV), and (VI) present strong empirical evidence for
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Table 3.4. Regression results
Inf. stock trading (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
const 0.4821a 0.3529a 0.4866a 0.3965a 0.3777a 0.3226a
(9.85) (9.51) (7.76) (6.47) (5.80) (4.98)
θ 0.7385b 3.0703a 0.7290b 3.0208a 1.0171a 2.9800a
(1.72) (8.24) ( 1.76) (7.58) (2.91) (7.67)
θ squared −6.6212a −6.5186a −5.8353a
(-7.13) (-6.58) (-5.92)
ASV -0.0110 -0.0156 -0.0147 -0.0179
(-0.45) (-0.62) (-0.60) (-0.73)
BAS −15.6897b −12.0139b -8.9688 -7.6783
(-1.99) (-1.73) (-1.06) (-1.02)
MOM -2.7973 -2.1986 -1.5405 -1.3496
(-0.77) (-0.66) (-0.45) (-0.42)
BASc,otm 0.0614 -0.0064 0.0431 -0.0113
(0.52) (-0.06) (0.38) (-0.10)
θS lagged 0.2441a 0.1826a
(3.56) (2.80)
θ lagged −0.6880a −0.4696b
(-2.68) (-1.88)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.0726 0.1888 0.0810 0.1942 0.1359 0.2226
N 239 239 236 236 236 236
F-statistic 32.7896 31.1878 24.5413
p-value 3.21× 10−8 6.81× 10−8 1.45× 10−6
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the two regression models (with and without
controls) defined in Eq. (3.18) and Eq. (3.19), respectively. The aim of these estimations is
to investigate the influence of the explanatory variables θ and (θ)2 on relative informed stock
trading θS . Both measures are defined in Eq. (3.16). The remaining covariates are control
variables and lagged relatively to θ and θS . ASV is the average relative abnormal stock
volume. BAS and BASc,otm denote the average relative bid-ask spreads for the stock and
the OTM calls, respectively. MOM is a momentum measure based on averaged daily stock
returns (see Section 3.5.3 for details). In the last two columns, these control variables are
complemented by θ lagged and θS lagged which are also computed by relying on Eq. (3.16)
but over the preceding trading week. Each column shows the estimated coefficients and
heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses. Year fixed effects are added to each
regression (where the last year is omitted in order to overcome the dummy variable trap).
Superscripts a and b indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5%-level, respectively.
To test for the non-linear behavior of conditional informed stock trading, an F-test between
each respective pair of regressions is conducted.
a concave relation between θ and θS , where the estimate βˆ1 from Eq. (3.19) is always positive
and the estimate βˆ2 always negative.27 In general, across both the odd and even columns, the
estimated coefficients βˆ1 and βˆ2 remain quite stable.
27I check for potential endogeneity issues by computing the correlation between the main explanatory variables,
i.e., θ and (θ)2, and the residuals of the respective regressions. In all cases, these correlations never exceed the
value of 10−6.
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Of all the control variables in Table 3.3, only the coefficient for the stocks’ average bid-
ask spreads is statistically significant, indicating that decreasing stock market liquidity also
reduces, ceteris paribus, the proportion of informed stock trading. However, if one additionally
includes both lagged values of θS and θ, this effect disappears.28 Furthermore, the results in
columns (V) and (VI) indicate that there exists a certain degree of autocorrelation in the case
of θS . Interestingly, θ lagged appears to have a negative influence on subsequent informed stock
trading. However, compared to θ the coefficients in both columns are considerably smaller and
less significant. Finally, I conduct an F-test between each pair of regressions, i.e., between (I)
and (II) etc., in order to test the statistical significance of the non-linear behavior of conditional
informed stock trading. The results strongly reject a linear relation in favor of a concave effect
of θ on θS . In summary, there exists empirical support for both the postulated sign as well as
for the functional form of θS(θ).
3.6 Conclusion
I have presented a model of multimarket informed trading that identifies the preferred trading
venue of heterogeneously risk-averse and imperfectly informed agents who can either trade in
the stock or in the corresponding options market. My focus lies on private signals which, once
revealed, exhibit the potential of causing significant shocks in the underlying asset value. I model
these shocks as jumps following an asymmetric double exponential distribution, where informed
traders’ informational advantage consists of two components: (i) they know that a jump will
occur, and (ii) they are aware of its sign, i.e., from which side of the exponential distribution it
will be drawn.
Throughout a random sequential trading process, competitive market makers continuously
update their beliefs regarding the risk of meeting a superior informed trader. Given their
updated beliefs, they adjust their respective price quotes to break even in expectation. In order
to avoid no-trading equilibria, I posit the presence of exogenously arriving liquidity traders.
In the rational expectation equilibrium, any resulting separation of informed traders between
venues must be as conjectured by market makers, i.e., such that the former thereby maximize
their expected utility from trading.
I show that a multimarket informed trading equilibrium can only be semi-separating, i.e.,
separating heterogeneously risk-averse informed traders across the two markets, if, given market
makers’ price quotes, all informed traders who opt for the options market are less risk-averse than
those opting for the stock market. My numerical analysis provides two striking characteristics of
such a semi-separating equilibrium. First, its existence is robust with respect to market makers’
beliefs regarding the overall probability of informed trading. Second, the higher this probability,
the larger the conditional probability of informed stock trading, where the sensitivity of this
relation decreases as the former increases.
28θ lagged and θS lagged are computed according to Eq. (3.16) but over the preceding trading week, i.e., letting
i run from five to nine.
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Relative to the risk-neutral benchmark, the proportion of conditional informed stock trading
is always higher under a semi-separating equilibrium. This difference is particularly pronounced,
if market makers’ perceive the risk of adverse selection to be relatively low. Hence, accounting
for informed traders’ risk aversion could explain why it is less likely to observe informed option
trading in real-world data than one would expect when solely considering options’ comparative
leverage advantage and relative market depth.
Given that the post-announcement returns of firms targeted by M&A transactions closely
follow an exponential jump distribution, I test my model’s prediction by looking at those firms’
pre-announcement stock and options trading data. I find the relative amount of abnormal stock
trading to be increasing in the overall proportion of abnormal trading volume. As predicted by
the model, the sensitivity of this positive relationship declines for higher levels of aggregated
abnormal trading volume.
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A3 Examplary Risk-Neutral Pricing Measure
In order to mitigate trading incentives induced by different risk preferences, I alternatively
assume both market makers to be risk-averse in the sense that they rely on a risk-neutral
pricing measure when computing the discounted conditional expectation(s) of their traded asset
payoff(s).
Due to the three different sources of risk, i.e., Xi, Vi, and Nt, the market of the considered
economy is incomplete (see, e.g., Kou (2002)). As a consequence, the benchmark risk-neutral
pricing measure is not unique. In order to derive such an equivalent probability measure Q, I
follow Merton (1976) by assuming that Vi and Nt have the same distribution under Q as under
P.29 Since the market prices for different risks are not the subject of this paper, I consider this
simplifying assumption acceptable.30
Based on this assumption, the Q-likelihood of more than one jump between t and T is
also negligible, i.e., it holds that Q(NT −Nt > 1) ≈ 0. Thus, one can solve for the risk-neutral
probability Q(X=u) ≡ q of an up movement of the stock value between t and t+∆t by imposing
the following martingale condition on St under Q
EQt [e−r∆tSt+∆t] = e−r∆t
{
Q(Nt+∆t −Nt = 0)× (qStu+ (1− q)Std) +
Q(Nt+∆t −Nt = 1)× (qStu+ (1− q)Std)× EQ[V ]
}
!= St
⇔ q = e
r∆t − de−λ∆t(1 + λ∆tEP[V ])
(u− d)e−λ∆t(1 + λ∆tEP[V ]) . (A3.1)
Relying on Eq. (A3.1), the risk-adjusted call and put values are given by their expected dis-
counted payoffs under Q, i.e.,
ct = EQt [e−r(T−t)ΠcT ] and pt = E
Q
t [e−r(T−t)Π
p
T ],
respectively.
Moreover, in the absence of a jump size risk premium, a risk-averse market maker’s evaluation
of the stock under asymmetric information remains the same as in Subsection 3.3.1.2. Hence,
Eq. (A3.1) can also be applied for computing risk-adjusted conditional option values.
29Merton’s (1976) underlying assumption is that jump risk is purely idiosyncratic and therefore can be elimi-
nated completely by diversification.
30Here, I moreover refer to liquidity traders’ unspecified risk preferences and consumption distributions as
sufficient degrees of freedom in order to equilibrate presumed stock value dynamics.
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B3 Derivation of Benchmark Call Price
Due to independence and the law of total probability the benchmark price of the European call
option at time t (under risk neutrality) is
ct = EPt [e−r(T−t)ΠcT ]
= e−r(T−t)P(NT −Nt = 0)
(
n¯∑
i=0
P
(
n¯∏
i=1
Xi = uidn¯−i
)
max(Stuidn¯−i −Kc, 0)
)
+
e−r(T−t)P(NT −Nt = 1)
(
n¯∑
i=0
P
(
n¯∏
i=1
Xi = uidn¯−i
)
EP[max(Stuidn¯−iV −Kc, 0)]
)
= e−r(T−t)e−λ¯
(
n¯∑
i=l∗
n¯!
i!(n¯− i)!p
i(1− p)n¯−i(Stuidn¯−i −Kc)
)
+
e−r(T−t)λ¯e−λ¯
{(
n¯∑
i=0
n¯!
i!(n¯− i)!p
i(1− p)n¯−i
∫ 1
bi
l
∧1
(Stuidn¯−iv −Kc)(1− p˜)η2vη2−1dv
)
+(
n¯∑
i=0
n¯!
i!(n¯− i)!p
i(1− p)n¯−i
∫ ∞
bi
l
∨1
(Stuidn¯−iv −Kc)p˜η1v−(η1+1)dv
)}
,
where n¯ := n− t−t0∆t , λ¯ := λ(T − t), bil = K
c
uidn−iSt denotes the necessary jump size such that the
call option ends up in the money at maturity, and l∗ is the smallest nonnegative integer such
that the same holds true in the case of no jumps. The integrals in the above equation can easily
be solved yielding the following call price
ct = e−r(T−t)
[
e−λ¯
(
n¯∑
i=l∗
φ[i, n¯; p](Stuidn¯−i −Kc)
)
+
λ¯e−λ¯
{
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{
(1− p˜)η2
(
Stu
idn¯−i
1− (bil ∧ 1)η2+1
η2 + 1
−Kc 1− (b
i
l ∧ 1)η2
η2
)
+ p˜η1
(
Stu
idn¯−i
(bil ∨ 1)−η1+1
η1 − 1 −K
c (bil ∨ 1)−η1
η1
)}}]
,
(B3.1)
where φ[i, n¯; p] ≡ n¯!i!(n¯−i)!pi(1− p)n¯−i.
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C3 Derivation of Expectations in Eq. (3.14) and Eq. (3.15)
The first expectation EPt
[
S
γ
T
]
in Eq. (3.14) can be written as a sum of weighted stock value up
and down movements
EPt
[
S
γ
T
]
= e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{∫ ∞
1
(Stuidn¯−iv)γη1v(−η1−1)dv
+λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
1
(Stuidn¯−ivv)γη1v(−η1−1)dv dFV
}
= e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{
(Stuidn¯−i)γ
η1
η1 − γ
+λ¯(Stuidn¯−i)γ
(
(1− p˜)η1η2
(γ + η2)(η1 − γ) +
p˜η21
(η1 − γ)2
)}
,
where λ¯ := λ(T−t). The first term in curly brackets corresponds to the case of one positive jump
only, while the second term contains two jumps, of which one is surly positive. The remaining
expectation terms are, however, less straight forward to compute. The RHS in Eq. (3.14) is
given by
EPt [ c
γ
T ] = e
−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{∫ ∞
bi
l
∨1
(Stuidn¯−iv −Kc)γη1v(−η1−1)dv
+λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
1
max(Stuidn¯−ivv −Kc, 0)γη1v(−η1−1)dv dFV
}
.
Due to the more complicated structure of the integrand, it is not possible to solve the above
double integral in closed form.
Similarly, for the case of a negative signal, the respective terms in Eq. (3.15) are given by
EPt
[(
1 + bSt − ST
bSt
)γ]
= e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{∫ 1
0
(
1 + bSt − Stu
idn¯−iv
bSt
)γ
η2v
η2−1dv
+ λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ 1
0
(
1 + bSt − Stu
idn¯−ivv
bSt
)γ
η2v
η2−1dv dFV
}
,
and
EPt
[
pγ
T
]
= e−λ¯
n¯∑
i=0
φ[i, n¯; p]
{∫ biu∧1
0
(Kp − Stuidn¯−iv)γη2vη2−1dv
+ λ¯
∫ ∞
0
∫ 1
0
max(Kp − Stuidn¯−ivv, 0)γη2vη2−1dv dFV
}
,
respectively.
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D3 Additional Proofs
Proof of Result 3.1. Both the LHS and the RHS of Eq. (3.14) as well as of Eq. (3.15) are con-
tinuous in γ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, given the conditions of Result 3.1, it directly follows from the proof
of Result 3.2 below that θ¯S(γ¯) as a function of γ¯ has to cross the bisector of R2+ somewhere over
(0, 1). This completes the proof.
Proof of Result 3.2. The proof’s structure identically applies to both a positive and a negative
signal and shall here be demonstrated for the latter case. For a fixed γ¯, the partial derivative of
the utility term on the LHS of Eq. (3.13) with respect to θS equals
∂
∂θS,t
U
(
Wt0
(
1 + bS(θS,t|θ
−
t )− ST
bS(θS,t|θ−t )
))
= U ′(·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
Wt0
ST
bS(θS,t|θ−t )2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂bS(θS,t|θ−t )
∂θS,t
,
where
∂bS(θS,t|θ−t )
∂θS,t
= (St − St)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− θ−t )α2(
θ−t θS,t + (1− θ−t )α2
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0,
and thus ∂∂θS,tULHS(·) is strictly negative.
Analogously, the partial derivative of the utility term on the RHS of Eq. (3.13) is given by
∂
∂θS,t
U
(
Wt0
ap(θS,t|θ−t )
p
T
)
= U ′(·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
−Wt0
ap(θS,t|θ−t )2
p
T
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂ap(θS,t|θ−t )
∂θS,t
,
where
∂ap(θS,t|θ−t )
∂θS,t
= (p
t
− pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−(1− θ−t )1−α4(
θ−t (1− θS,t) + (1− θ−t )1−α4
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0,
hence, ∂∂θS,tURHS(·) is strictly positive. This implies that for a fixed γ¯, there can be only one
corresponding θS,t(γ¯) ∈ (0, 1), hereafter denoted by θ¯S , that satisfies the equality in Eq. (3.13),
but not necessarily equals γ¯.
Let U¯ denote the utility level in Eq. (3.13) corresponding to θ¯S . Due to its asymmetric payoff
profile, the ‘normalized’ put option value on the RHS of Eq. (3.15) exhibits a less centered
probability mass over (0,∞) than the ‘normalized’ payoff from short selling on the LHS of
Eq. (3.15). Given the strict concavity of informed traders’ utility function, it thus directly
follows that
EPt
[(
1 + bS(θ¯S,t|θ
−
t )− ST
bS(θ¯S,t|θ−t )
)γ]
> U¯ ∀γ < γ¯,
and
EPt
[
pγT
]
ap(θ¯S,t|θ−t )γ
> U¯ ∀γ > γ¯,
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i.e., all informed traders who are less (more) risk-averse than their γ¯-th counterpart will prefer
to buy (short sell) put options (shares). Hence, in order to preserve the validity of Eq. (3.13), a
strictly increasing γ¯ therefore requires a strictly decreasing θ¯S and vice versa, i.e., θ¯S is strictly
decreasing in γ¯. This completes the proof.
Proof of Result 3.3. Assuming Eq. (3.14) to hold for any fixed γ¯ not necessarily equal to θS,t, it
follows that
EPt′
[
cγ¯T
]1/γ¯
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A
St + (St − St)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S+
θ+t′ θS,t′(γ¯)
θ+t′ θS,t′(γ¯) + (1− θ+t′ )α2
 =
EPt′
[
S
γ¯
T
]1/γ¯
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:B
ct + (ct − ct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:c+
θ+t′ (1− θS,t′(γ¯))
θ+t′ (1− θS,t′(γ¯)) + (1− θ+t′ )1−α4
 , (D3.1)
for t′ ∈ [t, t+ ∆t). In the following, in order to ease notation, I again omit the time subscripts
in Eq. (D3.1) and simply write θS instead of θS(γ¯).
Rearranging terms in Eq. (D3.1) yields
ASD +AS+θθS
[
θ(1− θS) + (1− θ)1− α4
]
= BcD +Bc+θ(1− θS)
[
θθS + (1− θ)α2
]
, (D3.2)
where
D :=
[
θ(1− θS) + (1− θ)1− α4
] [
θθS + (1− θ)α2
]
= θS
[
θ2 + θ(1− θ)1− 3α4
]
+ θ(1− θ)α2 + (1− θ)
2α(1− α)
8 − θ
2θ2S .
Solving for θS in Eq. (D3.2), one gets the following quadratic equation
θ2S
[
θ(B(c+ c+)−A(S + S+))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:a
+
θS
[
(AS −Bc)
(
θ + (1− θ)1− 3α4
)
+AS+
(
θ + 1− α4 (1− θ)
)
−Bc+
(
θ + α2 (θ − 1)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:b
+
[
(AS −Bc)(1− θ)α2
(
1 + 1− θ
θ
α(1− α)
8
)
−Bc+(1− θ)α2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:d
= 0. (D3.3)
The solution to Eq. (D3.3) is of course given by
θS(γ¯) =
−b±√b2 − 4ad
2a . (D3.4)
Recalling Eq. (3.14), it thus follows that θ?S(θ+) is a fixed point of Eq. (D3.4). Moreover,
recalling Result 3.2, there can maximally exist one such fixed point in (0, 1) corresponding to
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an interior solution. Therefore, it can always be determined which sign in Eq. (D3.4) yields the
semi-separating equilibrium. This completes the proof.
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4 Indebtedness, Interests, and Incentives:
State-contingent Sovereign Debt Revisited
Joint with Andrin Bögli
This paper studies state-contingent debt as an alternative refinancing instrument for
advanced economies. In times of high sovereign indebtedness, increasing yields impose
eminent debt roll-over risks. We analyze the welfare implications of two state-contingent
debt instruments: puttable and GDP-to-debt-indexed bonds, both temporary in nature
and intended to improve deleveraging feasibility. In return for an insurance premium,
puttable bonds offer protection against sovereign default, thereby internalizing the im-
plicit risk-sharing mechanism inherited by the ECB’s ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’
program. Similar to GDP-linked debt, bonds indexed to a country’s GDP-to-debt ratio,
henceforth ‘GDR bonds’, allow for consumption smoothing via state-contingent interest
payments. In contrast to GDP-linked debt, GDR bonds permit competitive risk-return
profiles even in the face of pessimistic growth outlooks. We find that, in the presence of
default costs, state-contingent bonds allow for substantial welfare improvements relative
to standard sovereign debt. For risk-averse consumers, the counter-cyclical fiscal leeway
created by GDR bonds dominates the interest savings provided by puttable bonds. We
verify this preference order by calibrating our model to the five Eurozone countries most
heavily affected by the debt crisis: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. We dis-
cuss implied deleveraging incentives, limited commitment, and practical implementation
issues for GDR bonds.
4.1 Introduction
Even though the most acute symptoms of the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis have abated, the
necessary precondition for its recrudescence still persists to date: massive debt-to-GDP levels in
many European countries. Surging public debt burdens arguably pose substantial refinancing
risks, if perceived default probabilities should shift upwards again (Calvo (1988)). This has led
both the press as well as renowned macroeconomists to recently rediscover the benefits of state-
We would like to thank Konrad Adler, Markus Brunnermeier, Marc Chesney, Sebastian Dörr, Lucas Fuhrer,
Seraina Grünewald, Michel Habib, David Hémous, Andreas Müller, Steven Ongena, Jean-Charles Rochet, Alexan-
der Wagner, Jiri Woschitz, Alexandre Ziegler, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and participants at the UZH Finance Poster
Workshop 2015, the Zurich Workshop on Economics 2015, the MFA 2016, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists
2016, and the URPP Financial Market Regulation doctoral colloquium at the University of Zurich for very helpful
comments and suggestions.
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contingent bonds as an alternative refinancing instrument,1 but this time for the pre-restructured
debt of advanced economies.2
This paper investigates the welfare implications of state-contingent debt as a temporary
device against swelling refinancing costs of highly indebted sovereigns. Our focus lies on gov-
ernments whose economically required deleveraging efforts under standard sovereign debt are so
immense that they have to be considered politically infeasible. We demonstrate state-contingent
debt’s virtue of providing more space for mitigating sovereign default risk. If sovereign borrow-
ing is contractible—a requirement whose practicability is discussed—this even holds true in the
presence of low growth expectations, i.e., when the issuance of standard GDP-indexed bonds is
particularly difficult.
In light of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s most effective crisis response, i.e., its ‘Out-
right Monetary Transactions’ program (OMT), we consider two types of state-contingent debt
instruments: (i) puttable debt and (ii) GDP-to-debt-linked bonds, henceforth simply GDR
(GDP-to-debt ratio) bonds. Investors in puttable debt receive the right to put their claims
with a third party in return for a fixed payment and are thus insured against sovereign default.
GDR bonds offer state-contingent interests that are inversely related to sovereign indebtedness.
Hence, conditionally on sufficient deleveraging, their interest payments can still be positive under
zero or even negative growth.
We find that, in the presence of non-negligible default costs, state-contingent bonds generally
lead to substantial welfare gains. In terms of relative welfare improvements for risk-averse
consumers, the counter-cyclical fiscal spending allowed for by GDR bonds’ cyclical interest
charges (as a function of GDP) proves superior to puttable bonds’ simple insurance mechanism.
For both instruments, governments deleveraging incentives as well as practical implementation
issues are discussed.
The ECB’s crisis mitigation efforts covered a wide range of non-standard monetary policy
measures: from expanding volume and maturities of lending operations to adjusting collat-
eral requirements for repo transactions, followed by direct interventions in securities markets.
Whereas the effects of the first such direct intervention, i.e., the ‘Securities Markets Program’
(SMP), remained limited, the sole announcement of its successor OMT in July 2012 significantly
calmed sovereign bond markets. In essence, OMT allows the ECB to buy unlimited amounts of
distressed government bonds (with maturities up to three years) on the secondary market, as
long as the issuing government agrees to comply with certain coercive measures.3
1For example, ‘The Economist’ referred to suggestions from Morgan Stanley to allow governments to issue
GDP-linked bonds (source: A chronic problem, The Economist, May 14, 2016, http://www.economist.com/node/
21698669). Blanchard et al. (2016) argue for a large scale issuance of growth-indexed bonds in advanced economies
during normal times. They show for several Eurozone countries how GDP-indexed bonds could significantly reduce
the upper-tail risk of excessive sovereign indebtedness, thereby attenuating implied default probabilities.
2Historically, securities linked to national growth have only been issued during the process of debt restructur-
ing. More recently, Argentina (2005), Greece (2012), and Ukraine (2015) issued warrant-like instruments, where
payments are conditional on realized growth rates.
3For an overview of the ECB’s non-standard measures up to and including OMT see, e.g., the speech by
Peter Praet, member of the executive board of the ECB, on April 17, 2013 (source: https://www.ecb.europa.
eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130417.en.html).
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Following Merton (1977), OMT’s conditional guarantee to buy traded sovereign bonds to
reduce distressed yields can be interpreted as a written put option: The issuing government
has the right to initiate purchases of its own bonds, once their price has fallen below a certain
threshold. Since its first announcement, this ex-ante free option indirectly offered to OMT el-
igible countries received considerable opposition among Eurozone countries, particularly from
Germany.4 Concerns were raised that OMT’s free option results in substantial risk redistri-
bution among member countries and fails to sufficiently reinforce fiscal discipline of candidate
governments.
In the context of OMT, state-contingency is achieved through lower interest rates during
times of high perceived default probabilities. The closest incentive-compatible alternative to
OMT are puttable bonds, where an intergovernmental organization insures investors against
default, thereby substantially lowering interest payable by the issuing government. Importantly,
contrary to OMT, the issuing government has to ex-ante compensate the insurance provider
by paying the insurance premium in return.5 Thus, puttable bonds internalize the risk-sharing
costs which remain non-remunerated under OMT.
First, motivated by OMT’s inherent insurance mechanism, we start our analysis with put-
table debt in the absence of default costs other than investors’ foregone repayments, and relate
our results to the seminal corporate debt valuation model by Merton (1974). The rationale
underlying puttable sovereign debt is simple. Newly issued puttable bonds contain an embed-
ded put option which serves as default protection for investors. If the sovereign is unable to
refinance its liabilities at maturity, i.e., whenever the government defaults on its puttable debt,
the writer of the embedded put option repays investors in full (principal and accrued interests)
and acquires the initial claim against the issuing sovereign.
Abstracting from any credit risk on the insurance guarantor’s side, puttable bonds correspond
to a risk-free investment and therefore only pay the risk-free rate. In the context of OMT, default
protection is provided by the ECB, i.e., more precisely by its stakeholders. In sharp contrast to
OMT, in order to issue puttable debt, the sovereign would have to ex-ante compensate the ECB
or another sufficiently capitalized intergovernmental agency for writing the embedded option.
Merton (1974) shows that the spread between risky debt and otherwise similar but credit
risk-free debt can be interpreted as the value of a put option on total assets. In the absence
of default costs, we demonstrate the validity of Merton’s (1974) equivalence result within the
sustainable sovereign debt model of Collard et al. (2015). They model sovereign borrowing to be
solely constrained by credit markets’ willingness to lend. Relying on uniformly distributed GDP
growth rates, which allow for closed-form solutions, we show that a risk-neutral government is
exactly indifferent between paying for protection against increased refinancing pressure today
4The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany questioned OMT’s compliance with EU law. It was finally
declared to be in line with the ECB’s official mandate of price stability and thus considered legal by the European
Court of Justice on June 16, 2015 (source: judgment of the court in case C-62/14, June 16, 2015, http://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/).
5In contrast to credit default swaps (CDS) on sovereign debt, the embedded default insurance of puttable
bonds can not be disentangled from the underlying default exposure. Moreover, the insurance premium is paid
in full at issuance, rather then periodically over the bonds’ lifetime.
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versus accepting lower publicly financed consumption or even the risk of default tomorrow.
However, as soon as default imposes additional costs on the defaulting government, the lower
default probability under puttable debt’s reduced financing costs becomes be welfare improving.
Second, we introduce costs incurred in case of sovereign default. As soon as default imposes
significant disutility on the defaulting government,6 it has incentives not to overborrow. Based
on actual country-specific yield spreads, we calibrate these costs such that the implied default
probabilities are consistent with Merton’s (1974) equivalence result. Hence, in the presence
of non-negligible default costs, instead of following Collard et al. (2015), we adopt a one-shot
perspective, where a risk-neutral government trades off publicly financed private consumption
against expected default costs when choosing its optimal borrowing rate. In particular, our
starting point is an already highly indebted government whose outstanding debt contains con-
siderable default risk and therefore imposes high refinancing costs.7
Within this new setting, we compare utilities between alternative state-contingent refinancing
instruments. In the spirit of Blanchard et al.’s (2016) current analysis for various Eurozone
countries, we additionally consider GDP-linked debt. To allow state-contingent debt instruments
to be welfare improving, we introduce a risk-averse consumer, who optimizes her utility from
publicly financed consumption conditional on the government’s borrowing policy. In order to
account for the different frequencies between private consumption decisions and the passage of
public budgets, the former is modeled in continuous time, whereas public borrowing remains
constant over the considered period.
In contrast to standard GDP-linked debt, GDR bonds’ interest payments inversely depend
on a government’s relative indebtedness, i.e., whenever its GDP-to-debt ratio rises, the payable
interests increase. In addition to imposing state-contingent financing costs, GDR bonds provide
a new signaling device for the issuing government. Even if credit markets have very pessimistic
growth projections, GDR bonds can still offer competitive risk-return profiles to reluctant in-
vestors, given that the issuing government can credibly commit itself to a sustainable deleverag-
ing. In case of insurmountable limited commitment concerns by potential investors, equipping
GDR bonds with an embedded put option written by a third counterparty, i.e., similar to
puttable bonds, could foster the enforceability of previous deleveraging commitments. The as-
sertiveness of the former European Troika in the Eurozone’s recent debt renegotiations provides
some evidence for such a supranational party’s potential enforcement power (see discussion in
Section 4.5).
6Examples comprise trade disruption or reputational costs for the defaulting government (see Section 4.3).
7In contrast to the analysis of puttable debt within the model of Collard et al. (2015), increased refinancing
pressure here occurs due to high perceived default probabilities, instead of tighter credit market conditions.
Lane (2012) provides an intuitive explanation, how—in the presence of high indebtedness—sudden shifts in
sentiments can cause a multicountry currency union to jump from a sustainable equilibrium to one with highly
increased yields and unsustainable debt levels. In the context of the Eurozone, such effects were likely amplified
by internal flights-to-safety. Indeed, the empirical evidence of De Grauwe and Ji (2012) suggests a significant
effect of negative market sentiments on the spreads of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain between 2010 and
2011. Up to the introduction of OMT, the severe effects of market sentiments were also pointed out by both
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012, http:
//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/) and the ECB (source: Draghi, M., ECB press conference,
September 6, 2012, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html).
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We conduct a sensitivity analysis of optimal government borrowing under (i) standard
sovereign debt, (ii) puttable debt, and (iii) GDR bonds. In the context of all three instruments,
we confirm the model’s capability to deliver intuitive results with respect to its parameters. For
instance, we find the government’s optimal borrowing rate to be increasing in GDP growth,
U-shaped in growth volatility (manageable versus unmanageably high growth risk), and to de-
crease in consumer risk aversion and default costs. Moreover, GDR bonds’ state-contingency
reduces the interest burden during times of low growth. This allows the issuing government
to deleverage less dramatically than under standard or puttable debt, while keeping its default
probability constant.
Third, in order to evaluate the welfare implications of state-contingent debt in the presence
of default costs, we run a case study calibrating our model to the five Eurozone countries whose
bond yields were most heavily affected by the debt crisis: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece,
and Spain. We calibrate country-specific default costs to match historical default probabilities
implied by sovereign credit ratings prior to the ECB’s OMT announcement. We find that, across
growth scenarios, switching from standard to puttable debt leads to welfare improvements.
In comparison to puttable debt, GDR bonds consistently yield superior utility levels. Con-
trary to former’s simple insurance mechanism, GDR bonds’ state-contingent interest charges
allow the risk-averse representative agent to considerably smooth her within-period consump-
tion path. Hence, in our calibration, GDR bonds’ consumption smoothing effect outweighs
puttable debt’s more substantial reduction in expected default costs. Moreover, we show that
even for very pessimistic growth projections (i.e., the fifth percentile of historical growth rates),
GDR bonds’ expected Sharpe ratios are around unity (or even higher) for all five countries.
Our paper relates to the literature on state-contingent sovereign bonds. Emerging economies
regularly face the risk of exogenous and undiversifiable income shocks that may cause capital flow
reversals and potentially lead to severe contractions. In order to provide developing countries the
possibility to hedge themselves against non-contractible shocks, Caballero (2003) proposes the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to supply a market for state-contingent bonds. Such bonds
would reduce refinancing pressure in case of a severe income shock by, e.g., relating interest
payments to income flows or by offering state-contingent insurance payments.8 Caballero’s
(2003) proposal can be viewed as an alternative to the IMF’s already existing contingent credit
lines for emerging economies. The potentially stabilizing properties of puttable sovereign bonds
for emerging countries without access to interest rate derivative markets are pointed out by
Neftci and Santos (2003).
GDP-linked securities represent the most prominent example of state-contingent sovereign
debt discussed in the literature. Shiller (1994, 2003) argues for macro markets to trade GDP-
linked perpetual claims on fractions of countries’ respective GDP. Borensztein et al. (2004)
identify four major benefits of GDP-linked bonds over standard sovereign bonds: (i) lower like-
8As an example for the latter, Caballero (2003) argues that “Chile could eliminate most, if not all, of its deep
recessions by embedding into its external bonds a long-term put option, yielding US$ 6-8 billions when the price
of copper [its main export commodity] falls by more than two standard deviations” (Caballero, 2003, p. 34). In
the context of private corporations, Chidambaran et al. (2001) discuss how the gold-mining company Freeport
McMoRan’s usage of gold-linked depository shares helped to reduce its financing costs.
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lihood of sovereign defaults, (ii) fewer damaging pro-cyclical fiscal policy implementations, (iii)
the opportunity for a smoother intertemporal tax path, and (iv) lower likelihood of government
overspending during booms.9 In the context of the Eurozone’s recent debt crisis, the stabilizing
effects of GDP-linked bonds on the public finances of advanced economies have repeatedly been
emphasized by Barr et al. (2014) and Blanchard et al. (2016), among others.
Naturally, our paper also relates to the numerous alternative proposals brought forward
in response to the currency union’s vulnerability to surging public debt levels. The so-called
‘Eurobonds’, probably the most prominently discussed of all suggestions, refer to government
bonds jointly issued by all Eurozone member countries. Since their credit risk relies on the
solvency of the Eurozone as a whole, the associated reduction in the risk of destabilizing attacks
on national government bond markets would be substantial (Favero and Missale (2012)).
The general concern among fiscally stronger member states (Germany in particular) has been
that Eurobonds could incentivize less disciplined member states to overborrow. Henderson and
Pearson (2011) share this concern and consequently propose the introduction of common senior
debt with maturity of less than one year called ‘Eurobills’ aiming at easening debt rollover
for Eurozone countries. Eurobills would be introduced permanently and participation in the
market tied to compliance with certain governance criteria. Brunnermeier et al. (2011) suggest
the creation of a ‘European Debt Agency’ that would buy national sovereign bonds up to 60%
of GDP for each member country. By securitization and the re-issuance of different tranches of
bonds, it could satisfy the demand for a safe asset which should also be used as main collateral
in central bank liquidity operations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 analyzes the effects of
puttable debt for a shortsighted risk-neutral government in the absence of default costs. While
allowing for default costs, Section 4.3 additionally introduces GDR bonds in the context of a
continuously consuming risk-averse agent. In Section 4.4, relative welfare effects of both puttable
and GDR bonds relative to standard sovereign debt are estimated based on an empirical case
study. Section 4.5 discusses potential implementation issues of GDR bonds and presents our
concluding remarks.
4.2 Puttable Debt in the Absence of Default Costs
Motivated by OMT’s implicitly written put option, we begin our analysis of state-contingent
debt by introducing puttable bonds into a stylized model of sovereign borrowing, where default
does not cause any costs to the defaulting government. We deliberately choose this starting
point, as the absence of default costs allows for a useful benchmark assessment of puttable
bonds’ potential welfare effects.
In summary, if costs of default are negligible, Merton’s (1974) reinterpretation of risk-
adjusted spreads as put options can be explicitly verified within Collard et al.’s (2015) closed
model of endogenous government borrowing. This insight proves valuable when evaluating put-
9For a detailed literature overview on GDP-linked bonds see, e.g., Barr et al. (2014).
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table debt’s welfare enhancing reduction in default risk in the presence of nonzero default costs
as introduced in Section 4.3.
Abstracting from any kind of default costs is similar to the assumption of a shortsighted
government discussed in Rochet (2006) and Collard et al. (2015).10 Shortsighted governments
always borrow as much as possible, since they do not take future repayments into account. Under
this extreme assumption, sovereign debt levels are capped only by credit markets’ willingness to
lend.
Furthermore, we start by assuming lenders to be shortsighted as well, i.e., in the sense that
interest spikes from the distant past do not make them anticipate any potential tightening of
credit availability in the future. In other words, until confronted by a credit shock, they regard
the risk-free interest rate as constant. This assumption is not crucial, but considerably simplifies
the model’s introduction, and is subsequently relaxed when we analyze puttable debt as response
to increasing refinancing costs.
4.2.1 Government Borrowing
Relying on Collard et al.’s (2015) notation, we denote by Yt the country’s GDP at period t, by
bt the incumbent government’s date-t proceeds from issuing zero-coupon debt with face value
dt maturing at t + 1, both expressed as fractions (denoted in lowercase) of Yt, and by α the
government’s primary surplus, also expressed as a fraction of Yt and assumed to be constant
over time. At any given date t, publicly financed consumption ct is given by
ct = ((1− α) + bt)Yt − dt−1Yt−1, (4.1)
i.e., private consumers receive the sum of their income net of the government’s surplus and
new borrowing proceeds net of expenses from repaying maturing government debt. Intuitively,
sovereign default then occurs at t+ 1 if
(α+ bt+1)Yt+1 < dtYt, (4.2)
i.e., if the sum of primary surplus and proceeds from newly issued debt are insufficient to repay
its current creditors.11 We assume that even in case of default, publicly financed consumption
is never negative, i.e., ct ≥ 0.
10Collard et al. (2016) argue that the therefrom deduced concept of ‘excusable default’—governments only
default on maturing debt if their budget constraint does not allow them to repay—better explains empirically
observed sovereign debt levels than the more familiar concept of ‘strategic default’.
11This condition of sovereign default is different from Eaton and Gersovitz’ (1981) concept of strategic default.
Collard et al. (2015) refer to mounting empricial evidence that most sovereigns do not default voluntarily. More-
over, Collard et al. (2016) show that calibrated ‘excusable’ default models, i.e., in the spirit of Cond. (4.2), yield
much more realistic debt-levels than models of strategic default.
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Collard et al. (2015) assume zero recovery in default.12 Given its shortsightedness, the
government aims to maximize the proceeds from borrowing at every date t. Hence, its t-proceeds
from borrowing are then given by
bt = max
dt
dt
1 +Rt
P((α+ bt+1)Yt+1 ≥ dtYt), (4.3)
where Rt denotes the market-implied risk-adjusted discount rate prevailing at t. Eq. (4.3) sim-
ply states that investors are only willing to lend the discounted expected repayment value of
the newly issued zero-coupon bond. Assuming risk-neutral and shortsighted credit markets,
Eq. (4.3) can be written as
bt = max
dt
dt
1 + rP((α+ bt+1)Yt+1 ≥ dtYt), (4.4)
where r refers to the risk-free interest rate, initially regarded as time-invariant by lenders.
The right-hand side of Eq. (4.4) exhibits a ‘Laffer curve property’. At the maximum, the
effects of increasing debt levels and default probabilities offset each other. Cond. (4.2) is
equivalent to
(α+ bt+1)gt+1 < dt,
where gt+1 ≡ Yt+1/Yt denotes the continuous growth rate between date t and t+ 1 assumed to
be i.i.d. with cdf F (·). Thus, relying on future borrowing proceeds bt+1, the government avoids
default at t+ 1 with probability
P((α+ bt+1)gt+1 ≥ dt) = P
(
gt+1 ≥ dt
α+ bt+1
)
≡ 1− F
(
dt
α+ bt+1
)
.
Collard et al. (2015) define maximum sustainable borrowing bM as the fixed point
bM =
α+ bM
1 + r gM (1− F (gM )), (4.5)
where
(α+ bM )gM ≡ dM
identifies maximum sustainable debt dM and gM satisfies
gM = arg max
g
g(1− F (g)). (4.6)
We now introduce a credit shock scenario as presented in Figure 4.1. After many consecutive
periods with low risk-free rates rL, an unanticipated shock at t tightens credit availability. This
has two immediate effects: First, the risk-free rate rises from rL to rH . Second, shortsighted
lenders are reminded of interests’ time variability, which directly affects their willingness to lend,
12Alternatively, one could assume that creditors can (partially) claim the government’s primary surplus upon
default. However, even if creditors receive the entire primary surplus, the maximum sustainable debt in Collard
et al. (2015) only increases slightly, due to its very low associated default probability.
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rt−2 = rL rt−1 = rL
rt = rH
piH rt+1 = rH
piL
rt+1 = rL
Figure 4.1. Unexpected rise in risk-free interest rates
Notes: This figure illustrates a rare and unanticipated tightening of credit market conditions
at t, modeled by an increase in the risk-free interest rate rt from rL to rH . Thereafter,
credit markets become aware of interest rates’ stochastic nature and form beliefs about
future risk-free rates at t + 1: either rt+1 stays at rH with probability piH , or it decreases
to rL with probability piL = 1− piH .
i.e., Eq. (4.4) becomes
bt = max
dt
dt
1 + rH
P((α+ bt+1)Yt+1 ≥ dtYt), (4.7)
i.e., the discount rate increases to rH .
Given the present interest rate shock, lenders now consider interest rates to be random but
stationary, i.e.,
rs
i.i.d.∼ r ∼ rL +B(1, piH)(rH − rL) ∀s ≥ t+ 1, (4.8)
where B(1, piH) denotes a Bernoulli distribution with ‘success’ probability piH . Defining βt ≡
(1 + rt)bt and recalling the stationarity of the country’s growth rate, i.e., gs i.i.d.∼ g ∀s ≥ t + 1,
we can rewrite Eq. (4.7) as
βt = max
dt
dtP
((
α+ βt+11 + r
)
g ≥ dt
)
.
With stochastic interest rates as defined in Eq. (4.8), maximum sustainable debt dM becomes a
function of βM given by
dM (βM ) = arg max
d
d
(
1− piL F
 d
α+ βM1+rL

︸ ︷︷ ︸
default probability
given d if r = rL
−piH F
 d
α+ βM1+rH

︸ ︷︷ ︸
default probability
given d if r = rH
)
, (4.9)
where maximum sustainable borrowing bM (t) = βM/(1 + rt) is state-dependent and βM is the
corresponding fixed point, i.e.,
βM = dM (βM )
1− piLF
 dM (βM )
α+ βM1+rL
− piHF
 dM (βM )
α+ βM1+rH
 . (4.10)
Due to the uncertainty about future interest rates, maximum sustainable debt in Eq. (4.9) is no
longer indirectly implied by gM in Eq. (4.6), but instead needs to take into account r’s binomial
distribution and the state-dependent default thresholds.
As demonstrated by Rochet (2006), assuming g to be uniformly distributed on [1 + µg −
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σg, 1 + µg + σg], Eq. (4.9) and Eq. (4.10) then imply
dM =
1 + µg + σg
2
(
piL
α+ βM1+rL
+ piH
α+ βM1+rH
) (4.11)
βM =
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σ
(
piL
α+ βM1+rL
+ piH
α+ βM1+rH
) . (4.12)
The following lemma gives the closed form solution to Eq. (4.12), on which we rely for our
analysis of puttable debt below.
Lemma 4.1. If (rL, rH) ∈ [0, 1)×[0, 1), g ∼ U[1+µg−σg, 1+µg+σg], and (1+µg+σg)2(8σ)−1 <
E[1 + r], then the fixed point in Eq. (4.12) is given by
βM =
−B −√B2 − 4AC
2A > 0,
where
A := (1 + µg + σg)
2
8σ − E[1 + r]
B := α
(
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σ (2 + rL + rH)− (1 + rL)(1 + rH)
)
C := α2 (1 + µg + σg)
2
8σ (1 + rL)(1 + rH).
Proof. For proof see Appendix A4.
4.2.2 Refinancing Costs During Credit Shock: Standard versus Puttable
Debt
Suppose now that the government is given the possibility to buy protection against increased
refinancing costs at t by issuing puttable instead of standard debt. The main difference between
puttable and standard debt is that the former insures investors against sovereign default, i.e., in
case of default at t+1, a third party guarantees to repay them in full. From investors’ perspective,
assuming the insurance writer to be sufficiently solvent, such puttable bonds correspond to a
risk-free investment. We impose the following conditions for issuing puttable debt at t:
C1. The government’s date-t proceeds may not surpass bM (t), i.e., they may not be higher
than in the absence of puttable bonds.
C2. The government is required to ex-ante compensate the guarantor for the initial default
risk taken over, i.e., for the default risk in absence of puttable bonds.
C3. The government is only allowed to issue puttable bonds, if the payment of the ex-ante
insurance premium does not cause it to already default at t.
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Table 4.1. Standard vs. puttable debt
Standard debt Puttable debt
Type zero-coupon zero-coupon
Insurance no yes
Ex-ante premium none put price pt
Spread Rt ≡ dMbM (t) − 1 risk-free rate rt
Notes: This table compares standard and puttable debt available to the government to
refinance its debt at t. Rt denotes the spread on date-t borrowing proceeds bM (t) to be
paid to investors at t + 1, if the government chooses standard debt. In case it chooses to
issue puttable debt, pt denotes the ex-ante premium to be paid by the issuing government
to the insurance provider at t.
Condition C1 is intuitive given the intended risk managing character of puttable debt. Hence,
it would be counterproductive, if sovereigns would be allowed to borrow more in the presence
of high interest rates than available under low refinancing costs. In fact, C1 prevents higher
borrowing due to a risk-shifting effect. C2 directly manifests itself in the ex-ante payable insur-
ance premium (see below). Finally, C3 is simply imposed by the government’s budget constraint
which does not allow for negative consumption after borrowing proceeds.
Table 4.1 contrasts the government’s two refinancing options at date t in more detail. For the
issuing government, the refinancing costs of standard and puttable debt differ in two dimensions:
on the one hand, the issuance of puttable bonds requires an ex-ante payment to the insurance
guarantor at t. This premium compensates the third party for providing investors with insurance
against sovereign default. The date-t value of the insurance pt corresponds to the price of an
European put option on sovereign debt with maturity t + 1 and a strike price equal to the
debt’s face value plus accrued interests. On the other hand, the issuing government is in return
protected against higher interests on its date-t borrowing proceeds due at t+ 1. Since investors
are insured against default risk, the payable interests on bM (t)Yt are reduced from the default-
adjusted spread RH to the current risk-free rate rH , where
RH ≡ dM
bM |RH − 1,
and bM |RH denotes maximum sustainable borrowing under high (default adjusted) interest
rates.
Moving to an intertemporal perspective, the discounted expected sum of current and future
publicly financed consumption equals
E
∑
s≥t
δs−tcs
 , (4.13)
where δ is the discount factor and cs is given by Eq. (4.1). Note that, for δ < 1, the borrowing
policy in Eq. (4.10) is consistent with the maximization of Eq. (4.13) by a risk-neutral govern-
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Table 4.2. Consumption under Standard vs. puttable debt (no default costs)
Standard debt Puttable debt ∆
(1) (2) (1)−(2)
Consumption at t ct ct − pt pt
Discounted expected
consumption at t+ 1 δE[ct+1|RH ] δE[ct+1|rH ] δbM (t) (rH −RH)Yt
Notes: This table compares current and future publicly financed consumption levels under
the issuance of standard and puttable debt, given an increase in the risk-free rate from rL to
rH at t. The third column lists the differences at t and t+ 1 from the perspective of a risk-
neutral government. pt denotes the date-t put price, δ the government’s discount factor,
bM (t) date-t maximum borrowing under stochastic interest rates, and RH the default-
adjusted spread based on rH .
ment who is indifferent towards variations in private consumption. A risk-averse government,
in contrast, might have an incentive to smooth private consumption across time by borrowing
less if production is very high in order to avoid future default. In Section 4.3, we account for
such consumption smoothing benefits by introducing a risk-averse consumer.
Consistent with the above analysis, we can rewrite date-t private consumption as
ct = ((1− α) + bM (t))Yt − dt−1Yt−1,
and at t+ 1, given a preceding refinancing with standard debt, as
ct+1|RH = ((1− α) + bM (t+ 1))Yt+1 − bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt,
where we rely on the identity bt(1 +Rt) ≡ dt with R ∈ {RL, RH} denoting the state-dependent
spread to be paid by the government on its borrowing proceeds.
In the presence of puttable debt, refinancing public debt with puttable bonds reduces date-t
private consumption by the put option premium, i.e.,
ct − pt,
where at t+ 1 the put option either pays bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt in case of default (zero recovery) or
nothing otherwise. Note that the put option’s strike price is set equal to the borrowing proceeds’
face value plus accrued interests in absence of puttable debt (see C2 above). At t + 1, due to
the lower spread charged by insured investors, private consumption increases to
ct+1|rH = ((1− α) + bM (t+ 1))Yt+1 − bM (t)(1 + rH)Yt,
where it holds that ct+1|rH ≥ ct+1|RH . The (discounted) differences in (expected) private
consumption from issuing either standard or puttable debt are summarized in Table 4.2.
Lemma 4.2. If g ∼ U[1+µg−σg, 1+µg +σg], then a risk-neutral government facing no default
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costs is indifferent between issuing standard or puttable debt in response to a credit shock.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A4.
Lemma 4.2 is in line with Merton (1974), implying that the put option price pt is equal to
the discounted spread δ(RH − rH) to be paid on the borrowing proceeds bM (t)Yt financed by
puttable bonds. In other words, a risk-neutral government’s disutility from having to pay the
insurance premium at t is exactly offset by higher private consumption due to lower interest
payments at t + 1. Hence, as long as there are no default costs, a risk-neutral government is
indifferent between issuing standard or puttable debt in response to an increase in interest rates.
Proposition 4.1. If RH > rH and the probability of default under standard debt with spread
RH is nonzero, then the issuance of puttable debt always decreases the risk of sovereign default.
In particular, if g ∼ U[1+µg−σg, 1+µg +σg] and bM (t)(1+RH)/(α+ bM (t+1)) > 1+µg−σg,
then moving from standard to puttable debt decreases the government’s default probability by
min
 bM (t)(RH − rH)
2σg (α+ bM (t+ 1))
,
bM (t)(1+RH)
α+bM (t+1) − (1 + µg − σg)
2σg
 ,
where the first (second) term applies in case of a nonzero (zero) default probability under rH .
Proof. For proof see Appendix A4.
So far we have been abstracting from any costs to be borne by a defaulting sovereign.
However, as soon as we introduce such sovereign default costs, Proposition 4.1 has important
implications: reducing a government’s default probability attenuates expected disutilities from
default and, therefore, enhances social welfare. Hence, facing non-negligible default costs, even
a risk-neutral government may be better off provided access to puttable bonds when facing
increasing refinancing costs.
Furthermore, in the presence of a risk-averse consumer, a comparison to the consumption-
smoothing benefits from GDP-linked bonds springs to mind. How puttable debt’s reduction in
expected default costs compares to GDP-linked debt’s decrease in consumption variability is the
focus of the following two sections.
4.3 State-contingent Borrowing in the Presence of Default Costs
Our previous working assumption of zero default costs incurred by a defaulting sovereign is
arguably unrealistic. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) distinguish among four different types of
sovereign default costs: (i) reputational costs, (ii) international trade exclusion costs, (iii) costs
due to negative shocks on the domestic banking system, and (iv) political costs borne by the
incumbent government. They find that the economic costs are generally significant, but short-
lived. However, sovereign defaults often bring far-reaching consequences for elected officials. The
authors document that in 18 out of 19 cases studied, the ruling coalition lost votes following the
default and their electoral support declined on average by 16%.
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Probably more meaningful to our case is the indirect measure of default costs given by the
sheer amount of fiscal tightening that has been accepted by the Hellenic government during its
ongoing debt negotiations in return for numerous bailout packages. In March 2012, the Greek
government and its counter parties, i.e., the European Commission, Eurogroup, ECB, and IMF,
signed the ‘Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece’.13 The austerity measures
imposed by this second bailout package revised the total amount of fiscal cost reductions to
approximately 65 billion Euros between 2010 and 2014, which corresponded to more than 30%
of Greece’s then GDP.14
As soon as default imposes significant disutility on the defaulting government, the latter has
incentives not to overborrow. Based on actual country-specific yield spreads, we calibrate these
costs such that the implied default probabilities are in line with Merton’s (1974) equivalence
result. Instead of following Collard et al. (2015), we adopt a simpler one-shot perspective, where
a risk-neutral government trades off publicly financed private consumption against expected
default costs when choosing its optimal borrowing rate. Given the intended temporary nature of
the hereafter considered refinancing instruments, we deem such a one-period view appropriate.15
In particular, our starting point is an already highly indebted government whose bonds contain a
considerable default risk and therefore impose high refinancing costs. In contrast to the analysis
of puttable debt within the model of Collard et al. (2015), increased refinancing pressure here
occurs due to high perceived default probabilities, instead of tighter credit market conditions.
Within this new setting, we compare utility gains from state-contingent refinancing instru-
ments. In particular, similar to Blanchard et al. (2016), we now also consider GDP-linked debt.
To allow such debt instruments to be welfare improving, we introduce a risk-averse consumer
who optimizes her utility from publicly financed consumption conditional on the government’s
borrowing policy. In order to account for the time discrepancy between private consumption
decisions and changes to public budget plans, the former are modeled continuously. Solving for
private consumption in continuous time also allows us to consider the imperfect foreseeability
of future debt levels due to deviations of private consumption from expectations, while fully
accounting for GDP-linked debt’s intertemporal consumption smoothing effect.
In contrast to standard GDP-linked bonds, we introduce bonds linked to a country’s GDP-
to-debt ratio, referred to as GDR bonds, where interest payments inversely depend on a govern-
ment’s relative indebtedness, i.e., implying counter-cyclical interest rate dynamics with respect
to relative indebtedness. If a country’s relative indebtedness increases, interest payments on
GDR bonds decrease and vice versa. Thanks to GDR bonds’ variable interest rates, negative
shocks in GDP lead to a lower interest burden, relaxing the sovereign’s refinancing pressure.
In addition to imposing state-contingent financing costs, GDR bonds provide a new signaling
device for the issuing government. Even if credit markets have very pessimistic growth projec-
13The second package was followed by a third bailout package signed in 2015.
14Source: Excessive austerity killing Greece, Kathimerini (English edition), September 30, 2012, http://www.
ekathimerini.com/145032/article/ekathimerini/business/excessive-austerity-killing-greece.
15In addition, it allows us to calibrate the model to data from highly indebted Eurozone countries in Section 4.4.
A model based on Collard et al. (2015) could not account for realistic default probabilities given the historically
low GDP growth volatilities.
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Figure 4.2. Timing of debt refinancing with continuous consumption
tions, GDR bonds can still offer competitive risk-return profiles to reluctant investors, assuming
that the issuing government can credibly commit itself to a sufficient deleveraging.16
Figure 4.2 summarizes the timing of our model where the government chooses its borrowing
rate at t0 which then remains fixed until t0 + 1. During the period, a risk-averse consumer
continuously maximizes her utility from publicly financed consumption, conditional on the gov-
ernment’s fixed borrowing policy. At t0 + 1, the government either refinances its debt (and sets
a new borrowing rate) or defaults.
4.3.1 Dynamics - Indebtedness and GDP
The state variable of interest is a sovereign’s annual GDP in relation to its accumulated public
debt.17 More specifically, we assume the following dynamics
dYt = Yt (µY dt+ σY dBt) , (4.14)
where Yt denotes the country’s rolling annual GDP and Bt a standard Brownian motion. In
addition, we model the dynamics of sovereign debt as
dDt = DtµDdt, (4.15)
where Dt corresponds to government date-t debt. Since we are considering a short-term decision
problem (one-period borrowing under the risk of default), we consider it sensible to model the
sovereign’s real GDP growth rate µY and GDP volatility σY to be exogenous and constant over
the considered time period. The proposed dynamics are consistent with Collard et al. (2015),
who assume log-normally distributed growth rates. At the beginning of the period, i.e., at t0, a
country’s government chooses its borrowing rate µD subject to its budget constraint.
We assume a country’s short-term wealth Wt disposable for consumption to be additive in
16In case of irreconcilable limited commitment concerns of potential investors, equipping the GDR bonds with
a puttable component could foster the enforceability of initial deleveraging commitments. See also Section 4.5.
17This is in analogy to the third criterion of the euro convergence criteria (also known as the Maastricht
criteria) which were established in 1992.
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Yt and Dt,18 i.e.,
dWt := (1− α) dYt + (µD −R)Dtdt− ctdt, Wt0 := (1− α)Yt0 +Dt0 . (4.16)
Here, ct denotes the risk-averse consumer’s continuous consumption and, as in Section 4.2, α
indicates the country’s primary surplus. Interest payments on government debt are given by
RDt, where R denotes the risk-adjusted interest rate, which is assumed constant over one period.
Note that, in contrast to Section 4.2, R is now exogenous.
Under puttable government debt as described in Section 4.2, investors possess the option
to put their bonds in case the country’s debt-to-GDP level exceeds a certain threshold, i.e., if
the country defaults. This credit insurance is provided by an intergovernmental agency which,
in return, is compensated with the corresponding insurance premium (payable ex-ante). As a
result, the issuing government only pays the risk-free interest on its debt but has to pay a fixed
fee to the insurance guarantor at issuance. The budget constraint then reads
dWt := (1− α) dYt + (µD − r)Dtdt− ctdt, Wt0 := (1− α)Yt0 +Dt0 − pt0 , (4.17)
where r denotes the constant risk-free interest rate and pt0 corresponds to the put price at
t0, i.e., the ex-ante payable insurance premium, which lowers the initial wealth available for
consumption.
The put price corresponds to the discounted value of the issued government debt multi-
plied by the probability of default. Assuming the insurance guarantor to be risk-neutral, the
corresponding discount rate equals the risk-free rate.19 The put price is then given by
pt0 = e−rDt0P
(
Dt0+1 − (Wt0+1 −Wt0)
Yt0+1
− Dt0
Yt0
> 0
)
, (4.18)
where we impose, consistent with Section 4.2, zero recovery in default. For simplification, we as-
sume that the country defaults whenever sovereign debt minus the change in disposable wealth
relative to GDP is larger than the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. However, this somewhat strict
default condition only has a small level effect and does not change our qualitative results. More-
over, in Section 4.4, we calibrate default costs such that the thereby induced default probability
under the optimal borrowing rate is consistent with credit-rating-implied default risk. Since the
debt-to-GDP ratio itself neglects changes in Wt between t0 and t0 + 1, we have to account for
potential differences in disposable wealth due to the consumer’s actual consumption. If she over-
consumes, i.e., if she consumes more than production growth and public borrowing allows for,
disposable wealth is reduced, which in turn increases the probability of sovereign default. We
18As in Section 4.2, we deliberately abstract from consumption financed by issuing private debt.
19Note that, in order to compute the put price, we consider that the government needs to pay the ex-ante
risk-adjusted interest rate on its debt and neglect a lower interest rate’s decreasing effect on the ex-post default
probability. This is consistent with condition C2 in Section 4.2. Consequently, our estimated put price reflects
a conservatively high estimate, as issuing puttable debt arguably reduces the chance that the put is exercised.
Hence, a lower put price could possibly be negotiated, unless the intergovernmental agency has full bargaining
power.
Chapter 4 173
implicitly assume that all produced goods need to be consumed within one period and cannot
be stored for later times.20
4.3.2 Government Borrowing with GDR Bonds and Default Costs
The government chooses its optimal borrowing rate subject to maximizing expected utility from
consumption of its risk-averse consumer, while simultaneously accounting for default risk. We
solve the government’s optimization problem by backward induction. First, following Merton’s
(1969) lifetime portfolio allocation approach, we determine the consumer’s optimal consumption
over time for a given constant borrowing rate µD set by the government. We model the risk-
averse consumer as a representative agent with CRRA-utility. Given the borrowing rate µD,
our representative agent chooses her optimal consumption plan c?t over a finite horizon, i.e.,
∀t ∈ (t0, t0 + 1), subject to her budget constraint. While doing so, she may consume more or
less aggressively, depending on her time preference as well as the relative value she assigns to
her end of period wealth. In addition, we assume that the representative agent, in contrast to
the government, does not incorporate any default costs into her consumption decisions.
Let the dynamics of short-term wealth Wt disposable for consumption under GDR bonds be
dWt := (1− α) dYt +
(
µDdt− d (Yt/Dt)
Yt/Dt
)
Dt − ctdt, Wt0 := (1− α)Yt0 +Dt0 , (4.19)
where d (Yt/Dt) / (Yt/Dt) reflects the interest payments on GDR bonds, indicating the link
between interest rates and relative indebtedness. The interest payments are increasing in changes
in Yt and decreasing in Dt. Note that our approach connects interest payments to the inverse
of relative indebtedness, whereas only the borrowing rate can be set by the government.
We require the representative agent’s budget constraint to be of multiplicative form of dis-
posable wealth in order to ensure a closed-form solution to her optimal consumption prob-
lem. Therefore, we rewrite the budget constraint by substituting Eq. (4.14) and Eq. (4.15) in
Eq. (4.19) as
dWt = ((1− α)Yt −Dt) (µY dt+ σY dBt) + 2µDDtdt− ctdt,
and restate
dW˜t = W˜t (µY dt+ σY dBt)− c˜tdt, W˜t0 := (1− α)Yt0 −Dt0 , (4.20)
where W˜t denotes the adjusted disposable wealth and c˜t := ct−2µDDt adjusted consumption.21
We apply dynamic programming (see, e.g., Merton (1969)) to solve for the CRRA-representative
agent’s optimal consumption path
c˜?t = arg max
c˜t
E
[∫ t0+1
t0
u(c˜s, s)ds + u¯(W˜t0+1, t0 + 1)
]
, (4.21)
20In addition, we neglect investments which Gali et al. (2007) have shown to remain unaffected by a shock in
government spending.
21Under standard as well as puttable debt, the necessary restatement of the corresponding budget constraints
in Eq. (4.16) and Eq. (4.17) is achieved by setting W˜t0 := (1 − α)Yt0 and c˜t := ct − (µD − R)Dt. The resulting
(restated) budget constraint is equal to Eq. (4.20).
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subject to the budget constraint in Eq. (4.20). It follows from CRRA-preferences that
u(c˜t, W˜t) = e−ρt
c˜1−γt
1− γ ,
and utility of bequest
u¯(W˜t0+1, t0 + 1) = e−ρ(t+1)I(t0 + 1)
W˜ 1−γt0+1
1− γ ,
for time preference ρ ≥ 0 and risk aversion γ > 0, where I(t0 + 1) denotes the relative weight
the consumer assigns to her end of period wealth.
Lemma 4.3. The solution to the dynamic programming problem in Eq. (4.21) subject to the
budget constraint in Eq. (4.20) is given by the optimal consumption plan
c˜?t =
W˜t
1
φ + e−φ(t0+1−t)
(
I(t0 + 1)
1
γ − 1φ
) , (4.22)
where
φ = 1
γ
(
ρ− (1− γ)
(
µY − γσ
2
Y
2
))
.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A4.
Finally, substituting c˜t := ct− 2µDDt into Eq. (4.22) yields the consumer’s effective optimal
consumption plan
c?t =
W˜t
1
φ + e−φ(t0+1−t)
(
I(t0 + 1)
1
γ − 1φ
) + 2DtµD.
The variable ct reflects the consumer’s excess consumption and might take on negative values.
In order to derive the utility of consumption, we add a base consumption level c¯, assumed to
be fixed in the short term (over one period). Adding c¯ ensures that utility is derived from total
consumption which itself is positive.
Second, having computed the optimal consumption path of the representative agent, we
solve the government’s optimization problem in terms of its optimal borrowing decision. The
government aims to pick the optimal borrowing rate µ?D that maximizes the expected utility of
its risk-averse consumer while accounting for possible default costs.22
Once the government has chosen the optimal borrowing rate at t0, the same cannot be
changed until t0 + 1. Hence, the government chooses µ?D such that
µ?D = arg max
µD
Ut (µD)
= arg max
µD
E
[∫ t0+1
t0
u(c?s + c¯, s)ds + u¯(Wt0+1, t0 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility of consumption and bequest
− e−ρΨ1{η>Dt0/Yt0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted costs of default
]
, (4.23)
22Similar to Müller et al. (2016), we also model welfare to be additively separable in the utility of consumption
and a linear default costs component.
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where
η = Dt0+1 − (Wt0+1 −Wt0)
Yt0+1
.
In Eq. (4.23), c?s denotes the representative agent’s optimal time-dependent excess consumption
at time s. Wt0+1 reflects the wealth at the end of the period as computed by Wt0+1 = Wt0 +∫ t0+1
t0
dW˜s. The last term in Eq. (4.23) corresponds to a risk-neutral government’s expected
default costs discounted to time t0, imposing equal time preferences as for the representative
consumer.
Proposition 4.2. If expected default costs under GDR bonds are sufficiently high to incentivize
the government to choose a bounded µ?D, then this µ?D is unique.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A4.
In summary, when choosing its optimal borrowing rate, a heavily indebted government needs
to optimally trade off higher accumulated consumption versus an increasing probability of de-
fault. GDR bonds might provide more space to reduce sovereign borrowing, while not too
severely limiting consumption. Therefore, GDR bonds could potentially allow for more sustain-
able deleveraging policies.
4.3.3 Comparative Statics
The comparative statics analysis of the above refinancing instruments requires an analogous
result as in Proposition 4.2 but for standard and puttable debt.
Corollary 4.1. If expected default costs under standard debt and puttable debt are sufficiently
high to incentivize the government to choose a bounded µ?D, then this µ?D is unique.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A4.
Figure 4.3 presents the comparative statics of a government’s optimal borrowing rate µ?D
under standard sovereign debt, puttable debt, and GDR bonds.23 Similarly, Figure 4.4 displays
the comparative statics of the corresponding default probabilities given the government’s optimal
borrowing rate µ?D. By referring to the various plots in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, we are able
to make several interesting statements regarding the sensitivity of µ?D and the implied default
probability with respect to changes of model parameters:
23Theoretically, by applying the implicit function theorem, one can derive the sensitivity of the optimal borrow-
ing rate with respect to model parameters. However, since the optimal borrowing rate depends on intertemporal
utility of consumption, we cannot compute closed-form solutions as, to the best of our knowledge, its integral over
time can only be solved numerically. This prevents us from applying the implicit function theorem with respect
to most parameters. There is one important exception: We can compute the sensitivity of the optimal borrowing
rate with respect to default costs under all three refinancing instruments, as they only influence the expected
default costs but not intertemporal consumption. We find that ∂µ?D/∂ψ < 0 ∀ψ ∈ R+. Derivations are available
on request.
176 Indebtedness, Interests, and Incentives: State-contingent Sovereign Debt Revisited
-0.04 0 0.04
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.8 1 1.2
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 0.045 0.09
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
-0.45
-0.3
-0.15
0
0.15
0.4 0.65 0.9
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 0.5 1
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 0.1 0.2
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Figure 4.3. Comparative statics of the optimal borrowing rate
Notes: This figure shows the government’s optimal borrowing rate µ?D under the three
refinancing instruments, i.e., standard sovereign debt (solid, circles), puttable debt (dotted,
crosses), and GDR bonds (dashed, asterisks), with respect to model parameters. Initial
values: µY = 0.02, σY = 0.03, Y0 = 1, D0 = 0.95, α = 0.03, ρ = 0.03, γ = 0.5, I(t0 + 1) =
10, Ψ = 0.1. Note that, for GDP volatility, µ?D under puttable bonds is depicted on the
right axis.
1. Unsurprisingly, the optimal borrowing rate is increasing in GDP growth. This is intuitive
since a higher GDP growth rate allows to accelerate debt-financed consumption without
increasing relative indebtedness. Thanks to lower interest expenses under low growth,
relying on GDR bonds enables the government to borrow more than under standard or
puttable debt without increasing the implied default probability. Regardless of the level
of µY , the probability of default remains very low under standard debt and GDR bonds,
and close to zero under puttable debt. A change in the GDP growth rate has a negligible
impact on the default probability under all three refinancing instruments.
2. The uncertainty of future GDP growth and the optimal borrowing rate under standard and
GDR bonds feature a U-shaped relationship. For very low levels of σY , i.e., in an almost
deterministic model, we observe an optimal borrowing rate that induces the debt-to-GDP
ratio to approach but not to cross the default threshold. However, once the growth shocks
become non-negligible, the government’s optimal borrowing rate decreases significantly.
In order to prevent the risk of large enough negative shocks that could trigger default,
it is optimal to preemptively smooth out the potential destabilizing effects on relative
indebtedness by borrowing less. However, GDR bonds’ variable interest rates alleviate the
risk of such shocks, thereby lowering the government’s need to further reduce borrowing.
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Figure 4.4. Comparative statics of the probability of default given optimal
borrowing
Notes: This figure shows the government’s probability of default given given the optimal
borrowing rate µ?D under the three refinancing instruments, i.e., standard sovereign debt
(solid, circles), puttable debt (dotted, crosses), and GDR bonds (dashed, asterisks), with
respect to model parameters. Initial values: µY = 0.02, σY = 0.03, Y0 = 1, D0 = 0.95,
α = 0.03, ρ = 0.03, γ = 0.5, I(t0 + 1) = 10, Ψ = 0.1.
Once GDP volatility exceeds a certain level, the risk that the country ends up in default
starts to increase significantly. If the government wanted to further limit the probability
of default, massive and costly (in terms of foregone consumption) cuts in the optimal
borrowing rate were needed. As a result, the government’s optimal borrowing level starts
increasing again when the chance to enter default becomes substantial (i.e., more than
> 20% for the given parameters). Under puttable debt, the optimal borrowing rate is
decreasing in growth volatility since higher uncertainty leads to a higher payable put
price. As a result, the government chooses a very low borrowing rate in order to sustain
a tiny default probability, thereby minimizing its insurance costs.
3. Regardless of the refinancing instrument, the implied optimal borrowing rate is decreasing
in the imposed default costs. The higher these costs, the higher are the incentives not to
enter default. As a consequence, the government borrows less if the costs of default are
high. Similarly, the probability of default is decreasing in the associated costs, hence the
country minimizes its default risk once the corresponding costs are substantial enough.
4. The initial debt-to-GDP ratio’s effect on optimal borrowing is slightly positive. The higher
this ratio, the smaller is the impact of a negative growth shock. As a consequence, the
government can marginally increase borrowing as the default risk becomes less sensitive
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to growth uncertainty. In addition, the marginal return on borrowing is increasing in the
initial debt level, which motivates, ceteris paribus, higher borrowing costs. Both effects
seem counterproductive, as countries with higher indebtedness borrow more. However,
the first effect is only due to our simplified definition of sovereign default. Moreover, the
optimal borrowing rate is negative for all levels of the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. The
relative indebtedness is hence even decreasing for high levels of debt, just at a slower pace.
The effect of the initial debt-to-GDP ratio on the probability of default is tiny.
5. The consumer’s risk aversion inversely affects the optimal borrowing rate. If less risk
averse, she prefers higher (debt-financed) consumption today at the cost of a higher default
probability tomorrow. For a strongly risk-averse consumer, by contrast, the government
decreases its borrowing rate in order to reduce the implied default risk. Puttable debt’s
inherent insurance mechanism as well as GDR bonds’ interst rate structure both alleviate
the optimal borrowing rate’s sensitivity to the consumer’s risk aversion.
6. Under standard sovereign debt, the optimal borrowing rate is slightly increasing in the
interest rate. The higher the interest payments, the more does the government need to
borrow in order to maintain consumption. Under puttable debt, the government pays the
risk-free rate on its bonds. Hence, R only affects the value of the put as we assume that
the government has to compensate the insurance guarantor for its initial default risk (see
Section 4.2), thereby conservatively neglecting a lower interest rate’s decreasing effect on
the ex-post default probability. However, the effect of the interest rate on the government’s
optimal borrowing rate under puttable debt is negligible.24
In summary, we find two persistent patterns across all parameter variations. First, optimal
borrowing is highest under GDR and lowest under puttable bonds. GDR bonds allow the
government to borrow more without substantially increasing its default probability compared
to standard debt, thereby making the deleveraging committment more feasible. Under puttable
debt, by contrast, the government extends its deleveraging effort in order to reduce the imposed
insurance costs. Second, we observe the default probability to be almost equal for standard
and GDR bonds but substantially lower for puttable bonds. This indicates that the latter’s
ex-ante payable insurance premium incentivizes the government to choose very low borrowing
rates which in turn almost completely eliminate its default risk. Specifically, the reduction in
borrowing further amplifies the default probability decreasing effect of puttable bonds’ per se
lower interest rates.
4.4 Case Study: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain
We now investigate GDR bonds’ potential virtue of mitigating the risk of swelling refinancing
costs in the presence of high indebtedness by analyzing the cases of Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
24Similarly, the effect of the consumer’s time-preference is rather weak and only plays a minor role in determin-
ing µ?D and the corresponding default probability. Marginally, the lower the consumer’s patience, i.e., the higher
ρ, the more she wants to consume today, leaving the government to prefer a higher optimal borrowing rate.
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Greece and Spain at the time of the OMT announcement on July 26, 2012. We base our
analysis on a comparison of the model predicted effectiveness of the following three refinancing
instruments: (i) the status quo with standard debt, (ii) puttable (risk-free) debt in return for an
ex-ante insurance premium in the spirit of Section 4.2, and (iii) GDR bonds as introduced in Sec-
tion 4.3. Like in Section 4.3, we analyze those three refinancing instruments in an environment
with continuous consumption and existing default costs.
In 2010, under the status quo, highly indebted Eurozone countries raised concerns regarding
sovereign default after having reportedly been targeted by speculative attacks on their bond
yields.25 Such attacks, that ultimately resulted in an upwards shift of the country’s perceived
default risk, lead to higher demanded yields, which ultimately increase—likely amplified by the
currency union’s internal flight-to-safety—its actual default probability. Indeed, the empirical
evidence of De Grauwe and Ji (2012) suggests a significant effect of negative market sentiments
on the spreads of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In particular, the sovereign bond yields of
Portugal, Ireland, and Greece soared to unprecedented levels due to fears of imminent sovereign
default. By the end of 2011, as shown in Figure 4.5, long-term bond yields had climbed to
13.08% for Portugal, 8.70% for Ireland, and even 21.14% for Greece, respectively.26 At these
levels, refinancing became very expensive, which finally led the ECB to announce its OMT
program in the summer of 2012.
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the calibrated parameters for the five countries.27 Since
there is a monotone one-to-one relation between a country’s optimal borrowing rate and its
default costs (see Footnote 23), we calibrate the latter such that its respective default probability
under the status quo is equal to one implied by its actual sovereign credit rating prior to the
OMT announcement. We therefore borrow Moody’s historical default probabilities, implying a
default probability of 1.9% for a Baa rating (Italy and Spain), 6.3% for a Ba rating (Portugal
and Ireland), and 33.3% for a C rating (Greece), respectively.28 Unfortunately, historical default
probabilities are not available for subgroups. For instance, we cannot distinguish between the
default probabilities of Portugal (Ba3) and Ireland (Ba1). Clearly, Portugal’s higher interest
rate (10.2% versus 5.2%) indicates a higher default probability.29 Except for Greece, we use
4-year generic government bond yields in order to be in line with Collard et al. (2015), who rely
on an average duration of sovereign debt equal to four years. For Greece, due to limited data
25As highlighted by both the IMF (source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012, http:
//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/) and the ECB (source: Draghi, M., ECB press conference,
September 6, 2012, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html).
26Despite the rise in yields, the governments of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain increased sovereign
borrowing over the same time period, indicating that higher refinancing costs force countries to borrow more in
order to finance consumption (source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/government-finance-
statistics/statistics-illustrated).
27Our results are robust to changes in the standard values of parameters ρ, γ, and I(t0 + 1).
28Source: Moody’s, Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-2008, March 2009, https://www.moodys.com/
sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007400000587968.pdf.
29We additionally analyze the three refinancing instruments’ effectiveness for probabilities of default as implied
by traded CDS-spreads and find similar results.
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Figure 4.5. 10-year yields on selected government bonds.
Notes: This figure shows 10-year yields on government bonds for Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, and Spain based on ECB data.
availability, we rely on its 10-year government bond yield.
We set I(t0 + 1) = 7, as we find this level to provide sufficient incentives to save a significant
part of disposable wealth for future periods. Given this weight on the consumer’s end of period
wealth, the expected disposable wealth is slightly increasing (on average 0.04% under the status
quo). In addition, a comparative statics analysis with respect to I(t0 + 1) reveals that the
sensitivity of the optimal borrowing rate to changes in the former is very small and negligible
for levels of I(t0 + 1) around seven. This is desirable as we do not want this parameter choice
to influence our results with respect to the optimal borrowing policies.
In addition, under (iii) GDR bonds, we need to ensure that the initial value W˜t0 is non-
negative. A negative initial value of the process W˜t would imply that higher GDP growth and
more borrowing decrease disposable wealth for consumption. As a consequence, we limit GDR
debt issuance to the maximum value such that W˜t0 is nonnegative.
In order to test the three different sovereign borrowing policies for different GDP growth
realizations, we introduce a scenario analysis with respect to the realizations of µY . We consider
three realizations of the GDP growth rate: (i) the best out of the 5% worst realizations of µY ,
i.e., the fifth historical percentile,30 (ii) zero-growth, and (iii) the historical average growth rate.
We then compare overall utility of the three refinancing instruments under these three scenarios.
30We again assume a normally distributed growth rate, implying the fifth percentile to equal µY − 1.645σY ,
where µY and σY denote the historical average GDP growth rate and volatility based on yearly OECD data
(http://stats.oecd.org).
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Table 4.3. Parameters
Parameter Variable Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain
GDP growth µY 2.29% 3.35% 1.68% 1.57% 2.01%
GDP volatility σY 3.46% 3.50% 2.31% 3.68% 2.23%
Debt-to-GDP ratio D0/Y0 102.41% 110.55% 108.35% 111.11% 61.83%
Interest rate R 10.22% 5.19% 5.85% 27.82% 6.95%
MPS α 0.23% 6.74% 6.51% 4.37% 4.01%
Consumption c¯ 65.82% 45.57% 61.51% 69.88% 57.82%
Risk aversion γ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Time preference ρ 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
Default costs Ψ 0.13 0.21 0.42 0.02 0.28
Risk free rate r 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30%
Notes: This table presents the calibrated parameters for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece,
and Spain. We use yearly OECD (http://stats.oecd.org) GDP data for the years 1970-2011
to compute µY and σY . D0/Y0 corresponds to relative indebtedness as of the end of 2011
and is based on World Bank data (http://data.worldbank.org). We use yield data of 4-
year generic government bonds per July 26, 2012 from Bloomberg for all countries except
Greece. As there is no data on traded government bonds with maturity less than ten years
for Greece at that time, we use 10-year government bond yields provided by the Bank of
Greece (http://www.bankofgreece.gr). MPS corresponds to the maximum primary surplus
based on OECD data. Consumption denotes national consumption in the year 2011 based
on World Bank data. Standard values are assumed for γ and ρ. Default costs are set
such that the default probability under the status quo and historical GDP growth matches
the sovereign default probability according to Moody’s credit rating at the time of OMT
announcement. The continuously compounded yield on a German 4-year government bond
as of July 26, 2012 serves as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate r.
Figure 4.6 displays the resulting differences in utility for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and
Spain.
We find that, across growth scenarios, switching from standard to puttable debt leads to
welfare improvements. The savings from lower interest payments more than compensate the
government for its ex-ante insurance payment. Due to countries’ low borrowing rates, the value
of the put option is relatively low considering prevailing interest rate levels, ranging from 0.18%
(Spain) to 0.76% (Ireland) of GDP. The effect of the three different GDP growth scenarios on
the insurance premium is small. In addition, default probabilities under puttable debt (0.48% on
average) are substantially lower than under the status quo (11.05%). This finding is consistent
with the result from Section 4.2, i.e., that, under the presence of default costs, puttable debt’s
default risk mitigation is welfare improving. Only Ireland, due to its comparably low interest
rate, does not experience a substantial utility increase when issuing puttable bonds.
Moreover, Figure 4.6 highlights that GDR bonds consistently outperform puttable bonds.
The welfare improvements induced by the former are especially pronounced for the case of zero
or negative GDP growth, where GDR bonds imply significantly lower interest payments. Thus,
contrary to puttable debt’s simple insurance mechanism, GDR bonds’ state-contingent interest
charges allow the risk-averse consumer to considerably smooth her within-period consumption
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Figure 4.6. Utility comparison between puttable and normal bonds (left) as
well as GDR and puttable bonds (right)
Notes: The left-hand side plot provides the relative utility differences between puttable and
standard debt. The right-hand side plot displays relative utility differences between GDR
bonds and puttable debt.
path, without increasing associated default risks too heavily. On average, optimal borrowing
rates are approximately twice as low under standard debt than under GDR bonds, and even
two times lower for puttable relative to standard debt. In summary, the data-implied default
costs are not high enough such that puttable debt’s reduction in default risk would keep up with
GDR bonds’ capability to smooth consumption.
If one instead considers more pessimistic (risk-neutral) default probabilities implied by his-
torical CDS spreads, the price of puttable debt’s embedded put option becomes larger. This
can change the relation between puttable and standard debt: As the ex-ante payable insurance
premium increases, wealth disposable for consumption is reduced, making standard debt rela-
tively more attractive. However, GDR bonds are still outperforming both normal and puttable
bonds, leaving the above results robust to changes in the calibration of default probabilities.31
To sum up, it hardly depends on the realization of the GDP growth rates which instrument
is most beneficial. We find the status quo with standard debt to be inferior to puttable debt.
Furthermore, GDR bonds which are inversely linked to relative indebtedness, provide even higher
31On average, imposing CDS-implied default probabilities, i.e., lowering Ψ, increases utility under normal and
GDR bonds by 0.13% and under puttable bonds by 0.01%. As a consequence, puttable bonds are relatively less
attractive under CDS-implied default probabilities. This discrepancy to Section 4.2 arises due to the significantly
lower default costs and the high weight on the consumer’s reduced utility of bequest, which is absent in Section 4.2’s
analysis of puttable debt. More importantly, under lower values of Ψ, GDR bonds still allow for higher utility
levels relative to normal and puttable debt.
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Figure 4.7. Optimal borrowing rate (left) and default probability (right) under
GDR bonds
Notes: The left-hand side plot shows the optimal borrowing rate of Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, and Spain under GDR bonds. The right-hand side plot displays the respective
probabilities of sovereign default.
utility than the issuance of puttable debt. Retrospectively, issuing GDR bonds might have been
an expedient refinancing alternative for the herein considered countries.
Having selected our preferred refinancing instrument, we plot the optimal borrowing rates
under GDR bonds as well as the corresponding default probabilities for the three GDP growth
scenarios in Figure 4.7. We find the optimal borrowing rates to lie between −10.90% (Spain with
µY = −1.66%) and −1.07% (Greece with µY = 1.57%). Hence, GDR bonds’ incentive structure
appears sufficient in inducing the issuing government to choose a deleveraging borrowing rate.
Figure 4.7 shows that neither the absolute level of the probability of default nor the order of the
five countries depend on the GDP growth rate.
Finally, we compute the Sharpe ratio of GDR bonds in order to evaluate their potential
attractiveness to risk-averse investors. The respective Sharpe ratios equal (µY − µ?D − rf ) /σY ,
where µY − µ?D reflects GDR bonds’ expected interest rate. If the Sharpe ratio of such an
investment instrument was below a minimum threshold, investors would not be willing to pro-
vide funds, as their expected compensation would be too small given the associated risk level.
Table 4.4 presents the computed Sharpe ratios for the three growth scenarios considered above.
Overall, the Sharpe ratios are high, i.e., between 0.61 and 4.09. Regardless of the realization
of the GDP growth rate, GDR bonds appear to be an attractive investment instrument, since
the optimal borrowing rates are always negative. In sharp contrast to standard GDP-indexed
bonds, GDR bonds’ Sharpe ratios remain competitive even for negative growth rates.
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Table 4.4. Sharpe ratios under GDR bonds: Scenario analysis
Negative GDP growth Zero GDP growth Positive GDP growth
Portugal 1.48 1.50 1.51
Ireland 1.42 1.48 1.51
Italy 2.03 1.99 1.99
Greece 0.61 0.68 0.68
Spain 4.09 3.70 3.14
Notes: This table displays the Sharpe ratios of GDR bonds as computed by SR = (µY −
µ?D−rf )/σY , where µ?D reflects the optimal borrowing rate of the government. The negative
GDP growth scenario features the best out of the 5% worst historical realizations of µY ,
i.e., the fifth historical percentile, zero GDP growth implies µY = 0, and positive GDP
growth corresponds to the historical average growth rate. We use yearly GDP growth and
volatility data from the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org).
However, if governments possibly deviated from their initial optimal borrowing rate after
having issued GDR bonds, their actual risk-return profile could deteriorate.32 If markets deem
this risk unacceptable, establishing an intergovernmental agency as counterparty (writer) of
GDR embedded put options could foster the credibility of initially proclaimed deleveraging
intentions. Buying such a put option would give hesitant investors the right to hand over their
GDR bonds to the option writer for a fixed amount, in case prices fell sharply due to a too high
µD. Hence, the put option would insure investors against overborrowing by the GDR bonds
issuing government.
In addition, the put premium would fairly compensate the option writing counterparty for
guaranteeing credit insurance. Importantly, the latter nevertheless had to maintain the enforce-
ability of Ψ upon option exercise. The case of Greece provides indicative evidence that such
intergovernmental institutions, i.e., the European Commission, Eurogroup, ECB, and IMF, in-
deed possess enough power to conditionally force Eurozone debtor countries to massive cuts in
fiscal spending. In Section 4.5 below, potential risks associated with the implementation of GDR
bonds are addressed more generally.
4.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In summary, our analysis indicates considerable virtues of GDR over puttable bonds in terms
of welfare improvements. Naturally, the introduction of a novel financial contract such as GDR
bonds brings about many new factors, which all need to be considered in detail. In this final
section, we address the most apparent points. We argue that—albeit justified—they can be
dealt with in reasonable manner.
32This, in fact, could happen if Ψ decreases or if default costs are not enforceable (see discussion in Section 4.5).
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Risk of Limited Commitment
Given the inverse relation between interests paid on GDR bonds and a country’s current GDP-
to-debt ratio, a natural concern is that issuing governments simply keep on increasing their debt
to lower payable interests on outstanding GDRs. From an ex-ante perspective, this is no problem
since investors are only willing to purchase GDRs, if the government can credibly commit itself
to a deleveraging borrowing rate. Ex-post, however, a limited commitment problem due to a
lack of enforceability may arise.
The enforceability of non-positive borrowing rates could, e.g., be achieved by contractually
forbidding the issuing government to auction any non-authorized debt during the GDRs’ lifetime.
For this purpose, an intergovernmental organization would have to be established, similar to,
e.g., the former European Troika (recently renamed as ‘European Quadriga’), who enforces
compliance with such contractual agreements. To be itself credible, it needs to be empowered
to impose sanctions, e.g., predefined coercive measures, in case of contravention.
Alternatively, similar to puttable debt, GDR bonds could be complemented by an embedded
put option. Whenever the government’s GDP-to-debt ratio at GDRs’ maturity falls below a
certain threshold, investors could put their bonds with the above mentioned organization and
receive a fixed payment in return. In case their GDR bonds get put, sanctions are imposed on
the issuing government. Note that, contrary to puttable debt discussed above, the writer of
the embedded put option would be compensated with the insurance premium paid by investors
instead of the issuing government.
Growth Risk
By construction, returns to GDR bonds are pro-cyclical, i.e., if growth rates are positive (neg-
ative), interests increase (decrease). Hence, similar to GDP-linked bonds (see Blanchard et al.
(2016)), GDRs represent so-called ‘high beta’ instruments, for which investors demand higher
expected returns per unit of risk.
In light of the above calibrated Sharpe ratios, we argue that GDRs easily exceed the necessary
return-for-risk profile usually demanded by investors for ‘high beta’ securities. Particularly,
GDRs’ Sharpe ratios are generally high due to the relatively low levels of growth volatility.
Moreover, growth rates are only imperfectly correlated across countries. Hence, making GDRs
available to a widely dispersed foreign investor base further reduces country-specific growth risks
borne by investors.
Novelty and Liquidity Risk
Newly introduced GDR bonds would entail substantial novelty and liquidity risks. Historically,
GDP-linked bonds have been mainly issued by developing countries, often during debt restruc-
turing. In the context of the potential isssuers we have in mind, Blanchard et al. (2016) conclude:
“With relatively strong institutions and an independent statistical agency, advanced economies
are in a better position to give confidence to investors that data on economic growth will remain
untampered and reliable.” (Blanchard et al., 2016, p.3)
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The absence of a reasonably liquid secondary market usually complicates the introduction
of novel financial securities, such as GDP-linked bonds (Barr et al. (2014)). A minimum scale
and sufficient standardization would therefore facilitate the successful implementation of GDRs.
The Sharpe ratios calibrated for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain firmly appear high
enough to compensate for GDRs’ potential novelty and liquidity risks. In case of unexpectedly
high initial liquidity concerns and novelty aversion, making GDRs puttable, as discussed above,
jointly decreases both types of risks.
In conclusion, we believe GDP-to-debt-index bonds to constitute a promising alternative for
managing the risk of future spikes in government yields for highly indebted Eurozone countries,
of whom there still are many. If implemented appropriately, they could be an effective state-
contingent debt instrument, temporary mitigating refinancing pressure and smoothing private
consumption, thereby creating space and time for a less painful, but more sustainable sovereign
deleveraging.
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A4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We start from Eq. (4.12), rearranging yields
βM
(
piL
α+ βM1+rL
+ piH
α+ βM1+rH
)
= (1 + µg + σg)
2
8σg
⇔
β2M (E[1 + r]) + βM (α(1 + rL)(1 + rH))
β2M + βMα(2 + rL + rH) + α2(1 + rL)(1 + rH)
= (1 + µg + σg)
2
8σg
,
which leads us to the following quadratic equation
β2M
(
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σg
− E[1 + r]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A
+βM
(
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σg
α(2 + rL + rH)− α(1 + rL)(1 + rH)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:B
+ (1 + µg + σg)
2
8σg
α2(1 + rL)(1 + rH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:C
= 0. (A4.1)
Whenever A ≥ 0, it must be that
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σg
≥ E[1 + r] ≥ 1,
where the second inequality holds since 0 ≤ r < 1. Hence, A ≥ 0 directly implies B > 0.
However, if both A andB are nonnegative, there exists no nonnegative solution βM to Eq. (A4.1).
A nonnegative βM therefore requires that A < 0, i.e.,
E[1 + r] > (1 + µg + σg)
2
8σg
,
and because C ≥ 0, the maximum βM is given by
βM =
−B −√B2 − 4AC
2A > 0.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We prove Lemma 4.2 in two steps. First, we compute the date-t put option
value. A standard European put option with strike price x, underlying S, and maturity t + 1
yields the following payoff at expiration
max (x− St+1, 0).
In the context of puttable bonds, this payoff can be written as
max (bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt − αYt+1, 0) .
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In the following, we denote by g the growth-rate threshold below which the put option yields
a positive payoff at maturity, i.e., the minimum growth rate necessary to prevent government
default:
bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt = (α+ bM (t+ 1))Ytg ⇔ bM (t)(1 +RH)
α+ bM (t+ 1)
= g(rt+1).
Since g is state-dependent, we write it as a function of rt+1. Given risk-neutrality and that
rt = rH , the date-t put price then equals
δ
(
P
(
g < g(rt+1)
)
× Et
[
bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt − αYt+1|g < g(rt+1)
])
=
1
1 + rH
(
piL
g(rL)− 1− µg + σg
2σg
×
(
bM (t)(1 +RH)− α
1 + µg − σg + g(rL)
2
)
Yt +
piH
g(rH)− 1− µg + σg
2σg
×
(
bM (t)(1 +RH)− α
1 + µg − σg + g(rH)
2
)
Yt
)
, (A4.2)
where the conditional expectation can be calculated in closed form by relying on the uniform dis-
tribution of g. Recalling the assumption of zero recovery in default from Section 4.2, Eq. (A4.2)
finally implies
pt =
1
1 + rH
(
piL
g(rL)− 1− µg + σg
2σg
+ piH
g(rH)− 1− µg + σg
2σg
)
× bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt. (A4.3)
Second, we show that the government is indeed indifferent between issuing normal and
puttable debt, i.e., that the following equation holds:
pt = δ︸︷︷︸
= 11+rH
bM (t)(RH − rH)Yt. (A4.4)
Plugging Eq. (A4.3) into Eq. (A4.4) and after some tedious but simple algebra wet get
b(t)(1 + rH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡βM
=
8σ
 piL
α+ βM1+rL
+ piH
α+ βM1+rH
−1 1 + rH
1 +RH
(2σ(RH − rh)
1 +RH
+ 1 + µg − σg
)
.
(A4.5)
Now, Eq. (4.12) implies
RH :=
dM
bM (t)
− 1 = dM
βM/(1 + rH)
− 1 = 4σg(1 + rH)1 + µg + σg − 1. (A4.6)
Plugging Eq. (A4.6) into Eq. (A4.5) and simplifying finally yields
βM =
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σ
(
piL
α+ βM1+rL
+ piH
α+ βM1+rH
) .
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This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. In the absence of puttable bonds, if rt = rH , the government defaults
at t+ 1 whenever
bM (t)(1 +RH)Yt > (α+ bM (t+ 1))Ytgt+1 ⇔ bM (t)(1 +RH)
α+ bM (t+ 1)
> gt+1,
i.e., the probability of default is given by
P|RH := P
(
g <
bM (t)(1 +RH)
α+ bM (t+ 1)
)
.
Given the uniform distribution of g, we get
P|RH =
bM (t)(1+RH)
α+bM (t+1) − (1 + µg − σg)
2σg
. (A4.7)
We have to distinguish between two cases: First, if bM (t)(1+rH)/(α+bM (t+1)) > 1+µg−σg,
Eq. (A4.7) implies that issuing puttable instead of standard debt reduces the default probability
by
P|RH − P|rH = bM (t)(RH − rH)2σg (α+ bM (t+ 1)) .
Second, in the complementary case, i.e., if P|rH = 0, puttable bonds eliminate the whole default
risk imposed by standard bonds. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. In order to solve for optimal consumption, we apply standard dynamic
programing techniques as described in, e.g., Merton (1969). We want to solve for
c˜?t = arg max
c˜t
U(c˜t, W˜t0+1) = arg max
c˜t
E
[∫ t0+1
t0
u(c˜t, t)dt + u¯(W˜t0+1, t0 + 1)
]
subject to the budget constraint
dW˜t = W˜t (µY dt+ σY dBt)− c˜tdt,
where u(c˜t, W˜t) = e−ρtc˜1−γt (1−γ)−1 and u¯(W˜t0+1, t0 + 1) = e−ρ(t0+1)I(t0 + 1)W˜ 1−γt0+1(1−γ)−1 for
ρ ≥ 0 and γ > 0.
The conjectured solution is of the form
J(W˜t, t) = e−ρtI(t)
W˜ 1−γt
1− γ ,
yielding the following Bellman equation
max
ct
J
W˜
(
W˜tµY − c˜t
)
+ Jt +
1
2JW˜W˜ W˜
2
t σ
2
Y + e−ρt
c˜1−γt
1− γ = 0 (A4.8)
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subject to the following boundary condition
J(W˜t0+1, t0 + 1) = e−ρ(t0+1)I(t0 + 1)
W˜ 1−γt0+1
1− γ .
Eq. (A4.8) yields the following first order condition for c˜?t , i.e.,
− J
W˜
+ e−ρt(c˜?t )−γ = 0 ⇔ c˜?t = I(t)−
1
γ W˜t. (A4.9)
Plugging the value function’s partial derivatives together with Eq. (A4.9) into Eq. (A4.8) gives
e−ρtI(t)W˜−γt
(
W˜µY − I(t)−
1
γ W˜t
)
+ e−ρt W˜
1−γ
t
1− γ (I
′(t)− ρI(t)) +
1
2(−γ)e
−ρtI(t)W˜ 1−γt σ2Y + e−ρt
1
1− γ
(
I(t)−
1
γ
)1−γ
W˜ 1−γt = 0,
which can be simplified to the following ODE
I(t)
(
ρ− (1− γ)
(
µY − σ
2
Y γ)
2
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ξ
−γI(t) γ−1γ = I ′(t),
or equivalently
I(t)
1−γ
γ I ′(t) = I(t)
1
γ ξ − γ.
If we set Z(t) := I(t)
1
γ , i.e., Z ′(t) = 1γ I(t)
1−γ
γ I ′(t), hence we get the following ODE
γZ ′(t) = Z(t)ξ − γ ⇔ Z ′(t) = Z(t) ξ
γ︸︷︷︸
=:φ
−1 (A4.10)
with boundary condition Z(t0 + 1) = I(t0 + 1)
1
γ . The corresponding homogenous ODE is
Z ′(t) = Z(t)φ ⇒ Z(t) = eφtC,
where C ∈ R is some integration constant.
We can solve the non-homogenous equation in Eq. (A4.10) by applying the variation of
constants, i.e.,
Z ′(t) = φeφtC(t) + eφtC ′(t). (A4.11)
Plugging Eq. (A4.11) into Eq. (A4.10) yields
φeφtC(t) + eφtC ′(t) = eφtC(t)φ− 1 ⇔ C ′(t) = −e−φt,
which has the solution C(t) = 1φe−φt+C˜, i.e., we get Z(t) =
1
φ+eφtC˜ and recalling the respective
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boundary condition yields
Z(t0 + 1) =
1
φ
+ eφ(t0+1)C˜ = I(t0 + 1)
1
γ ⇔ C˜ =
(
I(t0 + 1)
1
γ − 1
φ
)
e−φ(t0+1).
Hence, we have found Z(t) = 1φ +eφ(t−(t0+1))
(
I(t0 + 1)
1
γ − 1φ
)
, which by the above definition
of Z(t) gives us
I(t) =
( 1
φ
+ eφ(t−(t0+1))
(
I(t0 + 1)
1
γ − 1
φ
))γ
,
and by Eq. (A4.9) we thus finally get
c˜?t =
W˜t
1
φ + e−φ(t0+1−t)
(
I(t0 + 1)
1
γ − 1φ
) ,
where
φ = 1
γ
(
ρ− (1− γ)
(
µY − γσ
2
Y
2
))
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We first note that due to the definition of c˜t in Eq. (4.20), Wt0+1 does
not depend on µD since additional borrowings are immediately consumed by the representative
agent.
For u(·) in Eq. (4.23), we get
∂
∂µD
u(c?s, s) = u(c?s + c¯, s) = e−ρs
2Ds
(c?s + c¯)γ
> 0. (A4.12)
The discounted expected default costs in Eq. (4.20) equal
E
e−ρΨ1{Dt0+1−∆W
Yt0+1
>
Dt0
Yt0
} = e−ρΨP(Dt0+1 −∆W
Yt0+1
>
Dt0
Yt0
)
, (A4.13)
where ∆W := Wt0+1 −Wt0 . Rewriting the probability of default and taking the first partial
derivative with respect to µD yields
∂
∂µD
P
(
Dt0+1 −∆W
Yt0+1
>
Dt0
Yt0
)
= ∂
∂µD
P
(
Yt0+1
Yt0
Dt0
+ ∆W < Dt0eµD
)
= ∂
∂µD
G (Dt0eµD)
= g (Dt0eµD)Dt0eµD ≥ 0, (A4.14)
where G(·) denotes the cdf of Yt0+1 Yt0Dt0 + ∆W , and we have relied on µD ⊥ ∆W .
Let µ?D denote a bounded solution to Eq. (4.20). At µ?D it then has to hold that Eq. (A4.14)
is strictly positive. Thus, for a bounded solution to Eq. (4.20), the strictly positive marginal
utility from higher consumption between t0 and t0 + 1 needs to be offset by the effect of a
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strictly increasing default probability. In addition, we have to ensure that the derivative of the
power utility in Eq. (A4.12) and the part in Eq. (A4.14) can maximally interesect twice (at the
maximum and (local) minimum). For this to hold, Eq. (A4.14) needs to converge faster to zero
than Eq. (A4.12) which is true as Eq. (A4.14) converges exponentially. Hence, there can be only
one interior µ?D. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.2, we note that due to the
definition of c˜t in the restatement of Eq. (4.16) under standard debt, i.e., ct = c˜t − (µD − R),
and Eq. (4.17) under puttable debt, i.e., ct = c˜t− (µD − r), Wt0+1 does not depend on µD since
additional borrowings are immediately consumed by the representative agent.
For u(·) in Eq. (4.23), we get
∂
∂µD
u(c?s + c¯, s) = e−ρs
Ds
(c?s + c¯)γ
> 0. (A4.15)
The discounted expected default costs in Eq. (4.20) are given in Eq. (A4.13) and the first partial
derivative with respect to µD is positive as shown in Eq. (A4.14).
Let µ?D denote a bounded solution to Eq. (4.20). At µ?D it then has to hold that Eq. (A4.14)
is strictly positive. Thus, for a bounded solution to Eq. (4.20), the strictly positive marginal
utility from higher consumption between t0 and t0 + 1 needs to be offset by the effect of a
strictly increasing default probability. In addition, we have to ensure that the derivative of the
power utility in Eq. (A4.15) and the part in Eq. (A4.14) can maximally interesect twice (at the
maximum and (local) minimum). For this to hold, Eq. (A4.14) needs to converge faster to zero
than Eq. (A4.15) which is true as Eq. (A4.14) converges exponentially. Hence, there can be only
one interior µ?D. This completes the proof.
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